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Despite the advances made so far in developing human reliability analysis (HRA) 
methods, many issues still exist. Most notable are; the lack of an explicit causal 
model that incorporates relevant psychological and cognitive theories in its core 
human performance model, inability to explicitly model interdependencies between 
human failure events (HFEs) and influencing factors on human performance, lack of 
consistency, traceability and reproducibility in HRA analysis. These issues amongst 
others have contributed to the variability in results seen in the application of different 
HRA methods and even in cases where the same method is applied by different 
analysts. In an attempt to address these issues, a framework for a model-based HRA 
methodology has been recently proposed which incorporates strong elements of 
current HRA good practices, leverages lessons learned from empirical studies and the 
best features of existing and emerging HRA methods. This research completely 
develops this methodology which is aimed at enabling a more credible, consistent, 
and accurate qualitative and quantitative HRA analysis. The complete qualitative 
analysis procedure (including a hierarchical performance influencing factor set) and a 
  
causal model using Bayesian Belief network (BBN) have been developed to explicitly 
model the influence and dependencies among HFEs and the different factors that 
influence human performance. This model has the flexibility to be modified for 
interfacing with existing methods like Standard-Plant-Analysis-Risk-HRA-method. 
Also, the quantitative analysis procedure has been developed, incorporating a 
methodology for a cause-based explicit treatment of dependencies among HFEs, 
which has not been adequately addressed by any other HRA method. As part of this 
research, information has been gathered from sources (including other HRA methods, 
NPP operating experience, expert estimates), analyzed and aggregated to provide 
estimates for the model parameters needed for quantification. While the specific 
instance of this HRA method is used in nuclear power plants, the methodology itself 
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Humans are present in every aspect of a system and are responsible for its design, 
manufacture, safe operation and maintenance. Hence, their contribution to risk cannot 
be overstated as it is typically in the range of 60% - 90% [1], [2]. This high 
percentage of accidents and incidents involving human error in recent years has 
emphasized the need to study human performance in order to more accurately predict 
and quantify human error. The termination of Three Mile Island (near Harrisburg, 
PA) nuclear power plant’s (NPP) safety injection system by plant crew which led to 
the extensive damage sustained by the reactor core (03/1979) [3], the fatal runway 
overrun accident caused by the pilot and air controller of Comair Flight 191 in 
Lexington, KY (08/2006) [4], the fatal crash of the cruise vessel “Costa Concordia” 
off the Tuscan island of Giglio, Italy due to the Ship master’s error (01/2012) [5] are 
a few of the many examples of accidents caused by human error. 
The means by which human contribution to risk is assessed both qualitatively and 
quantitatively is known as Human reliability analysis (HRA), which is an important 
component of an integrated probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). As a discipline, 
HRA aims to identify, model and quantify human failure events (HFE) in the context 
of an accident scenario. Presently, dozens of HRA methods that can be used exist and 
new methods are still being developed. Despite all advances made so far in 
developing these HRA methods, many issues still exist. Most notable are; the lack of 




theories in its core human performance model, inability to explicitly model 
interdependencies between influencing factors on human performance and human 
failure events, lack of consistency, traceability and reproducibility in the qualitative 
and quantitative HRA analysis. These issues have led to variability in the results seen 
in the applications of the different HRA methods and also in cases where the same 
method is applied by different HRA analysts. 
In an attempt to address the aforementioned difficulties, a framework for a model-
based HRA methodology has been proposed that incorporates strong elements of 
current HRA good practices and leverages lessons learned from empirical studies and 
the best features of both existing and emerging HRA methods. It formally 
incorporates relevant cognitive and psychological theories in its human performance 
model on which the qualitative analysis tools and procedures of this method are built. 
This framework has two coupled phases of analysis which are the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. It is intended to support HRA in full-power internal events 
PRAs, low-power shutdown (LPSD) operations, event assessment and significant 
determination processes (SDPs), fire and seismic PRAs [6]. 
While this specific instance of the methodology is used in Nuclear Power Plants 
(NPP), the methodology itself is generic and can be applied across different industries 
and environments including oil & gas, aviation, power generation etc. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
In order to accomplish the intent of the proposed framework, the goal of this 
research is to fully develop both the qualitative and quantitative analysis phases of the 




The development of the qualitative analysis methodology is achieved by:  
 Enhancing the crew response tree (CRT) construction process for consistency and 
completeness by improving the overall structure of the flowchart used for CRT 
construction and also incorporated timing of crew responses. 
 Enhancing the framework to include more error modes (referred to as crew failure 
modes (CFMs)) in order to capture the various modes in which NPP operating 
crews could fail while conducting their day-to-day activities. 
 Enhancing the human response model (IDA) which is represented by fault trees, 
for more accurate identification of human failure events (HFEs) and scenarios 
leading up to the HFEs. 
 Providing guidelines for conducting task analysis and catalog of information 
required by the analyst in support of the HRA analysis process. 
 Developing of a comprehensive set of performance influencing factor (PIF) 
groups and hierarchy which enables information to be captured at different levels 
of detail. 
 Developing of a framework for relating CFMs to PIFs based on possible causes of 
failure and mechanisms for human error. This framework provides a means for 
developing a structured, causal model for the quantification approaches in this 
research work. 
 Developing a BBN causal model based on the CFM-PIF framework to model the 
effects of the influence of PIFs on crew performance. The BBN model nodes are 
made up of CFMs and PIFs, and the relationships between the nodes are based on 




modified for interfacing with existing HRA methods like SPAR-H. Note that this 
is of particular interest to HRA practitioners since SPAR-H is widely used in 
USA nuclear power plants for HRA. 
The development of the quantification framework and methodology for HEP 
estimation is based on the BBN model. This is achieved through: 
 The development of a methodology for the BBN model quantification. 
 The development of a methodology for HFE dependency modeling and 
quantification by incorporating the time slice concept of Dynamic Bayesian 
Networks (BBN) into BBN modeling and quantification. 
 The development of a methodology for assessing the levels of the different PIF 
states for input into the BBN model. These PIF levels are a part of the model 
parameters required for HEP estimation. 
 BBN Model parameter estimation by the use of Bayesian methods to incorporate 
data from sources which included other HRA methods, NPP operating experience, 
and expert estimates, through a detailed data gathering and analysis process. 
Example applications are used to demonstrate the capabilities of the methodology 
through step-by-step implementation. The examples include applications such as 
accident sequence precursor analysis (ASP), event assessment, and significant 
determination process (SDP). 
1.3 Overview of Dissertation 
Following this introductory chapter (which provides a general overview of this 
dissertation and its contributions), chapter 2 provides an introduction to current HRA 




based framework. It also gives an overview of the framework and the human response 
model (IDA) adopted for this methodology. Chapter 3 gives a high level overview of 
this research in terms of the contents of the subsequent chapters of this work.  
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the qualitative analysis process, including 
guidelines for task analysis. Chapter 5 through 10 discusses the different elements of 
the qualitative framework. It includes; the crew response trees (CRTs) and the 
construction flowcharts in chapter 5, Human response model fault trees in chapter 6, 
Crew failure modes (CFMs) in chapter 7, proposed PIF groups and hierarchy in 
chapter 8, CFM – PIF framework development in chapter 9, and the BBN model 
development in chapter 10.  
Chapter 11 provides an overview of the quantitative analysis process. Chapter 12 
through 14 discusses the different aspects of the quantitative analysis framework It 
includes; BBN model quantification in chapter 12, HFE dependency modeling and 
quantification in chapter 13, and data sources and parameter estimation in chapter 14.  
Chapter 15 demonstrates the application of this methodology to support different 
types of operations in NPP including ASP, event assessment, base line model, and 
SDP.  The summary and conclusions (which include contributions of this research, 
challenges and the possible future directions) of this work are discussed in chapter 16. 





2 Related Work 
2.1 HRA Overview 
As previously stated, the means by which human contribution to risk is assessed 
both qualitatively and quantitatively is known as Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). 
HRA aims to identify, model and quantify human failure events (HFE) in the context 
of an accident scenario. It is also an important component of an integrated 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for complex systems such as nuclear power 
plants. As a discipline, it is used to understand and assess the effect of human on 
system risk, thereby incorporating this into PRA with the overall goal of reducing the 
likelihood and consequences of errors made by humans. 
Presently, dozens of HRA methods exist and new methods are still being 
developed everyday. In the nuclear industry, the need for improved HRA 
methodologies for application to PRAs has motivated a number of major activities in 
research and development worldwide since early 1990s. These efforts have resulted in 
some improvements in the application of the so-called first generation HRA methods, 
and a number of new techniques and frameworks often referred to as second 
generation, or advanced methods have been developed. In comparison to the first 
generation methods, and with respect to the number and scope of applications, the 






2.1.1 First-Generation HRA Methods 
These methods typically have a set of error modes defined, most of which are 
commonly assumed to be Errors of Omission (EOO). Human error probabilities 
(HEPs) are generally calculated without specifically identifying the error modes. 
Typically, task analysis is conducted, nominal error rates are assigned and PIFs are 
utilized to adjust the error rates. Some methods provide a list of PIFs while others let 
the analyst specify the relevant PIFs for the HEP estimation. For example, THERP 
(Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction) [7] provides rules for performing 
predictive task analysis; however, no specific guidance is given for error mode 
identification. It assigns nominal error rates which are based on the characteristic of 
the activities derived from qualitative task analysis. It provides a PIF list but only 
three PIFs from the list are used in HEP calculations. It also does not provide specific 
guidance for cause identification. Its level of task analysis is more closely associated 
with the types of operator actions rather than the underlying cognitive processes 
driving operator behavior. 
2.1.2 Second-Generation HRA Methods 
 Over the past two decades the development of new HRA methods has taken place 
mostly along two parallel tracks. One track attempts to enhance the quality of HRA 
analysis within the “classical” framework of PRA [8], [9], [10]. The other track 
reflects the belief that substantive improvement in HRA for PRA applications 
requires structural changes to the PRA methodology, moving from the static, 
hardware-driven view of the world to a more flexible dynamic model of accident 




plant thermal-hydraulic response, and systems performance in a probabilistic-
deterministic simulation approach [11]. Of course these two tracks also share many 
common objectives and face many similar challenges.  Both intend to address error 
identification and probability estimation which are the two key components of a 
comprehensive HRA methodology. 
 With regards to the first track, these methods typically consider the context 
influencing the operator’s cognitive decisions and the emphasis is on identifying 
Error of Commission (EOC). In general, separate error modes are assigned to 
different HEPs. For example, CREAM (Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis 
Method) [12] identifies error modes for different cognitive activities (e.g. monitoring, 
diagnosis) and human functions (e.g. observation, execution). Thereafter, error rates 
are determined based on the cognitive activities and human functions with PIFs being 
utilized to adjust the error rate. Hence, second-generation methods have an increased 
emphasis on context and operator cognition than first-generation methods. However, 
these methods still have some limitations which include: 
 The lack of sufficient theoretical and experimental basis for the key ingredients 
and fundamental assumptions of many of these methods. 
 The lack of a causal model of the underlying causal mechanisms to link operator 
response to measurable PIFs or other characterization of the context. 
 Majority of the proposed approaches still rely on very simple and in some cases 
implicit functions to relate PIFs to probabilities without the theoretical or 




 In many instances, numbers are the result of expert elicitation, use of highly 
subjective scales, and unsubstantiated “reference probabilities”. 
2.2 Current Problems in HRA 
 The results and insights from PRAs are frequently used to drive risk informed 
decision making processes. Since HRA is a significant component of PRA, it is 
important to obtain consistent HRA results for inclusion in PRAs. A notably issue in 
the HRA discipline is the variability of results seen in the application of different 
HRA methods and also in cases where the same method is applied by different HRA 
analysts. Evidence has been indicated by HRA empirical studies [13], [14], [15]  that 
for a particular HFE, the HEP can significantly vary depending on the HRA method 
being applied and the analyst conducting the assessment. This variability can be 
traceable to some underlying issues including; the lack of a causal model that 
formally incorporates relevant psychological and cognitive theories in its core human 
performance model, inability to explicitly model interdependencies between 
influencing factors on human performance and human failure events, lack of 
consistency, traceability and reproducibility in the qualitative and quantitative HRA 
analysis. 
 Hence the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in an attempt to address 
these issues developed a uniform set of good practices [16] that should be considered 
when performing and reviewing HRAs. The HRA good practices are of a generic 
nature meaning that they are not tied to any specific HRA method. It provides a 
reference guide to the processes, individual tasks, and decisions that would be 




anticipated human operator performance for inclusion in PRAs. As part of this effort, 
a set of desired attributes of a robust HRA method was identified during a workshop 
organized by the US NRC and attended by HRA experts. The attributes include [17]: 
 Validity of the contents (plant, crew, cognition, action, EOCs, EOOs) etc. 
 Better causal models for relating error mechanisms to context and theoretical 
foundations. 
 Clear definition of the “unit of analysis” and level of detail required for various 
applications. 
 Adequate coverage of HFE dependency and recovery. 
 Reliability (reproducibly, consistency). 
 Capability for Graded Analysis like screening, scoping, detailed analysis. 
 Empirical Validity of HEPs like having basis in Operational Data, Simulator 
Experiments, etc. 
 Traceability/Transparency i.e. ability to reverse engineer the analysis. 
 Ability to test the entire or part of the model and analysis. 
 Usability/Practicality. 
The US NRC also led an effort to evaluate some HRA methods that are commonly 
used in regulatory applications against the formulated good practices [18]. As part of 
this effort, the strengths and limitations regarding the underlying knowledge and 
databases were also evaluated. These evaluations were done by eliciting input from 
recognized HRA experts representing the NRC, different industries, organizations 
and the private sector. The methods reviewed included some of the first and second 




from this evaluation and the uniform set of good practices formed the basis for 
determining the features needed in an HRA method and suggested the development of 
a hybrid approach capturing most of the positive features of the existing HRA 
methods. This led to the development of the framework for a model-based hybrid 
HRA methodology. 
2.3 Desirable characteristics of an advanced HRA method 
 In general, below is a high-level list of some desirable characteristics of an HRA 
method [8]:  
 Identification of human response (errors are the main focus) in PRA context. 
 Estimation of response probabilities. 
 Identification of causes of errors to support the development of preventive or 
mitigating measures. 
 Inclusion of a systematic procedure to aid in the generation of reproducible 
qualitative and quantitative results 
 Inclusion of a causal model of human response with roots in cognitive and 
behavioral sciences, and with elements (e.g., PIFs) that are directly or indirectly 
measurable, and a structure that provides unambiguous and traceable links 
between its inputs and outputs. 
 Detailed enough to support data collection and empirical validation at elemental 
levels. In general, data and models are tightly coupled. The model should be data-
informed, and conversely data collection and analysis must be model-informed. A 




should support the development and application of the model, and quantification 
of its parameters.     
Reason [20] distinguishes three levels of human error classification: behavioral-
level, contextual level, and conceptual level, addressing the “what”, “where”, and 
“how” of human errors. The conceptual-level error classification needs a cognitive 
model to trace errors to their origins, at levels below the overt errors. This 
classification and other similar ones provide a useful reference point for evaluating 
the depth of the HRA methodologies.  Most of the first and even some of the recent 
second generation HRA approaches, stay at the behavioral and contextual levels. 
These levels, however, are not sufficient to meet some of the key expectations for an 
advanced HRA approach.  It can be argued that: 
 Only a causal model can truly provide both the explanatory (conceptual level) and 
predictive capabilities. Without a causal model, it is difficult for instance to 
explain why in some cases seemingly similar contexts result in different operator 
responses. 
 Only a model-based approach provides the proper framework for tapping into and 
integrating models with data from the diverse scientific disciplines that cover 
different mechanisms and aspects of human behavior. Without a causal model it is 
difficult to understand the relationship between PIFs and human behaviors, and 
their application in HRA.  
 A causal model that explicitly captures the generic and more fundamental aspects 
of human response can be tested and enhanced using data and observations from 




situations of interest in HRA are highly context-dependent and rare, meaning that 
adequate statistical data are unlikely to be available for a direct estimation of 
operator response probabilities.   
 A generic causal model will have a much broader domain of applicability, 
reducing the need for developing application-specific methods. For instance, the 
same underlying model can be used for errors during routine maintenance work as 
well as operator response to accidents.  
 A model-based HRA method can significantly improve reproducibility of the 
results and robustness of the predictions.   
 Only a model-based approach provides a vehicle for orderly improvement of 
models and data, by identifying the data gaps and highlighting weak links, and 
questionable assumptions.       
It is evident that building a causal model of human behavior for HRA applications 
is an extremely challenging undertaking. Expectations from such a model should be 
set considering current state of the art in the supporting disciplines, and practical 
constraints in data collection and empirical observations. Some critical aspects of 
human cognitive behavior are currently at best only research subjects. Reliable 
scientific models are likely to emerge in the future at the cross-section of such fields 
as psychology, behavioral sciences, ergonomics, and neuroscience. Nevertheless, 
even with what we currently know from these disciplines, augmented with insights 
and data from actual operating experience, significant steps can be taken beyond what 





2.4 The Model-Based Hybrid HRA Methodology 
The model-based hybrid HRA methodology was developed in an attempt to 
incorporate strong elements of current HRA good practices [16] and to leverage 
lessons learned from HRA empirical studies [13] [15] with the best features of both 
existing and emerging HRA methods. It formally incorporates relevant cognitive and 
psychological theories in its human performance model on which the qualitative 
analysis tools and procedures are built. This framework has two coupled phases of 
analysis which are the qualitative and quantitative analysis and it is intended to 
support HRA in full-power internal events PRAs, low-power shutdown (LPSD) 
operations, event assessment and significant determinations, fire and seismic PRAs 
[6]. Note that crew as a whole is the unit of analysis in this methodology and not the 
individual operator. 
The qualitative analysis part of the methodology introduces the “crew response 
tree” (CRT) which provides a structure for capturing the context associated with the 
HFE, including EOO and EOC. It also uses a team-centered version of the 
Information, Decision and Action (IDA) model [22] and “macro cognitive” 
abstractions of crew behavior as well as other relevant findings from cognitive 
psychology literature and operating experience, to identify potential causes of failures 
and influencing factors during procedure-driven and knowledge-supported crew-plant 
interactions. The result of this analysis is the set of identified HFEs and the likely 
scenarios leading to each. The qualitative analysis approach is intended to be generic 




The quantification framework uses a conditional probability expression, 
associating the conditional probability of an HFE with probabilities of the contexts as 
given by PRA scenario, human failure mechanisms, and the underlying “performance 
influencing factors”. Such mathematical formulation can be used to directly estimate 
HEPs using various information sources (e.g., expert estimations, anchor values, 
simulator or historical data), or can be modified to interface with existing 
quantification approaches. 
As part of the development of this methodology, the focus has been to provide 
guidance and assistance for HRA analysts with a wide range of skill levels. This is 
due to the growth in risk-informed applications which has demanded the use of HRA 
methods in generating inputs to risk-informed decision-making processes by analysts 
who are not experts in cognitive science. The development also envisions software-
supported quantitative analysis, to build and analyze CRTs, identify Crew Failure 
Modes (CFMs), develop the human failure scenarios, and to support a number of 
quantification options. 
2.4.1 The Qualitative analysis framework 
 The broad objective of HRA qualitative analysis is to identify HFEs and 
characterize crew-plant scenarios that lead to those HFEs.  As such, there is a tight 
coupling between understanding and analyzing the plant/system response and 
conditions (systems behavior), and understanding and analyzing the crew activities 
(operator behavior). Therefore, the process of HFE identification and defining the 
scenarios leading to the HFEs is, in general, inseparable from the process of modeling 




 PRAs use event trees (ET) that define logical (and often temporal) sequences of 
binary events starting from an initiating event and resulting in plant End States (ES). 
Major functional responses of the plant and key crew actions constitute the various 
elements (top events) of the ET. The sequences of ET are typically the high level 
PRA scenarios (S). The details of how the plant functions fail as a result of failure of 
component or human actions are typically included in fault trees (FT) attached to 
various events of the ET.  The combinations of the events in these FTs, which are 
logically linked according to the ET scenarios, form the more detailed picture of the 
PRA scenarios (scenario cut-sets). Such sets are defined in this qualitative 
methodology as the PRA scenario context (S).   
 The proposed qualitative analysis framework uses two modeling vehicles namely 
[6]: (1) A process and representational method for analyzing crew-plant interactions 
with a focus on the identification and quantification of HFEs and possible recoveries, 
and (2) A human response model which relates the observable crew failures modes 
(CFM) to “context factors” for example, PIFs. 
2.4.1.1 Layers of the qualitative analysis framework 
 The qualitative analysis process has three main layers namely: 
 The CRT (top layer) 
 The human performance model (mid layer) 





Figure 2-1: The three layers of the qualitative analysis framework [23] 
 
2.4.1.1.1 The CRT (Top layer) 
Mosleh et al. [6] states that the crew response tree (CRT) which is a forward-
branching tree of crew cognitive activities and actions is the first modeling tool for 
the qualitative analysis process. It is a crew-centric visual representation of the crew-
plant scenarios which provides the roadmap and blueprint that supports the 
performance and documentation of the qualitative analysis. It serves as an aid to the 
analyst and is also envisioned as an HRA work product, i.e. a means of documenting 
and reporting the qualitative analysis. Its role is to ensure a systematic coverage of the 
interactions between the crew and the plant that is consistent with the scope of the 
analysis being conducted, thereby providing traceability for the analysis. 
The assumption made is that the customary steps of building a PRA model which 
starts with development of ETs for various initiating events, have been taken for 
many of the applications of the proposed methodology. In some PRAs, the process 




which are based on the ESDs. In order to assist in making the development of the 




Figure 2-2: Modeling Plant and Crew Interaction through CRT [6] 
 
Figure 2-2 indicates the conceptual relation between CRT and a typical PRA ET.  
The plant ET for an initiating event with system failures and HFEs is shown above 
the time arrow. The CRT which serves as a supporting tree is shown below the time 
arrow. Both the ET and CRT are synchronized and this is symbolized by the green 
arrow. The CRT gives the causal explanation of the HFEs. Symbolically, the causal 
explanations (links) are shown as dashed lines. The purpose of the link is to aid the 
analysts in keeping track of the relation between the CRT scenarios and event tree 
scenarios; it is not a formal mathematical or logical link. The nodes or branch points 
of the CRT can include operator decisions and actions, relevant plant/system 
functional states, as well as crew interactions (if the unit of analysis is each individual 




graphical representation of one of the possible crew response across the entire 
accident sequence. This would aid in increasing consistency and reducing variability 
in the HRA task analysis. The ET and corresponding CRT start at the initiating event 
(for full power applications). Looking at this conceptual picture, the possibility of 
having multiple CRT scenarios leading to the same HFE as defined in the PRA model 
(note the two dashed lines pointing to two CRT scenarios for HFE2.) is observed. 
Also, a given CRT scenario may include multiple HFEs. Therefore, it can be used to 
find the paths to predefined HFEs and possible recoveries, or used as an aid to 
identify new HFEs. 
2.4.1.1.2 Human performance Model (Mid-layer) 
The CRT branches are defined mainly at the functional level and typically do not 
cover the underlying human failure mechanisms and their causes. Hence, its structure 
captures some but not all aspects of crew responses and contextual factors. The 
remaining aspects of the context are captured by a set of supporting models of crew 
behaviors in the form of causal trees that are linked to the CRT branches. 
The encompassing human response model adopted to serve as the basis for this 
linkage is the crew centered version of the Information, Decision and Action (IDA) 
cognitive model [21], [22] which was originally developed to model nuclear power 
plant operator response in emergency situations. Given the incoming information in 
IDA, a response is generated by the crew model which links the context to the action 
through explicit causal models. IDA is a three stage model and these stages serve as 




adapts well to the information processing models commonly used in the human 
factors and cognitive psychology disciplines. The IDA stages are as follows: 
 Information (I) stage: This stage is focused on the perception of the crew’s 
environment and the cues they are presented with. Cognitive processing of 
information by the crew is limited to the task of information perception and 
prioritization.  
 Situation Assessment/Decision stage: The crew in this phase uses the perceived 
information and the cues presented to them in the (I) stage, along with stored 
memories, knowledge and experience to understand and develop a mental model 
of the situation. Following the situation assessment, the crew engages in decision-
making strategies to plan the appropriate course of action. External resources such 
as procedures may be used by the crew to assist in both the situation assessment 
and decision-making parts of this stage. 
 Action (A) stage: This is the final IDA stage where the crew executes the chosen 
course of action. 
A nested IDA structure may exist within each IDA element [11]. This implies that 
each phase of the I-D-A structure may be decomposed into sub I-D-A structures as 
needed for task analysis and for parsing of different human activities into sub-tasks or 
sub-events. For example I-in-I involves information being perceived and recognized, 
D-in-I involves the decision on what to do with the perceived information and A-in-I 





CFMs are used to further specify the possible forms of failure in each IDA phase. 
CFMs are generic functional modes of failure of the crew while interacting with the 
plant. They cover different modalities in crew response, including procedure driven, 
(PD), knowledge driven (KD), or a hybrid of both (HD). They can be mapped to 
physiological and psychological causes and their contextual factors or reasons. CFMs 
are tailored to the various sub-tasks that can be identified for the procedure driven 
crew interactions in nuclear power plants in the PD mode. 
2.4.1.1.3 Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) – Third layer) 
PIFs form the third layer of the qualitative analysis framework. PIFs also referred 
to as performance shaping factors (PSFs) are context factors (including plant factors) 
that affect human performance and can either reduce or increase the likelihood of 
error.  These PIFs are contextual factors that are not captured in the first two layers of 
the qualitative analysis. 
2.4.2 The Quantification framework 
An HFE is the result of one or several sequences of events or conditions (overall 
context) for a given plant PRA scenario (S). According to the CRT and corresponding 
linked causal models, the estimation of the human error probability (HEP) consistent 
with a “scenario-based” approach is done as follows [6]: 
(2-1)  
 “The summation in the brackets indicates the probability of i-th failure mode 
(FM) meaning CFM considering all possible CRT scenarios (j = 1, 2, …, J) that 




different instances of a fixed super set of factors). The set {Fj1, Fj2, …, S} 
includes the usual PIFs and everything else in the scenario context that affect the 
probability of HFE.   
 The term p(FMi | Fi1, Fi2, …) is the probability of i-th CFM for a given CRT 
scenario, and p(Fi1, Fi2 , …| S) is the probability of that scenario in the context of 
the PRA scenario S.  
 One can define CFMs in such a way that P (HFE | FMi ) =1  for all “i”. In this 
case the aim of the HRA quantification model is to assess the values of p (FMi | 
Fj1, Fj2, …) and  p(Fj1, Fj2, …| S) for each sub-context j.” 
In theory, all PIFs need to be considered in estimating p(FMi | Fj1, Fj2, …) and  
p(Fj1, Fj2, …| S) for each CRT scenario j and FMi. However, the crew response 
modeling methodology provides a basis for down-selecting those PIFs that are most 
relevant to each CFM. The formulation above symbolically indicates that in 
quantifying p(FMi | Fj1, Fj2 , …) and  p(Fj1, Fj2, …| S) one should take into account 
the collective effect of the set of relevant PIFs for each CFM. Contrary to the 
assumption made in many popular HRA methods, a consensus is emerging indicating 
that PIFs are in fact interdependent. Such interdependencies should be explicitly 
acknowledged in quantification of p(FMi | Fj1, Fj2, …) and  p(Fj1, Fj2, …| S). This 
provides the motivation to use influence diagrams (BBN) to, as a minimum, capture 
in a qualitative way the PIF interdependencies. The core of this research is the 




2.5 Overview of IDAC 
IDAC (Information, Decision and Action in Crew Context) is an operator behavior 
model developed based on many relevant findings from cognitive psychology, 
behavioral sciences, neuroscience, human factors, field observations, and various first 
and second-generation HRA methodologies [11].  It models individual operator’s 
behavior in a crew context and in response to plant abnormal conditions.  Three 
generic types of operators are modeled: Decision Maker (e.g., Shift Supervisor), 
Action Taker (operators at the control panel), and Consultant (e.g., resource experts in 
the control room). IDAC models constrained behavior, largely regulated through 
training, procedures, standardized work processed, and professional discipline. These 
constraints significantly reduce the complexity of the problem, when compared to 
modeling general human response. IDAC covers the operator’s various dynamic 
response phases, including situation assessment, diagnosis, and recovery actions. 
 At a high level of abstraction, IDAC is composed of models of information 
processing (I), problem solving and decision-making (D), action execution (A), of a 
crew (C). Given incoming information, the crew model generates a probabilistic 
response, linking the context to the action through explicit causal chains. Figure 2-3 is 
a schematic representation of the main elements of the IDAC modeling concept and 
its key elements in form of the umbrella I-D-A dynamic loop for each member of the 
crew. 
IDAC is composed of (1) a Problem Solving Model, (2) Mental State and Engine 
of Cognition, (3) Memory and Knowledge Base Model, (4) Casual Model of Internal 




effects of rational and emotional dimensions to form a small number of generic rules 
of behavior that govern the dynamic response of the operator.  
 
 
Figure 2-3: High Level View of the IDAC Dynamic Response Model 
 
 
2.5.1 Architecture of IDAC 
The architecture of IDAC is such that its main modeling elements can be 
repeatedly embedded in a layered and progressively detailed representation of the 
cognitive process. The various elements of the IDAC architecture are briefly 




2.5.1.1 Information Processing and Memory Model 
The information-processing model (I) covers the perception, comparison, 
abstraction and grouping, of incoming information, as well as retrieval and 
distribution of the information among various types of memory.  It filters the 
incoming information based on the human information procession capability (e.g., the 
7±2) and considers information importance and similarity (e.g., source similarity) in 
the process. IDAC model includes three types of memory: working memory (WM), 
intermediate memory (IM), and knowledge base (KB).  WM stores limited 
information related to the current cognitive process. IM, theoretically unlimited in 
capacity, stores information related to recent cognitive processes, which could be 
easily retrieved at any time given appropriate stimuli. KB, also theoretically unlimited 
in capacity, stores all problem-solving related knowledge obtained from training and 
experience. IDAC through its “cognitive engine” regulates the information relocation 
via among the various memory memories with explicit rules. 
2.5.1.2 The Problem Solving Model   
Any cognitive response of the operator to a situation, which has been brought to 
the operator’s attention through the information perceived, is translated into a 
problem statement or goal, requiring resolution. The process of problem solving or 
goal resolution involves selection of a problem solving method or strategy. For 
nuclear power plant operation, examples of high-level goals include “normal 
operation”, “trouble shooting”, and “maintain plant safety margin”. 
Problem solving strategies cover a wide spectrum from simple direct association of 




search/selection of a solution among possible candidates, “knowledge-based 
reasoning”. The list of strategies of course includes the most likely strategy of 
“procedure following”, but also “wait and monitor” and “trial and error”. There are 
also hybrid strategies mixing, for example, Knowledge-Based Reasoning and 
Procedure Following to form a more human-like hybrid problem solving strategy of 
“selective procedure following”. There is a hierarchy of goals and sub-goals, such 
that complex problems are broken down into simpler ones, and solved one at a time 
or concurrently, using corresponding strategies.  
The problem solving process involves a series of decisions to be made or solutions 
to be selected based on available alternatives. The decisions making stage has its own 
strategy: “cost-benefit optimization”. Together, the problem-solving and decision-
making processes constitute the second major structural part (D) of the IDAC model. 
This element covers the operator response phases of “situation assessment” or 
“diagnosis” as well as “response planning”. The action taking process (A) executes 
the decision made through the D process. 
2.5.1.3 Mental State and Engine of Cognition  
Human response is a dynamic process, guided by certain cognitive and behavioral 
rules, and influenced by physical and psychological factors. Memory, knowledge, and 
emotions, together with the core cognitive and intellectual faculties, are at work. A 
simple representation of the process steps and elements in terms of a hierarchy of 
goals and problem solving strategies is clearly an insufficient model for predicting or 
describing the behavior. The model also needs to cover, for instance, why and how a 




why and how a goal or strategy is selected or abandoned. The process needs a motive 
power or internal engine to run, i.e., to go through the I-D-A process dynamically and 
in response to changing external and internal environments. IDAC’s model of this 
engine is comprised of the Mental State with its set of elements (state variables), a set 
of rules of behavior, and information processing engine of WM.  
Cognitive engine of IDAC combines the effects of rational and emotional 
dimensions (within the limited scope of modeling the behavior of operators in a 
constrained environment) forming a small number of generic rules of behavior that 
govern the dynamic response of the operator. The Mental State registers 
psychological dimensions or the stream of feelings associated with the external 
factors, in form of stimuli and possible tendencies to act on the stimuli.  The stimuli 
are an individual’s perception and appraisal of the external world (e.g., perception of 
criticality of system state, perception of problem solving recourse, and perception of 
task complexity). The tendencies to act on the stimuli include the individual’s internal 
feelings pertaining to the stimuli (e.g., time constraint, task load, and information 
load).  These then result in various psychological and cognitive moods (e.g., stressed, 
alert, attentive to task and surrounding environment), which could affect an 
individual’s many kinds of judgments and behaviors.  Another group of Mental State 
elements in IDAC include the individual’s personal characteristics such as self-
confidence, and attitude. 
The psychological states are influenced by factors external to the individual, and 
include the team-related factors (e.g., coordination, cohesiveness, communication 




tool availability) and external factors (e.g., physical access, environmental factors, 
man-machine interface, and other conditioning events such as hardware failures). 
A significant number of studies were reviewed to identify possible candidates for 
the factors in IDAC. A key requirement in developing a list of factors for use in a 
causal model is to have a precise definition of each factor, and to ensure they that 
they do not overlap in their definition and role in the model. This is extremely 
difficult given the current state of the art, the quality, form, availability of relevant 
information, and complexities of communication across diverse disciplines that study 
the subject often for entirely different reasons and end objectives. IDAC has made an 
attempt to meet these requirements. One example is the way two Mental State 
elements of Time-Constraint Load (TLC), and Task-Related Load (TRC).  
IDAC uses an influence diagram to represent a set of cause-effect relations and 
interdependencies among these variables (factors), and between these variables and 
the incoming information perceived by the operator. This influence diagram is 
supplemented by a set of mathematical relations for more explicit set of relationships, 
which often take the form of a metric for tendencies and/or stochastic relations, rather 
than deterministic links. The assumed forms of these relations reflect the model 
developers reading of the available empirical and theoretical models, event analysis, 
simulator exercises, as well as the opinions of other searchers and practitioners 
expressed in the HRA literature. No formal validation has been performed. 
2.5.2 Modeling of the Dynamics of the Process 
The cognitive engine (its parameters, factors, and rules) operates on the memory, 




which the cognitive activities have been initiated. Clearly this is a dynamic process, 
and the set of Mental State parameters and variables, as well as the content of the 
various memories (including the knowledge base) are continuously updated during 
the course of the operator-system interactions. Dynamic nature of operator response is 
due in part to the change in some of the external factors (e.g., incoming information 
about the new state of the systems). The external factors are, therefore, divided into 
two groups of dynamic and static, where the distinction is based on whether the state 
(or value) of the factor changes or remains constant during the course of the event 
(response to an accident). 
Perceived raw information is temporarily stored in the WM and serves as the 
stimuli to change the MS.  The stimuli is amplified or damped after passing through 
the operator’s intrinsic psychological characteristics and other factor that could 
function as a “cognitive filterers”, before being appraised. 
The combination of cognitive process and observable actions of an operator during 
the course of an accident is a continuum. The entire process may be divided into 
smaller phases in terms of dominant goals or modes of response such as situation 
assessment search for the cause, and selection and execution of the response and 
recovery plan.  Each of these phases can be further divided into sub-phases (e.g., 
following specific segments of a procedure) with specific and distinct cognitive and 
behavioral characteristics. IDAC covers this continuum in form of a set of discrete 
cognitive events such as the steps associated with processing of the incoming 
information, goal selection, and selection and execution of problem solving strategies 




engine continues as a series of loops (Figure 2-3) covering these cognitive basic 
events throughout the course of crew response to an evolving situation. In the current 
trail applications of IDAC, a particular level of detail for the cognitive basic events is 
chosen that is consistent with the currently limited content and structure of the KB.  
Given the flexibility of the layered architecture and model decomposition using 
embedded I-D-A units, the fidelity and resolution of the model is a matter of 
modeler’s choice and a function of the intended use of the model.   
2.5.3 Response Probabilities 
The cognitive basic events and the resulting observable behaviors (closing a valve, 
skipping a procedural step) are not deterministic. IDAC considers alternative paths 
and outcomes for the various response steps (cognitive and outward behavior), each 
with an assigned conditional probability. At each option points, the list of options or 
alternative paths is assumed to be exhaustive and, therefore, the sum of the 
corresponding probabilities is 1. These probabilities are conditional on the context, 
including the sequence of preceding events, and their values are calculated as a 
function of the states of various model parameters and variables, including dynamic 
and static factors, and incoming information. Therefore, the probabilities cover a mix 
of model uncertainty, epistemic uncertainty of the model parameters, as well as the 
aleatory variability in the input variables.  
In current applications of IDAC, qualitative and quantitative scales are used to 
assess the state of input variables and parameters (e.g., PFSs), which in turn are used 
to calculate the probability for each alternative outcomes. Values of static PSFs are 




dynamic PSFs are dynamically calculated as a function of the scenario context, and 
static PSFs. For quantification of the static external PSFs, IDAC uses the 
conventional methods, such as expert judgment and surveys. In one implementation 
of IDAC, some of the psychological PSFs are assessed using a demand-resource 
model, where the psychological load is associated with the perception of relative 
magnitudes of the demand and available resources to meet it. In some cases the 
magnitude or indicators of demand and resource can be measured or estimated 
directly. In other cases, surrogate measures may be used, since the related variables 
are not directly observable.   
2.5.4 Errors from IDAC Perspective 
It is evident that errors and failures attributed to human, hardware, or software are 
only recognizable in context. Closing a valve might be an error in one context, and 
success in another. Similarly, skipping a procedural step, which might constitutes a 
violation of the prescribed response, could be the correct action for the specific 
situation at hand. This has been recognized by all HRA approaches, old and new. By 
applying IDAC, operator cognitive response and actions are identified which 
depending on the context might be labeled as correct or erroneous. Based on the 
original form of the IDA model [21], [22], a set of model-based criteria has been 
developed for characterization of operator errors. These criteria were used as the basis 
of error taxonomy for retrospective analysis of events, and for evaluation of the 
results of IDAC-based analysis of PRA scenarios. Errors are identification with 





Figure 2-4: IDAC-Based Error Reference Points 
 
An observable human action can be classified as an error with respect to the 
external reference points: the system, procedures, and the crew. As seen in Figure 
2-4a,  
 crew behavior is compared with the system needs or actual system state,  
 crew behavior is compared with the procedure requirements, and 
 procedure requirements are compared with the system needs 
Any mismatch between the states and mutual requirements of any two reference 
points can be classified as an error. Since the definition of errors is difficult and is 
always context-dependent, these reference points should not be viewed as rigid rules 
to define errors.  
The three internal error reference points correspond to the three main elements of 
IDAC, i.e., Information Module, Problem Solving/Decision Making Module, and 
Action Module. These internal reference points (Figure 2-4b) allow tracing the 
observable human action back to the cognitive stage where the error originated and 
then down to the influencing factors that affect the operators' cognitive and physical 




the module where a correct input resulted in incorrect output. A detailed taxonomy 

























3 Overview of Phoenix HRA 
This research started with the framework for the Model-Based HRA that had been 
proposed by Mosleh et al. in [6], [23] and developed the building blocks, complete 
methodology and procedure for its implementation. This chapter provides a road map 
through the research by briefly discussing the elements of the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis phases of the methodology and how this research has either 
developed or contributed to its development. This is done by summarizing the content 
of the subsequent chapters in this dissertation. 
3.1 Overview of the Qualitative Analysis Framework 
The qualitative analysis framework is made up of three main layers namely:  
 Crew response tree (CRT): This is a forward branching tree which provides a 
systematic coverage of the crew-plant interaction scenarios that is consistent with 
the scope of the analysis defined in the PRA model.  
 The human response model: The human response model adopted for this work is 
the Information, Decision and Action Model (IDA).  It is a cognitive model which 
is used to relate the crew failure modes (CFMs) to the crew responses modeled in 
the CRT. It is modeled using fault trees. 
 Performance influencing factors (PIFs): PIFs are factors that enhance or degrade 
human performance. They are related to the CFMs using a causal model.  
The framework layers and its relationship to a typical PRA model is shown in Figure 
3-1. The CRT is synchronized with the PRA model as indicated by the green time 




explanations of the HFE of interest. The dash lines which link the CRT to the PRA 
model serve as causal explanations and aid the HRA analyst in keeping track of the 




Figure 3-1: The qualitative analysis framework layers and a typical PRA model 
 
Each layer of the framework has major elements / building blocks as indicated in 
Figure 3-2. These elements have been developed or improved as part of this research 
and will be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. 
3.1.1 Elements of the top (CRT) layer 
The elements of the CRT layer are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this 
dissertation. Chapter 4 provides a road map to the qualitative analysis process. It 
discusses the procedure steps and sub steps required to conduct the qualitative 




work to aid the HRA analyst in task analysis. Task analysis is conducted in the 
context of the PRA model, CRT, IDA task decomposition, and the crew activities. A 
catalog of the types of information needed in support of the analysis process which 
have also been developed as part of this research is being provided as well. The 
output of the analysis process include; qualitative insights and narratives for HFE 




Figure 3-2: Qualitative framework layers and Building Blocks 
 
 
Chapter 5, we discuss the CRT development. It provides the guidelines and a flow 
chart to aid the construction process. The flow chart has accompanying tables that 
contain the questions for creating it and the branch point description. Also, discussed 
are the incorporation of the timing of crew responses and the crew’s ability recover 




CRT modules through simple merge rules to build larger and more comprehensive 
CRTs is also covered in chapter 5. As part of this research, the initial CRT flow chart 
structure has been modified and the timing of crew responses has been incorporated 
to enhance consistency and completeness of the constructed CRT. 
3.1.2 Elements of the mid (IDA) layer 
Chapter 6 discusses the human response model (IDA) fault trees (FTs). The FTs 
are used to model the human failure mechanisms and the modes of crew failure. 
HFEs or contributing causes can be traced through the I-D-A chain using the 
information-processing model. It aids in the identification of HFEs and scenarios 
leading up to the HFEs. They are used to link the CFMs to CRT branches.  As part of 
this research, the structure of the FTs has been modified and also expanded to include 
the set of CFMs that we have developed. 
As part of this work, we developed a comprehensive set of CFMs, discussed in 
chapter 6. They are used to further specify the possible forms of failure in each of the 
IDA phases. They represent the manifestation of the crew failure mechanisms and 
proximate causes of failure and are selected to cover the various modes of crew 
response including procedure driven, (PD), knowledge driven (KD), or a hybrid of 
both (HD).   The CFMs form the basic events in the IDA FTs. 
3.1.3 Elements of the bottom (PIF) layer 
A set of PIF groups and hierarchy that we developed during this research work for 
use with this methodology is discussed in chapter 8. It was developed based on efforts 




set of PIFs currently used in HRA. The PIFs are grouped in terms of front line factors 
that directly affect crew performance. Each PIF group is made up 2 to 3 PIF levels. 
The lower level PIFs are either types or attributes of the PIFs in the higher level. This 
hierarchical structure provides the ability to incorporate data into the analysis at the 
required level of detail. 
Chapter 9 covers the CFM-PIF framework that we developed as part of this 
research, for relating CFMs to PIFs based on possible causes of failure and 
mechanisms for human error. It provides a means for developing a structured, causal 
model. It has been developed based on extensive literature review of psychology, 
cognitive sciences, operating experience and expert inputs sponsored by the US NRC.  
The BBN model development is discussed in chapter 10. This model is developed 
as part of this work and it based on the CFM-PIF framework to model the effects of 
the influence of PIFs on crew performance. The nodes in the model are made up of 
CFMs and PIFs, and this model has the flexibility to be modified for interfacing with 
existing HRA methods like SPAR-H. 
3.2 Overview of the Quantification Framework 
 
Figure 3-3: The Quantification framework overview 
 
 
The quantification phase includes; the process of gathering the data required as 
input to the CFM – PIF BBN model, the analysis of the gathered data, and the 




probability (HEP) estimate. The inputs to the quantification process include the CFM 
minimal cut-sets and the PIFs that had been identified as being relevant to the HFE 
scenario during the qualitative analysis. Note that the entire quantitative analysis 
framework and process is being developed as part of this research work. 
The overview of the quantitative analysis process is given in chapter 11. It 
provides the ability to incorporate dependency between CFMs and/or HFEs into the 
analysis. We present the integrated model which is made up of the CRT, FTs and 
BBN. This model can be quantified using the Integrated Risk Information System 
(IRIS) software tool. This tool was built by the Center for Risk and Reliability at the 
University of Maryland, College Park to support PRA and safety monitoring of 
complex socio-technical systems. It uses a three-layer hybrid causal logic (HCL) 
modeling approach. Its 1st layer, the event sequence diagram (ESD) layer is used to 
construct the CRT sequences, 2nd layer, FT layer is used to build the FTs, and the 3rd 
layer, BBN layer is used to build and quantify the BBN model. 
Chapter 12 discusses the quantification of the BBN model. We provide an 
overview of the BBN quantification process and discuss the benefits of using the 
BBN as our quantification model. Also covered in this chapter is the methodology for 
assessment and estimation of PIF levels. The PIF levels are a part of the required 
model inputs. Finally, we present the methodology steps for BBN model 
quantification. These are the set of steps which the analyst needs to follow in order to 
estimate the conditional HEP of an HFE.  
Chapter 13 discusses HFE dependency modeling and quantification.  The issue of 




for the explicit treatment of dependencies among HFEs using the time slice concept 
of Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) and the BBN model. We also use an example 
case to illustrate the methodology steps.  
In chapter 14, we discuss the data gathering and analysis process in order to 
provide estimates for our model parameters. There is no single source that can 
provided all the information required in our model. Therefore, we had to incorporate 
data from various sources into our model parameter estimation process using the 
Bayesian methods. The data sources include other HRA methods, NPP operating 
experience, and expert HEP estimates.  
In chapter 15, we provide examples to demonstrate the complete application of our 
methodology (Phoenix HRA), including various important concepts developed as part 
of this research. Since the specific instance of this methodology is applicable to 
NPPs, the examples presented are tailored towards applications like that of accident 
sequence precursor (ASP) analysis, significant determination process (SDP) (events 
that involve performance deficiencies), event assessment.  We use an ASP analysis 
example to demonstrate our entire qualitative and quantitative analysis methodology. 
This research work is summarized and concluded in Chapter 16. We present the 
foundation of both phases of Phoenix HRA, the contributions of this research, the 
attributes of the methodology compared to what is required of a robust HRA method, 






4 Overview of the Qualitative Analysis Process 
The HRA qualitative analysis process broadly involves the identification of human 
failure events (HFEs) and the characterization of crew-plant scenarios that lead to the 
HFEs. Generally, it is assumed that the starting point for the qualitative analysis is the 
identification and definition of the human failure events (HFEs). This process can be 
generically defined as a four-step process [25] namely: 
 Identification and Definition of the HFE and its PRA Scenarios Context: One 
of the main objectives of HRA is the identification of HFEs, which are a result of 
an iterative process of developing PRA scenarios. The set of HFEs should 
represent those needed to model the impact of potential human failures on the 
accident scenario progression. An HFE definition may include the failure of the 
crew action described in relation to the function which they needed to achieve, the 
PRA scenario in which the HFE is modeled, the physical plant condition by which 
the crew’s action must be completed, and the manipulations that must be 
performed in order to achieve the required function. Note that the PRA scenario 
specifies the initiating event, hardware and crew action events that would lead up 
to the demand for the specific crew action. The preceding successes and failure 
events are relevant for the HRA because they aid in determining the context for 
the crew action as well as influencing the time evolution of the physical plant 
parameters [39]. Also, this step may involve refining the definition of the HFE. In 
other words, it may be necessary to decompose the identified HFE into sub-HFEs. 
For example, it may desirable to define HFE-FB={Failure to Perform Feed and 




Bleed}. For each HFE, the analyst needs to understand the scenario and the 
context that affects it. The analyst also needs to understand which procedures, 
intended and otherwise, the crew might use in the specified scenario.  
 Task Analysis: This step of the qualitative analysis process involves the 
identification of the subtask associated with the crew’s cognitive processes and 
physical actions in relation to the specific HFE of interest. Task analysis is also 
used to aid in identifying both the opportunities for incorrect responses, and 
opportunities for recovery after the incorrect responses are made. 
 Identification of Failure Causes: The aim of this step of the analysis is to 
identify the potential causes of human error which could lead to the failure of the 
specific HFE of interest. These causes of human error are referred to as crew 
failure modes in our methodology. 
 Assessment of Influence of Context: The aim of the final step of the analysis is 
to identify and assess the factors that influence the likelihood of the occurrence of 
human error by increasing or decreasing it. We refer to these factors as 
performance influencing factors (PIFs) and they are derived from context 
provided by the crew conditions, plant scenarios and environmental factors.  
The above steps, captured through appropriate tools and techniques, are reflected 
in the following process flow diagram (Figure 4-1). The diagram recognized two 
distinct possibilities as the starting point of the analysis: (1) HFEs are identified as 





Figure 4-1: Qualitative Analysis Process overview 
 
4.1 Summary of the Analysis Procedure 
The main steps of the Qualitative Analysis Procedure are: 
 Step 1: PRA Scenario Development/Familiarization 
 Step 2: Development of Crew Response Tree 
 Step 3: Identification of Crew Failure Modes for CRT Branches 
 Step 4: Construction of HFE Scenarios 
 Step 5: Analysis of HFE Scenarios, Development of Narratives, and Identification 
of Dependencies 
 
Important sub-steps and products of the steps are summarized in Table 4-1.  The steps 








Table 4-1: Major Steps and Products of the Qualitative Analysis Procedure 
 
 
In general, the objectives of Steps 1 and 2 (in part) are to identify and incorporate 
HFEs (which, in a PRA context, are defined as functional failures, such as failure to 
initiate feed and bleed before core damage occurs) into a PRA. If the PRA models 
(ESD/ET and corresponding FTs) exist and HFEs are identified, Step 1 of the 
qualitative analysis primarily becomes the process of analysts gaining familiarity with 
the PRA scenarios leading to the HFEs and gathering the needed information to 
support construction of the crew response tree and completion of other qualitative 
analysis steps. Otherwise, the analysis starts with development of the PRA models 
Steps   Sub-Steps   Product 
1.  Develop/Identify PRA 
scenarios for analysis
• Use standard PRA steps to build  or 
review ET or ESD for the IE
• Select PRA scenario and gather 
general context information for 
• ESD/ET 
• Plant Scenario Context 
Factors
• Major safety functions in 
2. Develop CRT • Perform Task Analysis (procedure 
review)




• Possibly modified PRA 
model 
3.  Identify Crew Failure 
Modes for CRT Branches
• Trace CFM Causal Models (FTs) for 
various CRT branches on scenarios 
leading to HFEs and keep portions 
applicable to each branch
• CFM sub-trees for CRT 
branches
4.  Develop CRT scenarios for 
HFE (s) in terms of CFMs and 
relevant context factors and 
PIFs
• Link FTs of CRT scenarios to HFEs 
of interest  and solve linked model 
• Identify relevant PIFs for CRT 
scenario using the CFM-PIF tables / 
CFM-PIF BBN model
• CRT scenario CFM “cut 
sets”
• List of PIFs for each
5. Analyze Scenarios, Write 
Narrative, Trace Dependencies
• Describe scenarios as sequences of 
crew cognitive and physical activities 
and factors contributing to the success 
of single or multiple failures (HFEs)
• Narratives for HFE 
scenarios 
• Qualitative Insights 




and, ideally, concurrent and iterative development of CRTs. When starting with an 
existing HFE, the process may indeed lead to the modifications of the HFE or the 
addition of new ones to the PRA. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will discuss our task analysis process and 
provide some information required to support the qualitative analysis process. In the 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation, we’ll discuss in detail the other steps and 
sub-steps of the qualitative analysis procedure which include the development of the 
CRT and CFM causal models, CFMs and PIFs used in the model, and the CFM – PIF 
causal model. 
4.2 Task Analysis 
A task is a set of human behaviors or actions which are necessary to accomplish a 
system goal, independent of the individual that is performing it. In the NPP, crews are 
assigned various tasks which need to be completed for the smooth running of the 
facility. Each task can be decomposed into multiple sub-tasks and each sub-task into 
more sub-tasks and so on. Hence, there is a need for a set of guidelines to aid in 
conducting task decomposition. 
Task analysis is a formal and systematic approach used to describe the physical 
actions and cognitive processes required by the crew in order to achieve the overall 
system goal [26], [28]. It creates a picture of the extent of human involvement given a 
certain task, and uses the information that is necessary for an analysis to the extent of 
adequacy required of that involvement. It describes the activities involved in 
completing a task. One of the main issues in task analysis is determining where to 




order to obtain the right level of detail required for the analysis. This is necessary to 
promote consistency and traceability among different analyst using this methodology 
and also to prevent the analysis being done at different levels of abstraction. Hence, 
guidelines for task analysis is provided to aid in identifying the sub-tasks (at the right 
level of detail) associated with crew’s actions and cognitive processes related to the 
specific HFE of interest. 
4.2.1 Task Decomposition 
A task can be described starting from the overall system goal(s) and then breaking 
it down to the level of individual operations. In order to successfully perform this 
decomposition, the analyst needs to consider the functional, cognitive and procedural 
requirements of the task to be analyzed.  
The crew response tree (CRT) is a tool used for task decomposition of the 
particular safety function of interest. The functional requirements are covered in the 
CRT flowchart construction process by decomposing the safety function (which can 
be considered the overall system goal) into individual crew member actions. This is 
accomplished by using the questions which guide the addition of branches to the 
CRT.  Procedures are used to provide explicit step-by-step guidance required by the 
crew in completing the safety function. 
In addition to the CRT, the human response model (IDA) is also used as a vehicle 
for task decomposition. The phases of the IDA model cover subdivisions such as 
Noticing/ detecting /understanding, Situation assessment / diagnosis, Decision 
making / response planning, and Action taking. Within each of the IDA elements, a 




decomposed into sub I-D-A structures. Each phase of the sub I-D-A structure can also 
be decomposed into other sub I-D-A structures and so on. The level of decomposition 
of these IDA elements depends on the amount of detail needed for the task analysis 
and parsing of different human activities into ‘sub-events” or sub-tasks (Figure 4-2). 
In addition to the nested IDA structure, the human response model has both cognitive 
and physical requirements embedded in it. As indicated in the fault tree representation 
of the model, the crew is either adhering to the procedures or relying on their 
knowledge as the strategy for performing their assigned task at any given time. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Representation of the flow of Task analysis 
 
 
Connected together, both modeling tools (the CRT and associated fault trees) in 
conjunction with the PRA model provide the flow of task analysis. Together, they 
provide the analyst with the information on what to consider in the task analysis. This 
mixture of procedures, cognitive and physical processes, and system interface aid in 




certain level of detail at the system, and the functional interface between the system 
and the crew.  
The PRA model also imposes a certain level of detail. The CRT is used to model 
the crew-plant interaction scenarios and for identifying the HFEs while the fault trees 
are used to represent the human response model where the HFE is the top event and 
the CFMs form the basic events. Therefore, the analyst can use the CFMs as an aid in 
identifying the level of task definition since it is the basic task unit used in estimating 
HEPs in our methodology. 
4.2.2 Crew activities 
In the task analysis process, each task can be decomposed into different task steps 
and these task steps can be characterized in terms of the activities that are involved.  
We have provided a set of activities to serve as a guide to the entire process as shown 
in Figure 4-2. These set of activities (see Table 4-2 ) represent the types of activities 
generally carried out by the crew (types of crew activities). These set was adopted 
from the extended version of CREAM [12], and we have expanded it to include other 
specific activities that we consider relevant in crew’s interaction with the plant or 
system.  
When combined with our human response model (IDA), each crew activity can be 
associated with the different IDA phases i.e. Information processing, Decision 
making and Action taking (see Table 4-3). We assume that in their interactions with 
the plant, the crew carries out four main functions namely: Noticing/ detecting / 
understanding, Situation assessment / Diagnosis, Decision-making / Response 




noting that the D phase has been decomposed into situation assessment/ Diagnosis 
and Decision making / response planning for simplicity. It can also be merged 




Table 4-2: Types of Crew Activities and Definitions 
 
Monitor
To follow the development or keep track of system parameters  / states, indicators, alarm 
activations, annuciators over a period of time.
Scan
To quickly or speedy review of displays, indicators or other information source(s) to obtain a 
general impression of the state of a system or individual parameters.
Detect / Observe
To discover or read specific measurement values, key alarm activations, annuciators, 
indications, procedures and changes in the state of the system in general.
Identify
To establish the identity of the state of a plant or parameter which may involve specific 
operations to retrieve information and investigate details.  It also involves choosing the right 
procedure to use or step to follow in completing a task."Identification" is a more thorough 
activity than "evaluation".
Communicate
To transfer information needed for system operation between crew members. This is done 
by either verbal, electronic or mechanical means. Communication is an essential part of crew 
response.
Evaluate / Interprete
To appraise or assess an actual or hypothetical situation, based on available information 
without requiring special operations. It also involves assessing crew actions like procedure 
transfers etc. Other related terms  are "inspect" and "check".
Record To write down or log system events, measurements and other related plant information.
Compare
To examine the qualities of two or more entities (plant / system information, events, 
parameters) with the aim of discovering similarities or differences. This comparison may 
require some form of calculation.
Verify
To confirm the correctness of a system /parameter condition or measurement, either by 
inspection or test. It includes the review of previous information gathered about the system or 
parameter, which could be in the form of feedback from prior operations . Verification also 
includes confirming the use of the correct procedure or procedure step for the task being 
performed (by the crew).
Adapt
To adjust to a changing plant / parameter state or condition e.g. adapting a set of procedure 
to the current plant condition.
Diagnosis
To recognise or determine the nature or cause of a condition by means of reasoning about its 
signs or symptoms or by the performance of appropriate tests.  "Diagnosis" is a more 
thorough activity than "identification".
Decide
To knowningly choose a certain course of action like choosing to collect a certain piece of 
information or not. This may be based on some preconceive notions or ideas.
Plan
To formulate or organise a set of actions (either long-term or short-term) by which a goal will 
be successfully achieved.
Coordinate
To bring system states and/or control configurations into the specific relation required to 
carry out a task or task step e.g. allocating or selecting resources in preparation for a 
task/job, calibration of equipment, coordinating activities among crew members, etc.
Execute
To perform a previously specified action or plan e.g. opening/closing control valves, starting 
/stopping pumps, filling/draining tanks, etc.
Regulate
To alter the speed or direction of a control (system) in order to attain a goal e.g. positioning 
plant  parameters to reach a target state.
Maintain
To sustain a  system plant in a specific operational state. Note that this is different from 
maintenance which is generally an off-line activity.
Adhere
To follow procedures and instructions for carrying out assigned task or specific course of 
action.






Table 4-3: Relationship between types of Crew Activities, CFMs and IDA phases 
 
 
Each crew activity can be described in terms of any of the combinations of the four 
functions it requires (Table 4-3). For example, a task step that requires the crew to 
compare certain aspects of the system performance will primarily involve Noticing/ 
detecting / understanding and Situation assessment / Diagnosis functions and this is 
indicated by shading the corresponding cells. Also since the crew (and not the 
individual operator) is the unit of analysis in our methodology, activities like 





















































communicate, adhere, decide and coordinate are considered to involve all four 
functions.  
Each crew activity can be used to characterize a task step and in some instances, a 
task step may be characterized by more than one crew activity. We have also included 
our CFMs I1 – A3 to aid the HRA analyst in identifying the predominant failure 
modes that can be associated with a particular crew activity. As an example, during a 
“comparing” activity, the predominant failure modes should be from any of those 
under the Noticing/ detecting / understanding and Situation assessment / Diagnosis 
functions. 
4.2.3 Basic Guidelines for Task Decomposition 
There are no hard and fast rules on where to stop task parsing i.e. the right level of 
detail required for the task analysis. However, we are providing some guidelines on 
which the analyst could base his or her decision. The level of task decomposition 
required for task analysis can be based on: 
 The level of detail required in the PRA model. In order to be consistent, the 
analyst can base the level of detail in the task analysis on that of the PRA model. 
 The resources available for modeling and conducting the analysis. This may affect 
the level of task decomposition because if the analyst has sufficient time and 
resources allocated for conducting the analysis, he or she may decompose the task 
into more levels of detail as opposed to when limited or insufficient time is 
available. 
 The HRA requirements and purpose of the analysis. The requirements specified 




level of task decomposition required. However, we recommend that task parsing 
should be continued at least till the analyst gets to the subsystem level. Thereafter, 
he or she may decide if the component level of detail is necessary or not. 
 The amount and type of information available. The amount and type of 
information available for the analysis would aid in determining the level of task 
decomposition. For example, if there is a lot of information available at the 
component level of the system, the analyst may be able to conduct the analysis at 
this level. However, if little or no information is available at this level but there is 
enough at sub-system level, the analyst will likely carry out the analysis at the 
sub-system level. 
 The success criteria for achieving the safety function. The success criteria for 
achieving the safety function can aid the analyst in determining the right level of 
detail for task analysis. If the success criteria at the component level are 
significantly different for the individual components, then it is recommended to 
model the different components separately and conduct the analysis at the 
component level. Otherwise, the analyst can stop at the subsystem level or merge 
the respective components and model them together. For illustrative purposes, a 
hierarchical task analysis (HTA) is used to represent the task (safety function) – 
Heat sink removal (Figure 4-3). This task can be accomplished by using the 
auxiliary feed water system (AFW), main feed water system (MFW) or the feed 
and bleed system (F&B). The MFW is made up of the main feed water and 
condenser pump subsystems while the F&B is made up of feed and bleed 




indicated in Figure 4-3. The AFW has three components namely component 
pumps, water source and valves (alignment). In order to use this system to 
accomplish the task (heat sink removal), the crew needs to start the pumps within 
one hour but need to make up the water source 8 hours later. Therefore due to this 
significant time difference between the two human actions, we recommend that 
the two components should be modeled separately. However, alignment of valves 
and pump start can be done within the same time frame and hence, there is no 









4.3 Information required to support the Qualitative Analysis Process 
An HRA analyst needs to collect various types of information in order to support 
the analysis process. This information are generally gathered through interviews with 
plant and operations personnel, plant walk-through, talk-through, review of plant 
documents like operating procedures, plant diagrams, training manuals, etc. It 
includes: 
 Operating instructions including those for emergency, annunciator, accident 
management, from the respective operating procedures 
 Pictures of the interface and working environment 
 General plant layout 
 Engineering flow information 
 Plant piping and instrumentation (P&IDs) information 
 Mechanical flow information 
 Information on system functions, associated systems and equipment modeled in 
the PRA 
 System-fault information from system-fault schedules 
 Interlock information from interlock schedules 
 Information on prior incident through interviews with plant personnel and 
incident reports 
 Existing task analysis from analysis reports 
 Training programs from training manuals and interviews with plant personnel 
Operating experiences through interviews with plant personnel, operation logs 




 Crew composition in terms of size, experience level, through interviews with 
plant management & plant personnel 
  Note that this is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but to provide some 























5 Crew Response Tree Development 
The development of a Crew Response Tree (CRT) is a key step of the qualitative 
analysis process. The CRT is a visual representation of the crew-plant interaction 
scenarios leading to HFEs as well as a structure that supports the performance and 
documentation of the qualitative analysis. The CRT is partly a formalization 
ATHEANA’s “deviation” search method [29] . CRT can be devoted to finding paths 
to predefined HFEs and possible recoveries, or used as a vehicle to also identify new 
HFEs. The process can cover both Errors of Omission and Errors of Commission. 
CRTs can be constructed for crew response situations that are procedure driven (PD), 
knowledge driven (KD), or a hybrid of both (HD).  
The main advantage of the CRT is that it leads analysts to perform a thorough 
assessment of the conditions that could lead crews to take inappropriate paths (for 
instance, when following procedures). This will obviously lead to a more extensive 
qualitative analysis and a broader consideration of the conditions that could lead 
crews to fail, along with different ways in which they could fail. The structure 
facilitates systematic identification of the so-called deviation scenarios (i.e. variations 
in conditions that could lead the crew to take inappropriate paths). The sub-steps 
involved in developing a CRT include the identification and review of relevant 
procedures, construction of the CRT, pruning/simplification of the CRT and the 




5.1 Identification and Review of Relevant Procedures 
For procedure-driven crew response, CRT branches include failures to perform 
certain steps in the procedure (i.e. the HFE can occur because of a failure to correctly 
follow a specific step of the procedure). Therefore, in preparing to develop the CRT, 
the analyst must identify and review which procedures are in play. The procedures 
may include the Functional Response Procedures (FRPs) and Critical Safety 
Functions Status Trees (CSFTs). And from an understanding of the role of the 
procedural steps, the analyst needs to identify the critical steps which, if not 
performed correctly, will lead to the HFE, unless the possibility of recovery exists. 
In some cases, the failure of a specific step, which leads to a branching from the 
expected response, may be due to the plant parameters or system states not fully or 
unambiguously satisfying the decision criteria. In addition, some failures of the HFE 
may occur because a response path takes too long. The nature of the steps of the 
procedure may be different, and failure in each type is a potential contributor. 
Note that not all the procedural directions are essential; some are confirmatory, 
and performing them incorrectly would not necessarily lead to failure. However, they 
may be relevant as recovery factors, and they certainly contribute to using up 
available time. Therefore, the branches on the CRT represent failures or successes to 
follow the critical steps in the procedure. On the failure branches, by walking through 
the procedure with an understanding of the way the plant status is changing, 





5.2 CRT Construction 
In order to simplify the process of constructing the CRT, a modular approach is 
proposed. According to this approach, CRTs are developed to model HFEs 
corresponding to a given safety function. Safety function may refer to the intended 
function of a specific plant system, a desired state of the plant or system in response 
to plant upset, or a combination of both. A typical event tree (ET) model includes 
success and failures of safety functions involved in plant response following the 
initiating event. Typically, crew tasks are defined in reference to delivery of the 
safety functions.  HFEs are also defined in reference to such functions. For instance, 
in implementing emergency operating procedure (EOP) E-3, it is expected that the 
crew performs four primary tasks (for which there are corresponding HFEs): 
1. Identifying which steam generator (SG) is ruptured and isolating it  
2. Cooling down the reactor cooling system (RCS) by cooling the secondary loop via 
dumping steam 
3. Depressurizing the RCS using the pressurizer spray or pressurizer PORV 
4. Stopping safety injection (SI) upon indication that the SI termination criteria are 
met 
 The analysts (PRA team) determine the level of detail at which the safety functions 
are defined. Based on the PRA scenario, the analyst will identify the safety 
function(s) that play a role in plant and crew response. The HRA team needs to 
review the event trees and consider other gathered information regarding the HFE to 
decide what safety function to analyze. Sometimes, there is more than one safety 




CRT will be developed for each identified relevant safety function. These function-
based CRTs may be linked to cover the full range of an accident timeline and possible 
scenarios as reflected in the corresponding PRA event trees or event sequence 
diagrams. 
 A CRT is primarily constructed to represent the task decomposition. Its 
development involves an interdisciplinary team of PRA and HRA analysts because it 
requires the knowledge of the human response and plant behavior. In principle, the 
ET plays a similar role in HRA, although the level of detail is not usually sufficient 
for HRA analysis. The initial methodology for the construction of the CRTs was 
provided by [25]. However, it has been improved and enhanced for consistency and 
completeness as part of this research work. The CRT Flowchart is to be viewed as the 
procedure aiding the analyst in the CRT development process. The questions in the 
flowchart serve as a guide to the addition of branches to the CRT. Hence, the 
flowchart has pruning rules incorporated into its design. 
 In order to construct the CRT, the main inputs needed by the analyst include the 
HFE definition, identified safety function, crew and plant context, and all procedures 
used to carry out the safety function. The main output is a task decomposition of the 
safety function in the form of an ET, which can be used to find the failure and success 
paths, and the branch points of interest. This would aid in the HEP quantification. 
 As stated earlier, before starting the process of constructing a CRT, the analyst 
needs information regarding other contextual factors that could lead to the HFE by 
influencing the crew’s ability to respond to the PRA scenario. This information can 




simulator observation, etc. The analyst is encouraged to collect additional information 
as needed during the CRT construction process and not wait to have a complete set of 
information before beginning the process. Even though the CRT represents 
procedurally driven task decomposition, and therefore would appear to be applicable 
only to internal events occurring at full power (where most of the tasks represented in 
the CRT involve EOPs related to the scenario), it can also be employed for other 
scenarios less closely linked with EOPs [25]. Figure 5-1 shows the CRT Flowchart. 
Table 5-1 provides a detailed description of the questions and Table 5-2 provides a 
description of the success and failure paths of each branch points in the CRT 
Flowchart. 
 Based on the understanding of the main inputs needed for the CRT construction, 
the analyst will step through the CRT flowchart to construct the CRT. He or she starts 
with the first question: “Is the specific function designed to be initiated 
automatically?” If the answer is yes, the analyst would follow the “yes-arrow” to 
question number 2: “Is the scenario a fast transient?” If the answer is no, the analyst 
will follow the “no-arrow” to question number 3:  “Is there a procedure that includes 
monitoring and operation of the specific safety function?” If the answer to question 
number 2 is no, the analyst will follow the “no-arrow” to the box which says “Branch 
Point A”. This informs the analyst that one branch point in the CRT should be 
created. The branch point’s success path is “crew manually initiates the safety 
function before it is automatically initiated”. The failure path is “crew does not 
manually initiate the safety function.” If the answer to question number 2 is yes, the 




analyst creates this branch point whose success and failure paths are “The safety 
function is automatically initiated.” and “The safety function is not automatically 
initiated” respectively. By systematically stepping through the flowchart with the aid 
of the questions and branch point descriptions, the CRT will be fully created when the 
analysts reach the sixth and final question in the CRT Flowchart: “Are there 
additional equipment and manual actions that could be used to provide the specific 
safety function?” If the answer is no, the process of constructing the CRT is complete. 
However, if the answer is yes, the analyst will follow the “yes-arrow” to question 















No. Question Description and Example
1 Is the specific function designed to be 
initiated automatically?
Auxiliary Feed Water is an example of safety function designed to 
be initiated automatically. Isolation of a steam generator is an 
example of a safety function that is not designed to be initiated 
automatically.
2 Is the scenario a fast transient? If loss of Main Feed Water occurs, the Auxiliary Feed Water will 
be automatically initiated shortly thereafter. Hence, Auxiliary Feed 
Water is a fast transient.
3.a Is there a procedure that includes 
monitoring and operation of the specific 
safety function?  
The answer to this question is either a “yes” or “no”.
3.b
Is there a specific entry point in the current 
procedure to a step to manually initiate the 
safety function?
If there is an entry point in the current procedure to a step (or a 
supplemental procedure) to manually initiate the safety function, 
the answer to this question will be “yes”. 
4 Are there other procedural entry points that 
lead to a step to manually initiate the safety 
function?
The answer is “yes” if there are additional entry points in the 
current procedure (or another procedure to which the operator is 
directed to) that includes a step to manually initiate the safety 
function.
5 Are there any unexplored options under 3.b 
and 4? If there are other options in the procedure to lead the operator to 
manually initiate the safety function, the answer will be “yes”. 
6 Are there additional equipment and manual 
actions that could be used to provide the 
specific safety function? This question refers 
to recovery actions that the crew could 
potentially take when everything else fails.
If there are other ways to achieve the same result as the safety 
function, the answer to this question will be “yes”. If there are no 




Table 5-2: Detailed Description of the Success and Failure Paths for Each BP 
 
 
5.2.1 Additional Notes on the Flowchart Questions and Branch Points 
 Questions 1 and 2 determine the relevant design feature and timing of system 
response. Based on that, Branch Point A explores possibility of “preemptive” 
action by the crew.  
BP Success Path Failure Path
A Operator manually initiates the safety function before 
it is automatically initiated.
Operator does not manually initiate the safety 
function before it is automatically initiated.
B The safety function is automatically initiated. The safety function is not automatically initiated.
C Operator does not manually turn off the automatically 
initiated safety function.
Operator manually turns off the automatically 
initiated safety function.
D
This branch point considers 
whether the crew is in the correct procedure,
various options provided by the procedure for 
success (i.e., multiple choices, each providing a 
successful path to the critical step to manually initiate 
the safety function, given the condition)
So this branch point may produce multiple branches, 
each of which need to be pursued separately in the 
CRT. The Success Path corresponds to operator 
choosing a correct option for the condition and 
manually initiating the safety function.
Operator is not in the correct procedure, 
Operator is in the correct procedure but chooses 
the wrong option for the condition, resulting in 
failure to manually initiate the safety function.
E Similar to Branch Point D. Similar to Branch Point D. 
F Operator doesn’t transfer to the wrong direction 
from the exit point.
Operator transfers to the wrong direction from 
the exit point.
G Safety function is not impaired by equipment 
(hardware / system) failure.
The safety function is impaired by non-
recoverable equipment (hardware / system) 
failure.
H Operators successfully initiate the safety function 
manually.





 Branch Point B considers the possibility of failure of automatic actuation of the 
omission system, while Branch Point C explores the potential for an error of 
commission (EOC) by the crew in disabling the safety function.  
 Question 3.a determines if there are procedures governing the crew response In 
most cases of interest, the answer to this question is “yes.” The cases where there 
are no procedures are outside of the scope of this flowchart. Question 3.b explores 
whether procedure has explicit entry point to a step for manually actuating the 
safety system. Branch Point D expands the CRT to include cases where the crew 
fails to enter the correct procedure, or fails in following the correct path (possibly 
one of several) leading to a step to manually actuate the safety system. 
 Question 4 determines if there are additional entry points in the current procedure 
(or another procedure to which the crew is directed to) that includes a step to 
manually initiate the safety function. Branch Point E is similar to Branch Point D, 
providing a second opportunity for the crew (response to Question 4).  Therefore, 
this Branch Point covers cases where the crew fails to enter the correct procedure 
when given a new chance, or fails in following the correct path (possibly one of 
several) leading to a step to manually actuate the safety system. 
 Question 5 makes sure that all the options listed under Branch Points D and E are 
covered in the analysis. If at this point the crew has reached the step to manually 
actuate the safety system, Branch Point F covers the possibility of the crew 
transferring to the wrong direction from the exit point. Branch Point G deals with 




(hardware/ system) failure, while Branch Point H considers the possibility that the 
crew may fail in the initiation and actuation of the system.   
 Question 6 determines if there are other ways to achieve the same result as the 
safety function. A positive answer to this question may require re-entering the 
flowchart through question 3. 
 













































5.2.2 Explicit Consideration of Time 
The CRT construction flowchart (Figure 5-1) produces a skeleton CRT of the main 
branches in reference to the plant functions and procedural steps. The variations in 
scenarios due to the timing of the crew’s response may also be included as branch 
points. Generally, the crew’s response is generally considered to be either successful 
or not as represented in the CRT construction flowchart. In this case, timing is of no 
significant importance. However, there are situations where the timing of their 
responses should be explicitly considered and these include: 
 When timing has a significant impact on their next action or representation of 
their mental state 
 When there are competing events i.e. situations where one action needs to be 
completed before the next one 
 When there are events in sequence (whether short or long duration) 
 When the current event has an impact on future events 
In order to explicitly consider timing in the CRT, each success path in the flow 
chart can be expanded into any of the following paths: successfully finished early, 
successfully finished late but within the allowed time window, and hardware failure 






Figure 5-2: Timing in CRT Construction (Success Paths) 
 
Also, each failure path can be expanded into any of the following paths: finished 
but not within the allowed time window, finished but with the wrong ordering that 
may cause component / system malfunction, partially finished (incomplete), no crew 




Figure 5-3: Timing in CRT Construction (Failure Paths) 
 
 
Therefore, instead of the conventional binary branches of the ET (which is 
generally used to represent the CRT when the timing of crew response is not of 




each branch point can be used when timing of crew responses that need to be 
incorporated into the CRT construction. 
5.2.3 Inclusion of Recovery 
Additional branch points can be introduced for explicit consideration of recovery 
from CFMs. Possibility of recovery refers to the possibility that the initial fault on the 
part of the crew may be corrected before the failure represented by the HFE occurs 
(i.e. it is internal to the evaluation of the HFE). In other words, before the cliff-edge at 
which no correction is possible, the crew is able to recognize that their response is not 
working and are able to do a mid-course correction.   
Some of what could be called recovery is already included as one of the PIFs, a 
good example being the skill-of-the-craft implementation of searching for 
confirmatory indications, another being the existence of an alarm that is directly 
related to the required response. However, in general, the possibility of recovery from 
CFMs can be included as branches of the CRT. We refer to this as “global” recovery. 
An example is when the analysts can identify the possibility that new information 
comes into play once the crew has deviated from the required path. It is necessary to 
be clear what recovery mechanisms represented are already included in the definition 
of CFMs. This because the ability of the crew to immediately realize and recover 
from an error while making it is incorporated in to the conditional probability 
estimate of the particular CFM. We refer to this as “local’ recovery. 
A high likelihood of recovery would generally be associated with scenario 




 The evolution of the plant status, as determined by parameters that the crew is 
expected to be monitoring subsequent to the error they have made, should be 
sufficiently at odds with the mental picture of the plant in order to create a need to 
reassess whether their response is the correct one. In other words, the new 
evidence is strong. 
 The newly revealed plant status is such that there is a plan or procedural path for 
correct response given a revised mental model. 
 The arrival of the new information and its assimilation can happen in sufficient 
time to allow the correct response to be effective and prevent the HFE.  
Therefore, to determine whether to take any credit for recovery, the analyst must 
develop an understanding of the evolution of the plant status and the expected crew 
behavior, following the initial incorrect response (as characterized by the descriptor 
for the CFMs). The analyst, therefore, should determine: 
 How the plant status is changing following the error. 
 What path through the procedures the crew is following, what new information 
will be revealed, and what does the procedure indicate about the plant status given 
this information.  
 How the crew interacts; who’s doing what and with what resources (e.g., 
procedures, displays). 
 How the training plays into the processing of this new information. 
 Whether and how the crew monitors the status of the plant to see if the plant 




check that level is stabilizing or increasing. This may be a parallel activity to the 
above. 
 Establish the timeline for the new information and the necessary responses to 
determine if this can be achieved given the success criteria for the response.  
For some cases, the identification of a recovery is quite simple. For example, in 
both Westinghouse and B&W procedures, if the crew member following the EOPs 
does not realize the need to begin feed and bleed, the crew member tracking the 
critical safety functions with his or her own procedure may identify the need. 
However, some of the more complex recoveries, particularly from errors of 
commission will be harder to track. 
5.2.4 Combining Function Level CRTs 
As indicated earlier, the CRT Flowchart methodology covers a case where the 
HFE is associated with a specific safety function in the context of a defined PRA 
scenario. The different “function-level” CRT modules can be assembled through 
simple merge rules to build larger and more comprehensive CRTs [6] .  
Let’s assume that the function “secondary heat sink control (SHSC)” is 
represented by CRT module 1, “Feed” is represented by CRT module 2 and “Bleed” 
is represented by CRT module 3 as indicated in Figure 5-4. Also, assume that the 
“success” end state in CRT module 1 is “Feed”. The CRT flowchart can be used to 
construct a CRT with “Feed” as the safety function (i.e. CRT module for function 2). 
Also, assuming that the “success” end state in CRT module 2 is “Bleed”, the CRT 
flowchart can also be used to construct a CRT with “Bleed” as the safety function 




connected together to form a much larger and more comprehensive CRT, covering 




Figure 5-4: Linking of function-level CRT modules to form a large CRT 
 
Here are some guidelines that could aid the analyst in determining whether to 
continue or stop developing the next CRT module from the end state of the present 
CRT (merge rules). 
 If there is an option for recovery, use that end state as the safety function in 
developing the connecting CRT. 
 If there is a “success” end state, use it as the safety function in developing the 
connecting CRT. 
 If there is a “failure” end state and no option for recovery, then stop at that point 
and don’t develop the connecting CRT. 
5.3 Pruning / Simplification of the CRT 
In addition to deciding which branches to keep in the tree and ultimately quantify, 




branches into a single node for quantification purposes.  For example, if the impact of 
some end states is not significantly different (i.e. the end states are similar) the analyst 
may decide to merge them to become one end state. In other words, it may initially be 
reasonable to break-out the various failure paths to a detailed level. However, for 
example, it may be decided later on that the cues and related decisions for some steps 
in the procedures create a dependency between the steps or imply that the steps 
should be integrated for quantification purposes. Thus, it may make sense to quantify 
the branches together. 
5.4 Addition of New HFEs to the PRA Model 








6 Human Response Model Fault Tree Construction 
The CRT branches and sequences capture some, but not all of the contextual 
factors and causes of crew error. In order to simplify the modeling process and 
analysis, the CRT branches are defined at the functional level and therefore; do not 
cover the human failure mechanisms or their causes [25]. HFEs or contributing 
causes can be traced through the I-D-A chain using the information-processing 
model.  An error (which is the mismatch between the crew’s action and plant need) 
could therefore be rooted in (1) action execution failure, A, given correct decision; (2) 
failure in situation assessment, problem solving and decision making, given correct 
information, D; or (3) failure in the information-gathering stage, I. Error is being 
defined in terms of the crew failing to meet the needs of the plant (and this is 
typically related to a required safety function) with focus on the functional impact of 
crew actions. It may be identical to HFEs defined in PRAs (as top events in the event 
tree or basic event in the fault tree) or one of the corresponding causes.  
 In this view, the “minimal cut-sets” of the human failure events are the failures in 






Figure 6-1: HFE logic in terms of IDA phases [6] 
 
 
 Potentially, all CFMs are relevant to each CRT branch point and therefore each 
HFE. However, when an analysis is conducted in the context of a scenario, and 
depending on the I-D-A phase, only a subset of the CFMs will apply. As an example, 
if there is no reliance on an alarm, then the CFM related to alarms “Key Alarm Not 
Responded To” will not be applicable. Therefore, an initial set of fault trees was 
introduced to aid the analysts in the selection of the relevant CFMs for each branch 
point within each scenario [25]. These fault trees were developed in order to bridge 
the gap between the fields of HRA and psychology/human factors and they are based 
on salient information from cognitive psychology literature. Using the same basis, 
inputs from domain experts and our judgment, we have expanded the fault trees (as 
part of this research work) to include all our CFMs and also improved the structure to 
enhance clarity and consistency. The improved and enhanced trees will serve as a 
better guide to the analyst in the CFM selection process. The complete list of CFMs 
and their definitions are discussed later in this dissertation. 
 The simplified cognitive model used in these FTs has three main parts as indicated 




context related to the CRT branch point assessed, the analyst will trace through until 
eventually encountering an end point in the trees which represents the CFM 
associated with the branch point. Note that the CFMs which form the basic events in 
the FTs (i.e. the lowest level of the FTs) have red small circles underneath them for 
easy identification. Also, in some instance, a CFM can occur when the crew is 
following procedure and also relying on their knowledge. The crew can also switch 
between the procedure mode (following procedure as the strategy) and knowledge 
mode (relying on their knowledge as the strategy) during a specific event. 
6.1 Failure in Collecting Necessary Information 
In order to fail in collecting the necessary information, the crew has to fail in 
collecting both primary and secondary information (as indicated in Figure 6-2). Each 
of this failure can occur if there is a failed information source, a failure in decision to 
collect information and a failure in execution to collect information. The information 
sources include plant instruments, documents (e.g. procedures), and the crew 
members. The CFM representing the manner in which the crew members would fail 
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Figure 6-2: Failure in Collecting Necessary Information part of the Fault Tree 
 
6.1.1 Failure in Decision to Collect Information 
As one of the reasons why the crew may fail in collecting either primary or 




could occur while the crew is following the required procedures (like EOPs or when 
they are relying on their knowledge as the strategy for completing their assigned 
tasks). While following the procedure as the strategy, the crew could fail either 
because the guidance given by the procedure is incomplete / incorrect or because they 
failed to collect the active information (i.e. when the crew is directed or told to obtain 
the information) required to enable them complete their tasks. The CFMs representing 
the manner in which this failure could occur (i.e. when they have failed to collect 
active information) include Data Not Checked with Appropriate Frequency, Data 
Not Obtained and Data Discounted. 
 When the crew is relying solely on their knowledge, failure could occur because 
they did not collect the required passive (i.e. when the information to be collected is 
unexpected) or active information. The CFM representing the manner in which failure 
to collect passive information could occur is Key Alarm Not Responded to (i.e. 
intentionally).When they fail to collect active information, the CFMs representing 
this manner of failure include Data Incorrectly Processed, Decision to Stop 






Figure 6-3: The Failure in Decision to Collect Information part of the Fault Tree 
 
6.1.2 Failure in Execution to Collect Information 
According to Figure 6-2, the crew may fail to collect either primary or secondary 
information because of their failure in execution to collect information . This could 
occur because they failed to collect either passive or active information. The CFM 
representing the manner in which failure to collect passive information could occur is 
Key Alarm Not Responded to (i.e. unintentionally) while those representing the 
manner in which failure to collect active information could occur include Data Not 






Figure 6-4: The Failure in Execution to Collect Information part of the Fault Tree 
 
6.2 Failure in Making the Correct Decision Given Necessary Information 
While following procedure or relying on their knowledge, the crew could fail in 
making the correct decision even if they have already collected the necessary 
information needed (Figure 6-5). In the procedure mode, this wrong decision could 
manifest in the form of the CFMs, Procedure Misinterpreted and Procedure Step 
Omitted (i.e. intentional) or when they deviate from the procedure being used. The 
crew’s deviation from the procedure being used would manifest in the form of the 
CFM, Inappropriate Transfer to a Different Procedure, error in action decision or 
situational assessment. While relying on their knowledge, the crew could fail solving 




assessment. The CFMs representing the error in action decision include 
Inappropriate Strategy Chosen and Decision to Delay Action while those 
representing error in situational assessment include Plant / System State 
Misdiagnosed and Failure to Adapt Procedure to the Situation. 
 
 
Figure 6-5: Failure in Making the Correct Decision part of the Fault Tree 
 
6.3 Failure in Taking the Correct Action Given Correct Decision 
The manner in which the failures in this part of the simplified cognitive model 
occur is represented by the following CFMs: Action on Wrong Component / 





Figure 6-6: Failure in Taking the Correct Action part of the Fault Tree 
 
The expected output from using the FTs is the list of CFMs relevant to each CRT 
branch point, hence HFE, while the inputs needed to aid in its application include the 
HFE definition, crew and plant context, identified safety function, developed CRT 
and identified critical paths in the CRT [25].  
The use of these FTs which are developed as a template in order to satisfy all the 
possible HFEs and crew plant interaction scenarios may result in a very large and 
complex model. Therefore, the analyst may adhere to the following principles 
(depending on the specific context of interest) in order to make the process more 
practical [25]: 
 Use the nature of the branch point to identify the relevant part of the CFM FT. For 
example, if a branch point corresponds to the crew transferring to a specific 
procedure, then the “information” and “decision” errors are dominant and the 
“action” error may be ignored. 
 Determine the status of the flags in the FT. If the status of a flag is off, then the 
related section of the FT may be completely ignored. For example if in a branch 




the “Flag of Following Procedure” should be set to “off” eliminating the 
























7 Crew Failure Modes  
Crew failures modes (CFMs) are used to further specify the possible forms of 
failure in each of the Information, Decision and Action (IDA) phases (i.e. they 
represent the manner in which failures occur in each IDA phase). They are the 
generic functional modes of failure of the crew in its interactions with the plant and 
represent the manifestation of the crew failure mechanisms and proximate causes of 
failure. They are selected to cover the various modes of crew response including 
procedure driven, (PD), knowledge driven (KD), or a hybrid of both (HD).  In the PD 
mode, CFMs are selected to represent how the subtasks typically found in operating 
procedures in nuclear power plants can be viewed by an observer who has an 
understanding of the crew’s expected response to a particular emergency situation. In 
order to avoid double counting crew failure scenarios during the estimation of human 
error probabilities (HEPs), the CFMs are defined as being mutually exclusive or 
orthogonal.  Note that “orthogonal” refers to how the CFMs are defined (eliminating 
overlap in their definitions) and should not be confused with mathematical 
orthogonality. 
7.1 Development of the CFM Set and Hierarchy 
 Initially, we developed a set of CFMs based on aggregated information from 
nuclear industry operating experience, relevant literature on crew error modes in 
nuclear power plants (NPPs) and discussions with NPP operators and experts. This 
was an iterative process which was repeated several times until we obtained a fairly 




US Nuclear regulatory commission’s (NRC’s) Scenario Authoring, Characterization, 
and Debriefing Application (SACADA) database project [30] into our initial CFM to 
obtain our proposed CFM set and hierarchy. The SACADA database project which is 
a part of the US NRC’s HRA data program [31] is an on-going data collection effort 
sponsored by the US NRC and aimed at collecting human performance data / 
information for use in human reliability application. This database is being developed 
by a team of well qualified industry experts from all parts of the world with a wealth 
of relevant experience to address the lack of appropriate and sufficient human 
performance data that is currently affecting human error probability (HEP) estimation 
in particular and the overall HRA quality in general. Hence, we incorporated the error 
modes from this database so that it will provide the necessary statistical basis needed 
by our methodology when the database matures in the future. 
 Table 7-1 shows the set of CFMs. Each CFM is defined based on the particular I-
D-A phase in which it occurs. 19 main CFMs have been defined (9 in the “I” phase, 7 
in the “D” phase and 3 in the “A” phase). Since we plan to incorporate data from the 
SACADA database project into our methodology, we have added a hierarchical 
structure to the CFMs (Table 7-2) to enable us maximize the use of its data points 
when they becomes available. Note that the main CFMs are indicated in green with 
the ID numbers while the lower level elements are indicated in other colors. Table 7-3 






Table 7-1: Set of CFMs 
 
 
7.2 CFMs in the Information Gathering / Processing “I” Phase 
The errors within the “I” phase assume that the crew has failed in detecting, 
noticing and understanding the plant function(s) they are supposed to be handling. 
Failure in this phase can be divided into two major groups namely: failure to collect 
passive information and failure to collect active information. The CFM that would 
occur during passive information gathering (i.e. when the information to be collected 
is unexpected) is “Key Alarm Not Responded To”. Other CFMs occur during active 














(intentional & unintentional) D1 Plant/System State Misdiagnosed A1 Incorrect Timing of Action










I6 Reading Error D6 Decision to Delay Action
























Not understood D2 Procedure Misinterpreted A2
Incorrect Operation of 
Component/Object
I2 Data Not Obtained (Intentional) Difficulty following or using procedure Executed discrete actions incorrectly














Slow interpretation of plant parameters D4 Procedure Step Omitted (Intentional) Dynamic manual control problem







































□  Sender error: Missed or incorrect
communication by the sender
◌      Misinterpreted: Misinterpreted procedure 
instruction.
     Missed communication: critical
information not communicated.
      Following Problem: Trouble following or 
using procedure
      Incorrect communication       Not Adapted: Failed to adapt to the situation.
◌    Wrong information.
◌       Proactive : Failed to take proactive 
action/anticipate required actions.
◌    Incomplete information.
◌       Adapt: Failed to adapt procedures to the 
situation.
◌    Imprecise information.
◌       Re-evaluate : Failed to re-evaluate/revise 
response as situation changed.
◌   Ambiguous information: 
unspecific in communication content.
◌       Prioritize : Failed to correctly balance 
competing priorities.
     Communication standards
deficiencies Procedure Step Omitted 
(Intentional)
◌      Specific/Focused Error: Misinterpreted, 
omitted or incorrectly performed one or more 
substep of a single step.
◌   Poorly directed: Not directed to
the right person.
      Not Consulted: Failed to consult available 
procedure.
◌   Wrong format: Phonetics/clear
terms were not used appropriately.
◌      Wrong: Used or transferred to a wrong 
procedure.
◌    Poor timing: Too early or too late.
◌      Deviated: Incorrectly decided to deviate 
from the correct procedure
□   Receiver misunderstanding
◌      Usage Rules: Violating general usage rules. 
(explain):_______________
     No repeat back: misunderstood
and did not repeat back
      Comprehensive : Failed to consider all 
options.
     Repeat back and uncorrected by
sender
      Choice : Made incorrect choice.
Data Not Obtained 
(Intentional) Decision to Delay Action
      Delayed: Delayed making decision.
Data Discounted
  Discredited: critical data 
dismissed, discredited or discounted
Incorrect Timing of 
Action




 Alarm Issues : Key alarms not 
detected or not responded to.
o  Executed discrete action(s) incorrectly
Decision to Stop 
Gathering Data
      Wrong position.
  Misinterpreted: critical data 
misinterpreted
      Skip: Skipped one or more steps
  Slow: Slow interpretation of plant 
parameters
     Order: Actions were performed in a wrong
order
Reading Error
 Indicator Issues : Key parameter 
value not detected or incorrectly read
     State Error: Failed to perform prerequisite
actions of the primary actions. 
Wrong Data Source 
Attended to 






      Wrong object.
  Incorrect/Incomplete : Failure to 
form a correct understanding or 
revise initial false concept.






















7.2.1 Key Alarm Not Responded To 
This is a case where the crew intentionally or unintentionally fails to respond to a 
key alarm. A key alarm is one for which response is expected to be immediate and the 
crew is adequately trained. It includes failure to detect, notice or understand the 
alarm. It is assumed that the alarm is the most important cue that is adequate for a 
correct assessment of the plant condition, and the expected response should lead to a 
successful outcome. A key alarm is typically expected to initiate an immediate 
response which may include working through a procedure. This CFM also includes 
not perceiving, dismissing and misperceiving the key alarm. For example, the crew 
may receive an alarm, but may be busy carrying out some other task which they 
believe is more important than responding to the alarm. Hence, they intentionally 
ignore it. Also, they may not receive the alarm because of the man-machine interface, 
noisy environment, or high work load and therefore, they don’t respond to it 
unintentionally. 
7.2.2 Data Not Obtained (Intentional) 
This CFM is applicable to a situation where the crew intentionally fails to collect 
data. This implies that the need for data is understood but a conscious decision has 
been made not to collect it. This may be because the crew has determined that the 
data is incorrect, misleading or unsuitable for the intended purpose. It may also be 
because they already have similar data which they believe should suffice. As an 
example, the crew may need to obtain specific data which they just obtained a few 





7.2.3 Data Discounted 
This is a situation where the crew understands the need for and has obtained 
correct information (either personally or communicated by another crew member) but 
decides to discard it (i.e. there is no intent to use or include it in the assessment of the 
plant state). In this case, the data is first gathered and later discounted as opposed to 
the CFM “Data Not Obtained” where the information has not been gathered at all. For 
example, the crew may obtain some information initially but on a second thought, 
they may decide to give it up because they assume it is not relevant to the current 
situation they are encountering. 
7.2.4 Decision to Stop Gathering Data 
This is a situation where the crew has been collecting information and at some 
point determines that they do not require any more data based on their confidence in 
the assessment of the plant status (i.e. they have collected enough information to 
enable them obtain a true picture of the plant state and no additional data is needed). 
Hence, there is no motivation to continue the data collection process since the goal 
has been accomplished. As an example, the crew may be gathering data with regards 
to a certain situation in the plant. They get interrupted by other persons or information 
and thereafter, they decide to stop collecting the data. 
7.2.5 Data Incorrectly Processed 
This is a situation where the crew misinterprets or is slow in interpreting plant 
parameters / information read from the indicator or received from other crew 




check the status of the charging pump and conclude that the charging flow is normal 
because the charging pump is still running. However, the failed (open) release valve 
may have caused no charging flow to the seals but the crew member may not realize 
it. He/ she may believe that the charging flow is normal. 
7.2.6 Reading Error 
This CFM is applicable to a situation where the crew tries to read a procedure or 
indicator but somehow makes a mistake. It include mistakes in reading procedure 
steps, detecting and/or reading the values of parameters from some form of display 
like an indicator, and mistakes in determining the status of equipment based on 
indications on the control panel. This is a case where everything is put in place 
correctly but the crew still makes a simple mistake. It is more of an “eye” error. For 
example, during an upset plant condition, the crew may misread a procedure step 
“turn valve A 3 times clockwise” as “turn valve A 2 times clockwise”, an “on” 
indicator pump light for “off” or  a “closed” valve indicator for “open”. 
7.2.7 Data Miscommunicated 
This covers the case where there is a missed or incorrect transfer of information 
between crew members (i.e. the receiver and sender). The sender may not 
communicate the necessary information or may pass along incorrect information in 
the form of wrong, incomplete, imprecise or ambiguous information to the receiver. 
Also, the crew member may direct the information to the wrong person, present it in 
the wrong format (e.g. inappropriate use of terms or phonetics) or at the wrong time 




information transmitted and does not repeat back to the sender (for an opportunity for 
confirmation). Also, the crew member may repeat the misunderstood information to 
the sender but the sender does not correct it. As an example, during a plant upset 
condition, the control room crew may not pass on the required information to the field 
crew on time. This may cause a delay in returning the plant to a stable state. 
7.2.8 Wrong Data Source Attended to 
This is a situation where the crew is aware of the need to obtain information and 
the correct information is available, but they unintentionally try to collect this 
information from the wrong source. For example, the required reading should be 
obtained from indicator “A” but it was obtained from “B”. 
7.2.9 Data Not Checked With Appropriate Frequency 
This is the case where the crew is not adequately implementing the monitoring 
strategy for data collection. For example, the crew may have the task of monitoring a 
parameter and the instruction to initiate some kind of response is dependent on a 
critical value of that parameter whose value is changing and is expected to keep 
changing rather than remain static. They may miss checking this critical parameter 
value and hence, fail to initiate the expected response in a timely manner. 
7.3 CFMs in the Situation Assessment / Decision Making “D” Phase 
The errors within the “D” phase assume that there is failure in situation 
assessment, problem solving and decision making “D” given correct information 
gathering “I”. Therefore, the assumption is made that the crew has detected, noticed 




have failed to make a correct assessment of the plant condition(s), diagnose, decide 
and plan the adequate response needed to solve the problem at hand. Failures in this 
phase result in implementing an incorrect strategy or approach and hence failing the 
required function. It is assumed that the CFMs in this phase occur as a result of the 
crew’s intent (i.e. they are intentional errors). 
7.3.1 Plant / System State Misdiagnosed 
This CFM applies to a situation where the crew conducts a wrong assessment of 
the plant condition. This may be because of their lack of awareness of the current 
condition of the plant, incorrect understanding of the plant condition or failure to 
revise their initial concept of the plant condition (which was false). As an example, 
during a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event, the crew may notice that the 
steam generator (SG) is almost solid and decide to trip the auxiliary feed water 
(AFW) pumps when they should not. 
7.3.2 Procedure Misinterpreted 
This applies to the situation where a procedure is incorrectly understood and, a 
decision is made based on the crew’s misinterpretation, leading to an incorrect 
response to the current plant condition. It is also applicable to a situation where the 
crew has difficulty in following or using the procedure. This may be due to reasons 
such as the complex nature of the procedure logic, the ambiguity of the procedure 
steps, or the complicated structure of the procedure. As an example, the crew did not 




pumping system. This led to a complete shutdown of the pumping system and other 
auxiliary systems that it supports. 
7.3.3 Failure to Adapt Procedures to the Situation 
This is applicable to a situation where the crew fails to adapt procedures to the 
situation at hand. It also covers cases where they fail to take proactive action, 
anticipate the required actions, re-evaluate or revise their response as the situation 
changes, or correctly balance competing priorities. This may be due to the ambiguity 
of the procedure or lack of understanding of the procedure as it applies to the 
particular situation. For example, the crew did not revise their response due to a 
changing situation, hence they kept following the initial procedure which was no 
longer applicable at that point in time. 
7.3.4 Procedure Step Omitted (Intentional) 
This is the case where the crew is working through a procedure and they skip or 
postpone a step or sub-step. When the crew skips a step, it implies that the crew has 
decided to rely on their knowledge, (i.e., mental reasoning) instead of following the 
procedure step by step. Hence they have no intention of completing it. This could be 
due to their lack of confidence in the procedure or the belief that skipping the step 
will still lead them to the expected result; thereby saving them some time which could 
be used to carry out other task. When they postpone a step, there is an intent or plan 
to complete it at a later time. The crew may decide to postpone the procedure step 
because they believe that doing so will still lead them to the expected outcome while 




important to do and they skip the step with the intent of returning to it later while 
believing that the expected response will still be achieved. As an example, while 
performing a task, the crew omitted a procedure step because they believed it wasn't 
relevant. 
7.3.5 Inappropriate Transfer to a Different Procedure 
This is the situation where the crew is working through a procedure and then 
decide to transfer to another one when they are not supposed to do so. The decision to 
transfer to another procedure may be because the crew assumes that it will save them 
more time while obtaining the same response they would have had from following the 
initial procedure. However, this is an incorrect transfer to another procedure and it 
may result in an unsuccessful response. This CFM also covers the violation of general 
procedure rules, situations where the correct procedure is available but the crew 
doesn’t consult it and also when the wrong procedure is used. For example, while 
completing a task, the crew transferred to another procedure when the current 
procedure they were using did not call for a transfer. 
7.3.6 Decision to Delay Action 
This is applicable to the situation where the crew having conducted a correct 
assessment of the plant state, decide not to implement the action or delay making 
decision (because they are waiting for more information) to the extent that the 
response is unsuccessful even when it is finally completed. As an example, during the 
loss of heat sink event, the crew may postpone the required feed and bleed operation, 




7.3.7 Inappropriate Strategy Chosen 
This is the case where the crew having made a correct assessment of the plant 
condition, decide to take a different course of action from the expected “normal” one 
(i.e. they made an incorrect choice). It is assumed that the expected or normal course 
of action is the guaranteed success path and that the alternate action may result in 
success or failure depending on the context. The crew’s decision to choose an 
alternate path may be as a result of their failure to consider all options, familiarity 
with the chosen path or lack of clarity of the expected course of action. For example, 
when the crew notices that the safety injection system (SIS) set point is about to be 
met and they do not find any significant event such as loss of coolant accident 
(LOCA) or steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), they may manually bypass the SIS 
(which is not an appropriate strategy at this point) to minimize the consequence due 
to the occurrence of safety injection (SI). 
7.4 CFMs in the Action Execution “A” Phase 
The errors within the “A” phase assume that there is failure in action execution 
“A” given correct situation assessment, problem solving and decision making “D” 
and correct information gathering “I”. Therefore, the assumption is made that the 
crew has detected, noticed and understood the plant function(s) they are supposed to 
be handling. Also, they have made a correct assessment of the plant condition(s), 
diagnosed, decided and planned the adequate response needed to solve the problem.  
However, they fail in executing the response or required action. It is assumed that the 




cognitive errors of slips and lapses even though, some cognitive errors may appear in 
some instances. 
7.4.1 Incorrect Timing of Action 
This applies to the situation where the crew is in the process of performing an 
action and they complete it prematurely, spend too much time on it or forget to take 
the required actions.  It is an honest delay on the crew’s part and not a deliberate 
attempt to slow down the desired action. As an example, the crew may be in the 
process of starting a pump and they become distracted by an alarm or a call to attend 
to another issue. They may return to complete the pump start-up or may totally forget 
altogether. 
7.4.2 Incorrect Operation of Component / Object 
This is a case where the right component or object is selected but it is manipulated 
or controlled wrongly. It includes performing actions out of sequence (e.g. skipping 
operation steps or reversing steps in the action when the ordering matters), and the 
placement of a component in the wrong position. This CFM also includes the failure 
to use alternative actions in instances when a change in situation has made it almost 
impossible to perform the original action, and dynamic manual control problems. In 
all these instances, the component is not operated properly and it may lead to 
inaccurate results being obtained. For example, while trying to close a valve, the crew 
turned the wheel 5 times in the clockwise direction while they were supposed to turn 




7.4.3 Action on Wrong Component / Object 
This CFM covers a situation where the wrong component or system is chosen to 
be manipulated, implying that the intent is to perform the right action however; it is 
carried out on the wrong component. For example, the crew was supposed to start 



















8 Performance Influencing Factors 
System failures have become more complicated due to the increasing complexity 
of systems that are being developed. This has led to more human-system interactions 
and has made it necessary to find ways of describing and representing different 
aspects of these interactions. Hence, performance influencing factors (PIFs) also 
known as performance shaping factors (PSFs) have been adopted by many HRA 
methods for the aforementioned purpose. PIFs are the contextual factors that affect 
human performance by enhancing or degrading it. Under different situations, they are 
used to simplify the contexts and causes affecting human performance. PIFs have 
different uses in HRA which include; representation of different factors influencing 
individual or team behaviors, decision making and actions, description of different 
aspects of human-system interactions, adjustment of HEP depending on the situation, 
prediction of common conditions that lead to certain types of error, indication of 
positive or negative influences on human performance, identification of roots causes 
of error and subsequent areas for improvement. 
The state of a PIF (i.e. its level of influence) is defined on different scales and this 
is dependent on the HRA method of choice. This level of influence typically ranges 
from low to high, in predetermined increments and it's used to modify HEP by 
increasing or reducing the likelihood of human error. Depending on the PIF, its state 
can be accessed by direct observation / measurement or by extrapolation from 




8.1 Issues with PIF sets used in current HRA methods 
Presently, no standard set of PIFs have been adopted for use by HRA methods. 
Each HRA method uses a different set of PIF for its HEP quantification, many of 
which have overlapping definitions. While most of these PIF sets have some roots in 
human performance literature, they are not suitable for use in developing a causal 
model. This is because they were only designed to be assessed by experts and not for 
model quantification. When the assessments of PIFs are done by experts, they can 
mentally compensate for the overlapping definitions, whereas using the same PIFs in 
a model requires the analyst to remove the overlap or explicitly capture the mental 
adjustment [32]. Also, some of the available PIF sets do not contain adequate 
information to cover the different aspects of human-system interaction while others 
lack a differentiation between factors that influence performance and behaviors that 
are used to indicate the state of these performance factors. For example, the PIF 
“work process” which is part of some PIF sets [19], often includes specific behaviors 
that do not indicate the true state of the PIF.  
8.2 Development of the Grouping and Hierarchy 
We began the process of developing our PIF grouping and hierarchy with a set of 
PIFs that was proposed by K. M. Groth [32], [33].  Groth’s PIF set was selected for 
the following reasons: 
 It is comprehensive set that was developed by aggregating information from most 
PIF sets used in a number of HRA methods including IDAC [34], SPAR-H [19], 
CREAM [12], HEART [35], [36], THERP [7]. It also incorporates the PIFs from 




 The PIF taxonomies of IDAC [34], which is the team-centered version of the 
human response model (IDA) [22] adopted for use in this research work, included 
PIFs from several HRA methods. The Human Event Repository and Analysis 
(HERA) [37], [38] database was also reviewed and relevant PIFs were mapped 
into this set. 
 It has a hierarchical structure which captures information about natural 
interdependencies among the PIFs. It can be expanded and collapsed as needed 
therefore promoting its use for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
 It is orthogonally defined meaning that the PIFs have no overlap in their 
definition even though they may be related. This reduces the artificial 
dependencies that are created due to overlapping definitions. 
 It is also neutrally defined enabling each PIF to have a positive or negative impact 
on human performance depending on the situation in context. 
In Groth’s PIF set, there are five main categories namely: Organization-based, 
Team-based, Person-based, Machine-based, and Situation/Stressor-based [33]. See 
Table A1 for the complete list of the PIFs and also [32], [33] for the complete 
definition of each PIF and the categories. 
Even though Groth’s PIF set was developed by aggregating information from other 
PIF sets used in HRA and this included IDAC [34], we had to specifically review and 
also incorporate some features of the PIFs from the IDAC model into our PIF 




 It is the team-centered version of the cognitive model (IDA) adopted for use in 
our HRA methodology, allowing us to take advantage of the extensive research 
work that has been done to develop it. 
 It offers a hierarchical structure and logical flow of information which is 
necessary for the development of a directed model. 
 Its PIFs are also orthogonally defined and the model offers qualitative links 
between its PIFs, which would also aid in the development of a directed model. 
 It is specifically focused on operating crews which is also the focus of our HRA 
methodology.  
After incorporating features of the PIFs from IDAC, we also made sure that our 
PIF set met the necessary requirements indicated in the US NRC’s Good Practice for 
HRA [16] and can be modified to interface with existing HRA methods like SPAR-H 
[19] which is most widely used for HRA by HRA practitioners in US nuclear power 
plants.  
Thereafter, we incorporated the error causes defined in the US Nuclear regulatory 
commission’s (NRC’s) Scenario Authoring, Characterization, and Debriefing 
Application (SACADA) database project into our PIF groupings and hierarchy. As 
has been discussed earlier under the section (Development of the CFM Set and 
Hierarchy), this database project is an on-going data collection effort sponsored by 
the US NRC and is aimed at collecting human performance data / information for use 
in human reliability application. Hence, we incorporated these error causes so that it 
will provide the necessary statistical basis needed by our methodology when the 




Our final PIF set which is used for causal modeling was developed by aggregating 
the information from these PIF sets and then we refined them into a single 
comprehensive set and structure hierarchy. Table A2 illustrates how the PIFs used in 
current HRA map onto the new PIF grouping. It specifically shows how the PIFs 
from the Good Practices for HRA, Groth’s PIF set, PIFs from IDAC model and 
SPAR-H map to the PIFs in our proposed grouping and hierarchy. In Table A3, we 
show how the error causes from the SACADA project map to the PIFs in our 
methodology. 
8.3 PIF Grouping and Hierarchy 
Although Groth’s PIF set has several advantages for inclusion in a causal model 
based framework as previously discussed, we have to make modifications and 
changes to its structure before using it in our work. This is because Groth’s PIFs were 
grouped in terms of their nature and the responsible parties (for example her 
organization-based PIFs are those PIFs that the organization is primarily responsible 
for) while this research focuses on the impact of PIFs on the crew’s performance. 
Also, even though the IDAC model focuses on operating crews, its PIFs are 
categorized in terms of factors that are either internal or external to the crew as 
opposed to how they impact crew’s performance. Therefore, our final PIF set which 
is used for causal modeling was developed by aggregating the information from these 
sources. Thereafter, we reorganized and grouped them in terms of their impact on the 
crew’s performance and this form the basis of this set.  
 When an abnormal event (problem) occurs in the plant, the crew starts the process 




emotionally and physically [40]. These three types of responses are interdependent 
and they form the crew’s response spectrum which is model by IDA (the human 
response model). So, in order to determine the impact of the PIFs on the crew’s 
performance, it is necessary to organize the PIFs in terms of the crew’s natural 
response spectrum. The PIFs have been organized into nine (9) main groups in an 
attempt to look at the frontline factors that directly affect / impact human 
performance. Note that these groups are also individually considered as PIFs. The 
groups (also known as the “Primary or level 1 PIFs”) are Knowledge/Abilities and 
Bias which maps to cognitive response, Stress maps to emotional response, while  
Procedures, Resources, Team Effectiveness, Human System Interface (HSI), Task 
Load, and Time Constraint all maps to physical world (Figure 8-1).  
 
Figure 8-1: Crew's response spectrum & Primary PIF groups 
 
 
The PIFs are classified into levels within the groups, hence forming a hierarchical 
structure which can be fully expanded for use in qualitative analysis and collapsed for 
use in quantitative analysis (Table 8-1). They are organized to show the beginning of 




factors which affect human performance from a causal perspective.  These PIF groups 
are orthogonally defined in a sense, meaning that we have attempted to reduce the 
overlap in their definitions (but not totally) even though the groups may be related to 
each other. Level 1 PIFs which are also the main or Primary PIF groups have a 
directly impact on human performance. Level 2 PIFs either directly affect or form 


































































































8.4 Definitions of the proposed PIFs 
Our proposed PIF set has been structured to enable its use in both qualitative and 
quantitative HRA applications. It may not be possible to directly include all the PIFs 
in the hierarchical structure in a quantitative analysis. However, the hierarchical 
structure provides the flexibility to use the same PIF set in applications where every 
factor can be explicitly identified (e.g. computer modeling) and also where only the 
high level factors are required (may be due to lack of data to support the lower level 
factors) as is the case with many HRA methods (where error analysis and HEP 
estimation is done manually or with the aid of a tool). In this methodology, the idea is 
to use the level 2 and 3 PIFs to aid the analyst in the assessment of the frontline (nine 
primary PIFs). 
In the definition of the PIFs, three aspects are considered which include: 
 Its nature (i.e. its inborn or inherent qualities). For example, procedures will 
always be written set of step-by-step instructions that a crew would follow to 
complete a task.  
 Various attributes of the PIF (i.e. characteristics or qualities associated with or 
used to describe it). In other words, this is how we see or measure the PIF (e.g. is 
the procedure adequate, inadequate, etc). 
 Its influence on other PIFs and / or performance (i.e. how it affects or impacts 
other PIFs or human performance). For example, if the procedure to shut down 
the reactor is not available when needed, the crew’s stress level due to their 




may not be able to correctly shutdown the reactor (their performance is affected 
and it may lead to error on their part). 
8.4.1 Human System Interface (HSI) Group 
HSI refers to the ways and means of interaction between the crew and the system. 
This PIF covers the quality (usability, ergonomics, physical access, etc) of the HSI 
[41] both in terms of system output as well as the crew's input to the system. This 
group is made up of two level 2 PIFs namely: HSI Input and HSI Output. 
1.1.1.1 Human System Interface (HSI) Input 
This PIF refers to quality of HSI with respect to the input provided by the crew. 
Humans interact with the system by providing input in such ways as turning a dial, 
pushing a button or entering a command on a keyboard. HSI should be designed to 
maximize the ability of the human to provide correct input to the system. 
1.1.1.2 Human System Interface (HSI) Output 
This PIF refers to the quality of the HSI with respect to the information and other 
outputs generated by the system for use by the crew. Humans interact with the system 
to get information (system output) which includes reading analog and digital displays 
[32]. HSI should be designed to maximize the ability of the human to obtain the 
correct information and feedback from the system. Humans must be able to gain 
access to the physical location of the output device and clearly read the output. They 
could be prevented from obtaining the correct output by the presence of inaccurate 
labels, display ranges, or markings [42], [43]. This PIF would be considered 
inadequate in situations where there are : inaccurate display formats, label, mimic or 




alarms, misleading indicators, missing indicators, similarity between alarm and 
indicator controls, nonstandard controls which operate differently from the normal 
conventions, difficulty in indicator detection due to the occurrence of slight changes, 
inadequate system feedback like long system response time, inadequate distribution 
of relevant information over time and space. 
8.4.2 Procedures Group 
As a PIF, procedures refer to the availability and quality of the explicit step-by-
step instructions needed by the crew to perform a task. Ideally, no errors should be 
committed by the crew when they are following the procedure correctly. However, 
procedures could be written incorrectly and therefore lead the crew to make errors 
even with the right intent. This group is made up of two level 2 PIFs namely: 
Procedure Quality and Procedure Availability. 
1.1.1.3 Procedure Quality 
Procedure quality refers to the condition of the required procedure with regards to 
completeness of content, ease of adherence and appropriateness in terms of ensuring 
adequate job completion. Procedures should be clear, concise, correct, well-written, 
organized, and adequately formatted [44]. The quality of a procedure would be 
considered inadequate in instances where it is technically inaccurate and unusable 
[45]; the format and required level of detail is not appropriate; it provides incomplete 
and conflicting guidance [43];  its assumptions is not aligned with the actual plant 





1.1.1.4 Procedure Availability 
This PIF refers to the situation where procedures for the task at hand are in 
existence and accessible [32]. The procedure should be applicable to the condition 
which it is intended for. This PIF would be considered inadequate when the required 
procedure is non-existent, inaccessible, or the available procedure is only partially 
relevant to the present situation or completely irrelevant. 
8.4.3 Resources Group 
This refers to the availability and adequacy of the required resources which are 
necessary to aid the crew in completing their assigned task. Resources are provided 
by the organization to the crew and these include the two level 2 PIFs (required tools 
and a conducive work environment). 
8.4.3.1 Tools 
This PIF refers to the availability and quality of the hardware and software tools 
(including number and type) that are required to ensure that personnel do not have to 
develop work-arounds or postpone tasks. Note that tools include both hardware and 
software packages, and are generally more portable than machinery (which are 
usually fixed part of a system).As a PIF, tools is comprised of two level 3 PIFs 
namely Tool Quality and Tool Availability. 
8.4.3.1.1 Tool Quality 
This PIF refers to the appropriateness [44], [45] and readiness of the required 
tools. Some tasks require specially designed tools which need to be properly 
designed, well maintained, and calibrated [34]. In these instances, using general tools 




8.4.3.1.2 Tool Availability 
As a PIF, Tool Availability refers to the accessibility of the required tools to 
perform the task at hand. Not having access to the proper tools could lead to the use 
of inappropriate tools as surrogates or a delay in task completion [7]. 
8.4.3.2 Work Place Adequacy 
This PIF generally refers to the quality of the work environment and includes 
aspects of workplace layout [12] and configuration [46] that could affect crew 
performance. For example, poor illumination and constant noise could reduce 
information perception, and a narrow work space may limit movements and increase 
the likelihood of introducing unintended actions on the system. In contrast with HSI 
quality which focuses on fixed equipment (e.g., control room displays) that can't be 
readily changed by the organization; workplace adequacy covers aspects of the work 
environment that can be changed by the organization. 
8.4.4 Team Effectiveness Group 
As a PIF, Team effectiveness refers to the degree of harmonization and 
synchronization of crew member's contribution to the team's overall goals and team 
tasks. The team in this context refers to a group of persons working together to 
achieve a common goal / purpose. In order to work together as a unit, an effective 
team needs to be properly coordinated and have ability to adequately exchange 
information between its members. Therefore, Communication and Team 





This PIF refers to the quality of the information exchanged between members of 
the crew and this could be done verbally or in writing. It also covers the availability 
of the means and tools necessary for effective communication and allows for the 
sharing of knowledge about a specific situation between crew members [47]. It is 
made up of two level 3 PIFs namely: Communication Quality and Communication 
Availability. 
8.4.4.1.1 Communication Quality 
This PIF refers to the degree by which the information that is received corresponds 
to the information that was transmitted [34]. It is affected by a person's inability to 
articulate the information to be transmitted, clarity of the information transmitted and 
received, adequacy of the information, external distortion, malfunctioning 
communication equipment etc. 
8.4.4.1.2 Communication Availability 
This PIF refers to the existence and accessibility of the tools, means and 
mechanisms necessary for the crew to share information. In particular when dispersed 
at different locations, this PIF allows members of the crew to be kept abreast of a 
shared situation. Untimely communication has the same effect as lack of 
communication because the information is not communicated when necessary [32]. 
8.4.4.2 Team Coordination 
As a PIF, it refers to the overall ability of a team to work together as a unit to 
perform a given task [48]. A coordinated team should be cohesive, have the right 




responsibilities. Therefore, this PIF is comprised of five level 3 PIFs which include 
Leadership, Team Cohesion, Role Awareness, Team Composition and Team 
Training. 
8.4.4.2.1 Leadership  
This PIF refers to the team leader's ability to set a direction and gain the 
commitment of the team to change / maintain goals by building relationships and 
working with them to overcome obstacles to change. The team leader serves as the 
link between management and the team members. In literature, team leadership 
(direct supervision) and management are generally referred to as leadership [44], 
[49], [50]. Here, team leadership has been separated from management because the 
team leader is considered a team member but with the additional authority and 
responsibility of setting the direction [51] or goals, assigning tasks to other team 
members and working with them to accomplish these goals [52]. 
8.4.4.2.2 Team Cohesion 
As a PIF, Team cohesion refers to the interpersonal interaction between the crew 
members and represents the group morale [34] and attitude towards each other. 
According to Mullen and Copper [53], facets of team cohesiveness include: 
interpersonal attraction of the crew members, their commitment to the team task, 
group pride and team spirit. 
8.4.4.2.3 Role Awareness 
This PIF represents how well each crew member understands his or her 




member's formally and informally assigned responsibilities and their interactions with 
each other [54]. 
8.4.4.2.4 Team Composition 
This PIF refers to the size [50], uniformity and variety of the team which provides 
the required knowledge, experience and skills to perform a given task [49]. The size 
is usually determined by the nature of the team task as too small a size creates 
excessive workload for the team members while too large a size would result in 
wasted resources, and also a reduction in the overall team performance. The 
organization is responsible for determining the team composition by staffing [55] the 
team with personnel that possess the appropriate skill set. 
8.4.4.2.5 Team Training 
As a PIF, team training refers to the degree to which the crew members are trained 
on how to work with each other as members of the same team. It is very important to 
have a crew in which members can collaborate and work effectively together. Hence, 
one of the ways of achieving this is providing them with the proper training. 
8.4.5 Knowledge / Abilities Group 
This PIF refers to the adequacy of knowledge and abilities of the crew. In order to 
perform an assigned task, the crew needs to possess the required knowledge 
(understanding of the system and task to be performed) [41], [56], experience 
(accumulation of the knowledge gained over time through training and previous 
interactions with the system) [57], [58], skill (ability to perform the necessary task 




and also the required physical ability. It is difficult to separate knowledge from 
experience because experience is partly gained by putting the knowledge acquired 
into practice. However, less experienced personnel are not necessarily less 
knowledgeable than their more experienced counterparts [32] and vice-versa. As a 
PIF group, it is comprised of three level 2 PIFs namely: Knowledge/Experience/Skill 
(content), Knowledge/Experience/Skill (access), and Physical Abilities and 
Readiness. 
8.4.5.1 Knowledge/Experience/Skill (Content) 
This PIF refers to the adequacy of knowledge/Experience/skill [45] , [46] that the 
crew possesses for the task at hand. In addition, the crew needs to form the correct 
mental model of the situation in order to adequately analyze the problems 
encountered in the course of performing their assigned tasks. This PIF is comprised of 
a level 3 PIF referred to as “Task training”.  
8.4.5.1.1 Task Training 
As a PIF, Task training refers to the degree to which the crew is trained on the 
specific task so that they would have adequate knowledge/experience/skill to perform 
it. Training refers to the knowledge and experience imparted to the crew by the 
organization and it comprises of the course contents, scheduling and frequency of the 
training courses [32]. 
8.4.5.2 Knowledge/Experience/Skill (Access) 
This PIF refers to the ability to obtain and utilize the Knowledge/Experience/Skill 




think, act and review (STAR) when challenged with a difficult situation. This PIF is 
comprised of a level 3 PIF referred to as “Attention”. 
8.4.5.2.1 Attention 
As a PIF, attention refers to the crew's ability to distribute the available cognitive 
[32] and physical resources and it can be affected by many external distractions as 
well as internal thoughts and distractions (e.g. emotional state of mind of each crew 
member). It is comprised of attention to the current task and attention to the 
surroundings [34]. Attention to task is the ability of the crew to focus on a task 
(mainly in interactions with the human-system-interface to monitor and control the 
system). Attentions to the surroundings involve being aware of the state of the 
surrounding environment and the actions of other crew members in order to prevent 
an unintentional change to the system state. 
8.4.5.3 Physical Abilities and Readiness 
This PIF refers to the crew's physical capability and readiness to perform the task 
at hand. The crew's physical ability and readiness for duty is affected by the 
frequency of task assignment, the duration of the task and the particular shift they are 
assigned to (i.e. day or night shift). Physical Abilities includes alertness [7], [59], 
fatigue [43], sensory limits, and fitness for duty [45]. Fatigue which also affects this 
PIF describes the state of being physical weary or worn out. It could affect the crew’s 
performance by causing errors in skill-based actions, or delayed cognitive responses. 
8.4.6 Bias Group 
This PIF refers to the crew's tendency to make decisions or reach conclusions 




agree with the decision or conclusion. Bias may appear in the form of confirmation 
bias, (i.e., only selecting the piece of information that supports one's hypothesis), 
belief bias, (i.e., only selecting the piece of information that reinforces one's own 
personal beliefs), and averaging bias (regression toward the mean) [60], [61]. Bias 
may result from such factors as previous experiences, familiarity with a certain 
situation specific training, competing goals, and personal motivation, morale and 
attitude. Bias can also be externally-induced such as preferences or inclinations in 
judgment encouraged or imposed by the team leader, organizational culture, or a 
recognized authority. Extreme bias becomes fixation, which could induce systematic 
errors. As a PIF group, it is comprised of five level 2 PIFs namely: 
Morale/Motivation/Attitude, Safety Culture, Confidence in Information, Familiarity 
with or Recency of Situation, and Competing / Conflicting Goals. 
8.4.6.1 Morale/Motivation/Attitude (MMA) 
Together, this PIF refers to the team's intrinsic characteristics (including 
personality [49], temperament [62], style [54], strategy, etc.) which indicates their 
commitment and willingness to thoroughly complete task and the amount of effort 
they are willing to put into a task. Morale and Motivation [63] reflect the crew 
member's level of energizing, channeling, and sustaining their effort. Attitude is a 
positive or negative state of mind or feeling towards the work [41], [59], manifesting 
itself through such things as the crew member's willingness to voluntarily assist other 




8.4.6.2 Safety Culture 
This PIF refers to the organizational attitude, values, and beliefs toward the 
employees and the safety of the public [64]. According to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) [65], "safety culture is an assembly of characteristics and 
attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 
priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 
significance". Typically, safety culture is set by management and trickles down, 
affecting performance at all levels, including the crew and other individuals. 
8.4.6.3 Confidence in Information 
This PIF refers to the team's belief in the information they have in terms of 
accuracy, validity, credibility, etc. The crew needs to have some level of confidence 
in the information they obtain from indicator reading, procedures etc. so that it can be 
used adequately. 
8.4.6.4 Familiarity with or Recency of Situation 
As a PIF, it refers to the perceived similarities between the current situation and 
the crew’s past experiences, training received and general industry knowledge [58]. 
This PIF can explain why the same task is assessed differently in terms of its 
complexity by different crew members. It may also bias the crew's assessment of the 
actual situation in favor of what they recall from their past experiences, training, etc. 
8.4.6.5 Competing / Conflicting Goals 
This PIF refers to the situation where the crew has different goals and objectives 




on their level of comfort with some of the options, or perceived workload, urgency, 
and impact. 
8.4.7 Stress Group 
As a PIF, stress refers to the tension / pressure [7] induced on the crew by their 
perception of the situation [66] or by the awareness of the consequences and 
responsibility that comes along with the decisions they make. As a PIF group, it is 
comprised of two level 2 PIFs namely: Stress due to Situation Perception and Stress 
due to Decision.  
8.4.7.1 Stress due to Situation Perception 
This PIF refers to the tension / pressure induced on the team by their assessment of 
the urgency (speed) and severity (magnitude) of the situation (which may be an 
undesired outcome e.g. system failure). This PIF is comprised of two level 3 PIF 
namely: Perceived Situation Urgency and Perceived Situation Severity. 
8.4.7.1.1 Perceived Situation Urgency 
As a PIF, it refers to the tension / pressure induced on the team by the assessment 
of the speed at which an undesired outcome (e.g. system failure) is approaching [32], 
or by the perception that the available time is inadequate to complete the task at hand. 
According to Wickens [67], it can also be viewed as the rate at which the situation at 
hand is moving towards the moment when a negative consequence will materialize. 
8.4.7.1.2 Perceived Situation Severity 
This PIF refers to the tension / pressure on the crew caused by their assessment of 




consequences. The undesirable outcome could adversely affect the crew, plant and 
the public in general [32].  
8.4.7.2 Stress due to Decision 
This PIF refers to the tension / pressure on the crew caused by the awareness of the 
responsibility that comes along with that particular decision and their perception of 
the impact / consequences of the decision on themselves, the facility and the society 
in general. Often times when there is a potential that major negative consequences 
could be involved, people tend to delegate their authority to made decisions to others 
for fear of being held accountable [67]. 
8.4.8 Task Load Group 
As a PIF, Task load refers to the load induced on the crew by the actual demands 
of the assigned task in terms of the complexity of the task, quantity, importance, 
accuracy requirements per unit of time. The perceived level of this load is dependent 
on the proficiency level of the crew and their level of familiarity with the tasks [34]. 
It is also acknowledged that there may be cases where having too few tasks can lead 
to errors due to the crew's complacency. Task load is a component of the perceived 
workload [44], and the term “workload” seen in literature generally has a broader 
meaning than task load [68]. As a PIF group, it is comprised of four level PIFs 
namely: Cognitive complexity, Execution Complexity, Extra Workload and Passive 
Information Load. 
8.4.8.1 Cognitive Complexity 
This PIF refers to the cognitive demands [69] induced on the crew by the situation 




imposed by external factors. It is comprised of two level 3 PIFs namely: Inherent 
Cognitive Complexity and Cognitive Complexity due to External factors. 
8.4.8.1.1 Inherent Cognitive Complexity 
This PIF refers to the cognitive demands induced on the crew by the inherent 
complex nature of the problem being solved. Some tasks could be complex in nature,  
hence the crew may have difficulty  understanding what is required of them in order 
to complete it. 
8.4.8.1.2 Cognitive Complexity due to External factors 
This PIF refers to the cognitive demands induced on the crew by external 
situational factors and conditions. In this instance, external factors /conditions like not 
having the proper tools to process information or make diagnosis may induce some 
mental demand on the crew. 
8.4.8.2 Execution Complexity 
This PIF refers to the physical demands induced on the crew by the situation and 
assigned tasks in terms of the inherently complex nature of the task or that imposed 
by external factors. It is comprised of two level 3 PIFs namely: Inherent Execution 
Complexity and Execution Complexity due to External factors. 
8.4.8.2.1 Inherent Execution Complexity 
This PIF refers to the physical demands induced on the crew by the inherent 
complex nature of the problem being solved. Some tasks could be naturally complex 




8.4.8.2.2 Execution Complexity due to External factors 
This PIF refers to the physical demands induced on the crew by external 
situational factors and conditions. The crew may have to complete a task in a very 
noisy or extreme high / low temperature environment and these factors may induce 
some physical demand on them. 
8.4.8.3 Extra Workload 
This PIF refers to the load induced on the crew by the extra work that has to be 
performed in addition to the main tasks. Note that the main tasks are those which are 
properly designed and the crew has adequate training to complete. While these extra 
work are relevant to the task (e.g. making or answering phone calls to report the 
current status of the system), they can also be viewed as interfering activities [43] 
which can cause distractions while completing the assigned task. 
8.4.8.4 Passive Information Load 
This PIF refers to the load induced on the crew by the amount of information and 
cues (e.g. indicators, alarms) that is presented to them by the external world [7]. 
When this load is high, it may lead to stimulus overload [70]. 
8.4.9 Time Constraint Group 
As a PIF, time constraint refers to the crew's perception of the adequacy of the 
time available to complete the task at hand. It involves both the real duration of the 
task (which is the amount of time required to complete the task) and the perceived 
time (which is the crew's estimate of the available time). Obviously, there is the real 




perception of time can affect the crew’s stress level if it is estimated to be inadequate 























9 CFM – PIF Framework Development 
After defining the crew failure modes (CFMs), performance influencing factors 
(PIFs) groups and hierarchy, the next step was to develop a model that can be used to 
map them to each other. In order to accomplish this, there is a need to understand the 
mechanisms of human performance that could lead to failure, as well as how various 
contextual factors could influence the mechanisms and lead to undesirable human 
performance.  
9.1 Background 
PIFs could also be defined as contextual factors (which include plant factors) that 
influence the likelihood that the psychological failure mechanisms activate the 
processes that lead to proximate causes of macrocognitive function failures. In an 
effort sponsored by the US NRC to develop a tool that could be used to inform HRA, 
specifically to identify the relevant causes and contributors to failure in human 
cognition, Whaley et al. [72], [73], [74]  conducted a thorough literature review of a 
broad range of cognitive models to identify categories of cognitive mechanisms that 
can lead to human failures in the different phases of human information processing 
and the contextual factors that can contribute to failures of those cognitive 
mechanisms. Its main product is an elaborate cognitive framework which establishes 
the connections between PIFs and the cognitive mechanisms that lead to failure in 
human performance. In order to show these connections, the literature review 




 Psychological / Cognitive failure mechanisms: These are the cognitive or 
psychological processes which could lead to failure when they are associated with 
contextual factors that promote error. They are identified for each proximate 
cause. Examples include cue context, change detection, and goal conflict). 
 Proximate causes: These are categories of clusters of psychological failure 
mechanisms that can lead to failure in cognitive functions like detection, 
understanding, decision making, etc. Therefore, proximate causes are the 
consequence of psychological failure mechanisms and serves as the obvious 
indication of the more basic cause of failure to perform a function. Examples of 
proximate causes include cues / information not perceived, incorrect data and 
incorrect frames. 
 Macrocognitive functions: These are the categories of clusters of proximate 
causes and they include detection/noticing, sense making/understanding, decision 
making, action implementation and team coordination. These functions overlap 
and dynamically interact with each other in a continuous, non-linear loop 
involving cyclical and parallel processes even though they are listed separately. 
The term “macrocognition” was originally created by [75] to explain cognitive 
tasks that occur in real world settings and research work in this area tries to show 
how to integrate smaller microcognitive models in order to explain how the 
human brain functions in complex settings. 
This cognitive framework has four elements (macrocognitive functions, proximate 
causes, cognitive failure mechanisms, PIFs) and the mapping established between 




a given proximate cause of failure of a macrocognitive function, one can identify the 
cognitive failure mechanisms for the associated error and the PIFs that may activate 
the mechanisms involved. This mapping can be represented in the form of a table or a 
tree structure (fault tree tipped sideways) [72], [74]. It is important to note that the 
connections or links identified was based on information available, with the 
understanding that some links may be modified later on as more information becomes 
revealed in cognitive literature.   
9.2  CFM – PIF Framework 
Since the US NRC had already sponsored the development of this elaborate 
cognitive framework to support HRA (aimed at bridging the gap between HRA, 
psychology and cognitive sciences), we decided to adopt it and use it as a starting 
point in the development of this framework (instead of reinventing the wheel). The 
framework has 5 main elements which includes CFMs, Macrocognitive functions, 
Proximate Causes, Cognitive failure mechanisms and PIFs. The CFMs and PIFs have 
been discussed in previous chapters, so we will discuss the other elements of this 
framework in following sections. 
9.2.1 Macrocognitive Functions 
According to Klein et al., [76], macrocognition focuses on the nature of human 
performance. This is a “field” where decisions are often very complex, have to be 
made quickly, by domain experts, in risky situations. Microcognition, is typically 
focused on tightly controlled laboratory research, with the goal of explaining the 




have been developed, and are focused on different aspects of the brain functions and 
human cognition. Macrocognition integrates the narrowly focused microcognition 
laboratory research findings into a larger picture, by explaining how the brain works 
in applied, complex settings.  Microcognition has been used as a building block in 
this framework because it: is easily understood by HRA analyst; organizes the 
microcognitive models into a useable set of functions; useful when conducting 
predictive analyses of human performance in complex scenarios; can synthesize 
psychological research findings into a structure that yields a coherent understanding 
of the functions of human cognition and how it fails; integrates state-of-the art 
psychology and cognitive science into a foundation for HRA [72].  
Many macrocognitive models have been developed including [11], [22], [76] - 
[78]. IDAC [11] and IDA [22] were developed for modeling operator performance in 
NPP domain and have been adopted as the human response model for this work. The 
five macrocognitive functions included in this framework are [72]:  
 Detecting and Noticing: This is the process of perceiving important information in 
the work environment, with emphasis on the sensory and perceptual processes. 
These processes allow humans to perceive large amounts of information and 
focus selectively on the pieces that are pertinent to the present activities. 
 Understanding and Sensemaking: This is the process of understanding the 
meaning of the information that has been detected. According to [76], 
sensemaking is a cyclical process that starts when a person or group of persons 




one is surprised or an unexpected event occurs. It involves putting together pieces 
of information to form a complete understanding of a situation. 
 Decision Making: This involves situation assessment, goal selection, diagnosis, 
evaluating options, selection, and response planning. With NPP, the process of 
decision making NPP usually involves experts and is largely driven by 
procedures.  
 Action Taking: This involves the performance of an actual task in a NPP setting. 
It is necessary to specify the level of action implementation that is required for 
any function. According to [72], it is defined as implementing an action on the 
level of a single manual action (e.g. pushing a button) or a predetermined 
sequence of manual actions, and must involve the manipulation of the hardware 
and/or software that would consequently alter plant status. 
 Team Coordination. In NPP, this involves interactions between the individual 
crew members that make up the team. It is important to note that team 
coordination is also considered a PIF in our PIF groups and hierarchy.  
9.2.2 Proximate Causes 
Proximate causes are identified as the immediate cause of the failure of a 
macrocognitive function. According to [72], they were developed as clusters of 
mechanisms based on their effect of failure. They provide answers to questions asked 
about the resulting effect of the failure of a mechanism. For example, the resulting 
effect of the failure to the understanding of the situation (Understanding / 
Sensemaking macrocognitive function) include; using incorrect data to understand the 




incorrect frame to understand the situation. They are also considered are categories of 
clusters of psychological failure mechanisms. They are the consequence of 
psychological failure mechanisms and serve as the obvious indication of the more 
basic cause of failure to perform a function. 
9.2.3 Cognitive / Psychological Failure Mechanisms 
These are the cognitive or psychological processes that can lead to human error. In 
this framework, these mechanisms are used to specify the means by which a failure 
mode can occur.  These are the processes by which macrocognitive functions work 
and can lead to failure when associated with contextual factors that promote error. 
They are identified for each proximate cause in this framework. As an example, the 
mechanisms associated with the proximate cause “the use of incorrect data to 
understand the situation” includes: data not properly recognized, classified or 
distinguished, and attention to wrong / inappropriate information. 
9.2.4 PIF Mapping 
Since Groth’s PIF set [32] was adopted for use by Whaley et al [72] as the PIF set 
of choice (i.e. the PIF set that is linked to the cognitive failure mechanisms in the 
framework), this made it easier to map our proposed PIF set (which was developed 
based on Groth’s PIF set) to the cognitive failure mechanisms. However, not every 
PIF in Groth’s set was included in the cognitive framework by [72]. According to 
[72], some were not included due to inability to link them to proximate causes and 




to the CFM-PIF framework that were not part of Groth’s PIF set, some of which 
Groth had mapped from other HRA methods to her PIF set as discussed in [32]. 
In our CFM - PIF model, we made modifications to the list of PIFs that were 
included in the cognitive framework in [72]. We removed behavioral indicators like 
“proximity” and “anxiety” which were included as PIFs from our model since it is 
outside the scope of this research work. PIFs which Groth had already mapped to her 
set from other HRA methods were also removed and replaced with the equivalent 
ones that were defined in her’s. Thereafter, we mapped the PIFs in our proposed 
grouping and hierarchy onto the modified PIFs. 
9.2.5 CFM Mapping 
IDA model (the cognitive model adopted for this research work) was one of the 
cognitive models reviewed by [72] to guide the adaption of macrocognition to the 
NPP operations. Hence, the macrocognitive functions can be mapped to different 
phases of the IDA model (Table 9-1). 





We added an extra layer to the cognitive framework by linking the CFMs to the 
macrocognitive functions, thereby making the CFMs clusters of the macrocognitive 
functions. The mapping of the CFMs to the macrocognitive functions, proximate 
causes, cognitive failure mechanisms and the PIFs was done by selecting a particular 
CFM and examining how each of the macrocognitive functions influenced it based on 
cognitive psychology literature findings and our judgment. This was an iterative 
process which led to the creation of our initial CFM – PIF model by mapping of each 
CFM to PIFs influencing it through the relevant macrocognitive functions, proximate 
causes and cognitive failure mechanisms. Figure 9-1 shows an example of the tree 
structure for mapping the CFM (Incorrect Timing of Action) to the PIFs influencing 
it. See Appendix B for the complete tables showing our proposed mapping of each 

















Note that the CFMs were defined to indicate crew failure in the different IDA 
phases.  Each of these phases can be further decomposed into the form of a nested I-
D-A structure. At the first level (which is that of the CFMs), I-D-A would represent 
failure in information received phase (I), decision made phase (D) and action 
performed phase (A). The (I) phase can in turn involve its own I-D-A sub structure. 
For example, failure in the recognition of the incoming information (I in I), decision 
on how the information should be processed (D in I) and acting in accordance with 
the decision (A in I). Similarly, the D and A phases can also have their I-D-A sub 
structures as well.  Therefore, the macrocognitive functions identified by [72] may be 
represented by the IDA model (i.e. they form the second level I-D-A structure given 
that the CFM is the first level) See Table 9-2.   
 
Table 9-2: Example demonstrating the nested IDA structure 
 
 
Using the cognitive framework produced by [72] as the basis for relating the 
CFMs to PIFs (i.e. developing our initial CFM –PIF model) was done to improve the 
qualitative analysis performed to support HRA quantification by focusing on the 
psychological and cognitive aspect of human performance. This aspect of human 
performance is important in crew’s understanding and response to accident scenarios. 




influence of the contextual factors (PIFs) and all the factors that needs to be modeled 
in order to estimate HEP. In addition, the mapping of the CFMs through the 
macrocognitive functions, proximate causes and failure mechanisms to the PIFs 
provides a means for developing a structured, causal model for the quantification 
approach proposed in this research work. This structured, causal model should aid in 
improving the consistency, traceability and reproducibility in results produced by 




























10  BBN Model Development 
10.1 BBN Overview 
A Bayesian belief network (BBN) is a type of probabilistic network used to 
represent the relationship between variables. Probabilistic networks are generally 
graphical models that are used to indicate the causal relationships and interactions 
between a set of variables. The nodes in the graph represent variables and the arcs 
(sometimes referred to as edges) indicate the direct dependencies (relationships) 
between the nodes. Therefore, a BBN consist of a set of nodes which represent 
variables and set of directed arcs which represent the direct causal relationships 
between the nodes. The variables and the directed arcs together form an acyclic 
directed graph [80].  
BBNs have two aspects namely: the qualitative and the quantitative aspect. The 
qualitative aspect is represented by the structure of the network (i.e. the arrangement 
of the nodes and arcs to show the causal relationship between them [81]). The 
quantitative aspect involves the quantification of the strength of the causal 
relationship between the nodes probabilistically. This Chapter will focus on the 
qualitative aspect while chapter 12 will focus on the quantitative aspect of the BBN. 
BBNs are becoming a popular part of the risk and reliability analysis discipline 
because of their ability to incorporate both qualitative and quantitative information 
from different sources for analysis. They provide the flexibility of updating the model 
(present state of knowledge) to incorporate new evidence as they become available. 
BBNs are a specific type of causal models and they are used to capture the stochastic 




modeling interdependences among elements of the system. This causal structure can 
be used for causal reasoning (i.e. using the knowledge of the cause represented by a 
node in the network to determine the probability of the effect also represented by 
another node in the network), evidential reasoning (i.e. reasoning backward from the 
effect to the cause) and intercausal reasoning (i.e. the combination of causal and 
evidential reasoning used to provide insights into the process of determining 
mitigation factors) [82]. 
10.2 BBN Structure 
The structure of a BBN represents the qualitative relationship between the 
variables in the network. Each variable is represented as a single node which is 
distinctively defined even if it is causally influenced by other nodes in the network. 
The relationships between these nodes are indicated using directed arcs. Two nodes 
are connected if one influences, affects or causes the other and the directed arc 
indicates the direction of the effect.  
 Two main steps are involved in the development of a causal model in the case of a 
BBN. The first step involves the identification of the variables to be included as 
nodes in the model. The second step involves the identification of the relationships 





Figure 10-1: Sample BBN diagram 
Figure 10-1 indicates a BBN with 4 nodes namely: a, b, c, and d. Node a is a root 
node (i.e. it has no arcs pointing into it). Node d is an end node (i.e. it has no arc 
pointing out of it). Node a serves as a parent node to nodes b and c (i.e. these nodes 
are its children). Nodes b and c serve as parent nodes to node d. This implies that 
node a has no parent but has two children (nodes b and c). Node b has a parent (node 
a) and one child (node d). Node c also has a parent (node a) and one child (node d). 
Node d has two parents (nodes b and c) and no child. 
10.3 BBN Representation of the PIFs 
We constructed a BBN to represent our PIF grouping and hierarchy (Figure 10-2). 
The variables included as nodes are the PIFs and the directed arcs are used to 
represent the relationship between the nodes as indicated by the different levels of the 
PIF (Table 8-1). In the model (Figure 10-2), the blue color nodes represent the level 1 
(main PIF groups), brown color nodes represent the level 2 PIFs while the orange 





Figure 10-2: BBN representation of the PIFs 
 
10.4 Master CFM – PIF BBN Model Construction 
In this research work, the two main groups of variables to be included as nodes are 
PIFs and CFMs since the primary purpose of our BBN is to model the effect of the 
PIFs on the CFMs. This BBN model (Figure 10-3) is constructed using the variables 
(CFMs and PIFs) and the relationships indicated in the CFM-PIF framework 
(Appendix B). It shows the path of influence of the PIFs on each other and also on the 
various CFMs. Note that we have included the level 3 PIFs in this BBN model and 
their relationship with the level 2 PIFs (directed arcs from the level 3 PIFs to the level 
2 PIFs) is based on our PIF grouping and hierarchy indicated in Table 8-1. Referring 
to the Master BBN model (Figure 10-3), the CFMs nodes are shown in green, level 1 




color. Therefore, this is our proposed Master BBN model which shows the 




Figure 10-3: Master CFM-PIF BBN Model 
 
The CFM nodes in the Master BBN model and the CFM basic events in the FTs 
associated with branch points of the CRT are obviously the connection between the 
PIF hierarchy and the rest of the qualitative analysis modules. By this illustration, the 
HFE scenarios identified through CRT and CFM fault trees are now extended to 




10.5 CFM – Main PIF Group BBN Model Construction 
Using the top two layers (CFM and Main PIFs) of the Master BBN model, Figure 
10-3, we constructed the CFM - main PIF group BBN model (Figure 10-4). The 
variables included as nodes are the level 1 (main PIFs groups) in blue color, and 
CFMs in green color. According to our CFM-PIF framework, each CFM is influenced 
by all the main PIFs. Therefore, the directed arcs which go from the main PIFs to the 
CFMs represent the relationship between these variables. 
 
 
Figure 10-4: CFM-Main PIF BBN Model 
 
 
There are two approaches to building this BBN model. One approach will involve 
developing a BBN model of the effect of PIFs on each CFM (this implies building 19 
BBN models in this case). The second approach involves developing a single BBN 
model which includes all the CFMs. The second approach was adopted in this 
research work because it considers the effect of interdependency among the PIFs and 
CFMs which should not be ignored in HRA. Due to this notion of interdependency 
and other advantages of BBN discussed earlier in this chapter, the use of BBN 
became the proposed option among a number of alternatives such as use of tables (as 




method for modeling the effects of the PIFs on CFMs. In other words, the CRT/FT 
formalism does not in itself require the use of BBNs for PIF modeling, but the 
proposed option addresses a number of outstanding HRA issues such as modeling 



































11  Overview of the Quantitative Analysis Process 
It is generally agreed that qualitative analysis is very important in the practice of 
HRA as it provides a basis for the evaluation of the crew performance in its 
interaction with the system and also provides possible suggestions for improvement. 
There is also a need to express the results of the analysis in quantitative terms since it 
is conducted in the context of a PRA. Since the results obtained from PRAs are 
frequently used to drive risk informed decision making processes, it is important to 
obtain consistent HRA results for inclusion in PRAs. Hence, we are providing a clear 
and systematic approach to quantification. 
11.1 The Integrated Model 
As discussed in previous chapters, the qualitative analysis framework has three 
layers. The crew response tree (CRT) represented by an event tree, forms the top 
layer. The human response model (IDA model) which is modeled using fault trees 
(FT) forms the second layer. Each branch point in the CRT is quantitatively linked to 
its own instance of the CFM FTs, noting that the FTs need to be pruned in order to 
satisfy the conditions of the relevant CRT branch point (since the FTs were developed 
as a template to satisfy all conditions). The basic events in the FTs are the CFMs 
which denote the ways in which crew failures occur at the CRT branch points. This 
approach of linking the FTs to the CRT will help identify the crew-plant interaction 
scenario cut-sets. The CFMs are linked to the PIFs, which forms the third layer of the 




using a BBN. These three layers (CRT, FT & BBN) are combined together to form 
the integrated model illustrated in Figure 11-1. 
 
Figure 11-1: Sample diagram of the integrated model 
 
11.1.1 The role of IRIS Software in Quantification 
Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) software tool can be used to support 
the quantification process. This tool was built by the Center for Risk and Reliability 
at the University of Maryland, College Park to support PRA and safety monitoring of 
complex socio-technical systems. It uses a three-layer hybrid causal logic (HCL) 
modeling approach [83] which allows the application of different PRA modeling 




techniques for modeling deterministic causal paths with the flexibility of modeling 
non-deterministic cause-effect relationships among system elements [84]. 
Deterministic causal paths are modeled using event sequence diagrams (ESD) which 
are similar to ETs and FTs while the non-deterministic cause-effect relationships are 
modeled using BBNs.  
The ESD (1st layer) is used to construct the CRT sequences, FT (2nd layer) to build 
the FTs which link the CFMs to CRT branches and the BBN (3rd layer) to build and 
quantify our BBN models.  Therefore, the integrated model (CRT, FT & BBN) is 
solved using the hybrid causal logic approach provided by IRIS software. 
11.2 Summary of the Analysis Procedure 
The HRA quantitative analysis process broadly involves the estimation of human 
error probabilities (HEPs) for human failure event (HFE) of interest. From our 
qualitative analysis process, we obtain CFM cut-sets (which are the minimal 
combination of CFMs that could lead to the HFE of interest) and the list of PIFs that 
the HRA analyst has identified as being relevant to CRT scenarios used to model the 
HFE. These CFM cut-sets and PIFs are the inputs to our quantitative analysis process. 
We are quantifying the CFMs in order to obtain the estimated HEP for the HFE of 
interest. The two options for quantifying the CFMs are: 
 Direct assessment: The direct assessment approach entails directly obtaining the 
probability of CFMs. Thereafter, the values are used as base values but can be 
modified using PIF values in order to account for the effect of the relevant PIFs 




mathematical formulation and /or worksheets, just like what is obtainable in most 
first and second generation HRA methods. 
 Through a BBN model: This involves constructing a BBN by using the CFMs and 
PIFs as nodes and the arcs to show the relationship between them. We decided to 
use this option for quantification because the BBN provides numerous benefits 
which includes: the ability to incorporate both qualitative and quantitative 
information from different sources for analysis; a causal structure for modeling 
interdependencies among elements of a system; the flexibility of updating the 
model (present state of knowledge) to incorporate new evidence as they become 
available; the capability of reasoning under uncertainty; and its ability to interface 
with existing event /fault tree (ET/FT) PRA models.  
Hence, the quantitative model is a BBN model which was developed in the 
previous chapter. The quantitative analysis process can be generically defined using 
the following steps: 
 Identification of the relevant CFMs in the CFM – PIF BBN model: The 
BBN model contains 19 CFMs and for a particular HFE, not all of them are 
relevant. For a particular HFE, the CFMs which are relevant are identified as 
part of the qualitative analysis process and they form the CFM cut-sets. These 
CFMs are considered “relevant CFMs” because they are ones that will be 
quantified in order to obtain the HEP. Hence, they need to be identified in the 
model. The other CFMs are considered “non-relevant” to the HFE and this 




 Identification of the relevant PIFs in the CFM - BBN model: Just as in the 
case of CFMs, not all PIFs are relevant to the particular HFE. Therefore, the 
“relevant PIFs” need to be identified in the model. 
 Assessment of the relevant PIF levels: The levels of each of the relevant PIFs 
need to be assessed by the HRA analyst (using the tables provided for each 
PIF) and then inputted into the model for each PIF. 
 Determination of the temporal ordering of the relevant CFMs: The order 
in which the CFMs occur is an important factor in the quantification process. 
The HRA analyst has to determine if the CFMs will be quantified with 
consideration for dependency or not in order to choose the right procedure for 
quantification.  
 Estimation of the conditional probabilities of the relevant CFMs: The next 
step in the process is to estimate the conditional probabilities of the CFMs. 
 Estimation of the HEP for the HFE of interest: The final step in the analysis 
process involves the incorporation of the conditional probabilities of the 
relevant CFMs into the logic equation of the CFM cut-sets in order to obtain 
the estimated HEP for the HFE of interest.   
In the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, we’ll discuss in detail the steps of 
this analysis process including data sources, model parameter estimation and provide 

















12  BBN Model Quantification 
This involves the quantification of the strength of the causal relationship between 
the nodes in the network probabilistically. After all the relationships between the 
nodes in a BBN are determined (i.e. the model is fully developed), each node gets 
assigned a marginal or conditional probability table (CPT), depending on its location 
in regards to other nodes in the network. Each node in a discrete BBN has a finite 
number of possible states and it is assigned a probability distribution based on the 
possible states of its parent nodes. Note that the sum of the marginal probabilities of 
all the states within the same node must be equal to 1.  
Referring to Figure 10-1, the root node a would be quantified using the marginal 
probabilities of its states. For example, let’s assume that node a has two possible 
states. Therefore, the marginal probabilities would be  = p and Pr  = 1 - p. 
Nodes with one or more parents (b, c, d) would be quantified using CPTs. The size of 
the CPT for each node depends on the number of states of the node, number of 
parents for the node, and the number of states of the parent nodes. For a binary node 
with n parents (each parent node is also binary), number of required conditional 
probabilities = 2 . For example, the CPT for b (with a single parent a) is given 
below. Note that each column in the CPT must be equal to 1. 
 
Table 12-1: CPT for node b given parent a in Figure 10-1 
  Parent (a)  Pr Pr  
Child (b)  Pr Pr | Pr |  





12.1 BBN Quantification Overview 
Mathematically, A BBN is a quantitative causal model which is used to represent 
the joint probability distribution of a universe of events U = (U1,...,Uk), in terms of a 
set of system variables ( nodes) V = (V1,…,Vn), a graph and the conditional 
probability distributions [85].  The chain rule, equation (12-1) is utilized by the BBN 
model to calculate the joint probability of the variables from the conditional 
probability distributions. It indicates that the probability distribution over a set of 
variables (known as the joint probability distribution) P(V) can be calculated as a 
product of conditional probabilities distributions: 
 (12-1) 
Due to the conditional independence statements in the BBN (i.e. each child node is 
conditionally independent of all its non-descendants given its parent nodes, pa), the 
BBN specifies a unique joint probability distribution, equation (12-2), (which 
simplifies the scope of the conditional probability distributions) calculated as the 
product of all the conditional probability tables (CPTs) specified in the BBN [80], 
[85]: 
(12-2) 
Note that pa(Vi) are the parents of Vi in the BBN model. 
 
12.1.1 Bayesian Updating 
One of the benefits that the BBN offers as a modeling tool is the flexibility of 
updating the model (i.e. the present state of knowledge) to incorporate new evidence 
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as it becomes available. This ability to update the model is embedded in the use of 
Bayes’ Theorem [80], [82], [87], equation (12-3). 
      (12-3) 
 
Bayes’ Theorem which is the heart of Bayesian inference provides the ability to 
estimate the conditional probability of N|M from that of M|N and vice versa. This 
implies that the BBN can be used to conduct multiple types of inferences or reasoning 
which includes causal reasoning from M to N, evidential reasoning from N to M and 
intercausal reasoning (combination of causal and evidential reasoning) [82], [88], 
[89].  This ability to reason about specific events is very useful in HRA. The HRA 
analyst would implement causal reasoning by using the knowledge of PIFs to 
estimate the probability of the HEP for the specific HFE. Also, evidential reasoning 
which is actually the ability to reason backwards from the effects (human error) to the 
causes (PIFs) gives the HRA analyst the ability to identify the PIFs that greatly 
degrade human performance and hence most directly contributed to the occurrence of 
the HFE. This is also useful when conducting analysis to provide insights on how to 
prevent HFEs [85]. 
12.2 Overview of our BBN Model Quantification  
Building a master network like the master BBN model (Figure 10-3) often requires 
a careful trade-off between the desire to build a large and comprehensive model that 
includes every little detail to obtain the highest level of accuracy possible, and the 
feasibility, the cost of construction in terms of time and resources needed, and the 






number of nodes in the network (over 60), the number of arcs (over 200), the size of 
the CPTs, it will be extremely difficult to properly quantify this model. Therefore, our 
quantification methodology will be focused on the CFM – Main PIF BBN model, 
Figure 10-4. For the purposes of the quantification and hence forth in this 
dissertation, we will be referring to this model as “The BBN model”. Also, we are 
repeating the diagram of the model here, but the names of the CFMs nodes changed 
to represent their respective IDs in the model. This model will be used for further 
reference in this work. It has 19 CFMs and 9 PIFs (Figure 12-1). Each node in the 
model has two states. Each CFM has a success and failure state. The success state 
implies that the specific CFM has not occurred (i.e. the crew has not failed in that 
instance) while the failure state implies that the specific CFM has occurred (i.e. the 
crew has failed in that instance). 
 
 
Figure 12-1: The BBN Model 
 
The joint probability distribution encoded in the BBN model for each CFM is 




   (12-4) 
This joint probability distribution expression is substantially simpler than one that 
would have resulted from the direct application of the chain rule, equation (12-1). 
In HRA, quantification involves the estimation of the human error probability 
(HEP) for a particular human failure event (HFE). An HFE is the result of one or 
several sequences of events (overall context) for any given plant PRA scenario (S) in 
accordance with the CRT and corresponding linked causal models. To be consistent 
with a scenario-based approach, the HEP can be estimated using the following 
expression which provides a conceptual link between the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of HRA [6]: 
     (12-5)  
     
 The summation in the brackets indicates the probability of i-th CFM considering 
all possible CRT scenarios (j = 1, 2, …, J) that leads to the particular HFE of 
interest. Each scenario is characterized by a set of n factors (or different instances 
of a fixed super set of factors). The set {Fj1, Fj2, …, Fjn ; S} includes the usual 
PIFs and everything else in the scenario context (e.g. elapse time in a scenario, 
specific crew action etc.) that affect the probability of HFE. 
 The term P(CFMi | Fj1, Fj2, …, Fjn ; S) is the probability of i-th CFM given the 
context for a particular CRT scenario S, and P(Fj1, Fj2, …, Fjn | S) is the 
probability of the context given the particular PRA scenario S.   
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  The CFMs can be defined in such a way that P(HFE | CFMi ) =1  for all “i”. In 
this case the aim of the HRA quantification model would be to assess the values 
of P(CFMi | Fj1, Fj2, …, Fjn ; S) and  P(Fj1, Fj2, …, Fjn | S) for each sub-context j. 
Hence, the HEP can then be estimated using the following expression: 
   (12-6) 
 
Therefore, according to equation (12-6), we need the values of   P(CFM | Fj1, Fj2, …, 
Fjn) and  P(Fj1 ,Fj2 , …,Fjn | S) in order to estimate the HEP for any HFE of interest.  
In relation to the BBN model (Figure 12-1),  
 P(CFM | S) i.e. the estimated HEP, represents the output of our quantified BBN 
model. This output is the joint probability distribution of the CFMs and PIFs i.e. 
P(CFM ∩ PIF1, PIF2, …, PIF9) for each of the 19 CFMs. 
 The term P(Fj1, Fj2, …, Fjn | S) represents the conditional probability of the 
different states (two in this model) of each of the nine main PIFs  i.e. P(PIF1), 
P(PIF2), …, P(PIF9). This is the data required to complete the marginal 
probability table for each main PIF node. 
 The term P(CFM | Fj1, Fj2, …, Fjn) represents the probability of the different 
combinations of P(CFM | PIF1, PIF2, …, PIF9) for each of the 19 CFMs. This is 
the data required for the conditional probability table for each CFM node. 
12.3 Assessment of PIFs Levels 
Part of the output of the qualitative analysis is the list of the PIFs that the HRA 
analyst has determined to be relevant to the CRT scenario of interest. These PIFs are 
| | 1, 2
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determined to influence the crew’s performance throughout the scenario. Each PIF in 
the BBN model has two states. One state is the nominal state in terms of its influence 
on the CFMs (crew performance). In this context, “nominal” implies that the PIFs do 
not have a significant influence on the crew’s performance (i.e. they do not improve 
or degrade their performance ideally). The second state of the PIFs is the state that 
influences the crew’s performance by degrading or reducing it (i.e. it enhances crew 
failures). Table 12-2 shows the level descriptor for the main PIFs and their expected 
effect on crew performance. 
 
Table 12-2: PIF levels and effect on crew performance 
 
 
In order to aid the HRA analyst in the assessment of the level of each main PIF, 
































each of these PIFs. These questions aid the HRA analyst to represent a continuous 
variable (PIFs levels in the model) with point estimates. These questions are primarily 
made up of the information on the level 2 and 3 PIFs. Therefore, even though the 
level 2 and 3 PIF are not directly included as nodes in the version of the BBN model 
used for quantification, they are used in the assessment of the main PIFs (which are 
nodes in the quantified BBN). Hence, we are still capturing the information that these 
PIFs (level 2 and 3) provide in our quantification framework (indirectly).  
12.3.1 PIF Assessment Questionnaires 
The tables in this section contain questions that would aid the analyst in estimating 
the marginal probability levels of the PIF nodes in the BBN. Note that sophisticated 
social science survey instruments may be needed to support the HRA analyst’s 



















































































































Table 12-5: Resources assessment questionnaire 
 
 


































ID Questions Lower level PIF Yes No N/A
1

























Is the crew likely to have multiple competing demands on
their attention? Attention
8











Table 12-7: Team Effectiveness assessment questionnaire 
 
 






























































Table 12-8: Bias assessment questionnaire 
 
 







































































Table 12-9: Stress assessment questionnaire 
 
 



























































































Table 12-11: Task Load assessment questionnaire 
 
 
12.3.2 Estimation of the PIF Levels 
The questions provided for a specific PIF node in the quantification model aids the 
HRA analyst in estimating its level. This can be accomplished using the following 
steps (for each PIF node): 
 Read through each question and if the answer is “Yes”, place a “Y” in the box 
under the Yes column heading that is on the same row with the particular 
question. If the answer is “No”, place an “X” in the box under the No column 
ID Questions
Lower level 



















































heading that is on the same row with the particular question. If the question is not 
applicable to the particular plant or setting, place a “N/A” in the box under the 
N/A column heading that is on the same row with the particular question. 
  Add up the number of “Y”s, “X”s and “N/A” respectively.  
 Follow the instructions given at the bottom rows of each PIF questionnaire to 
estimate the marginal probability level of the degraded state of that PIF. 
 Input this information into marginal probability table for the PIF node in the 
model. Note that the sum of the marginal probabilities of both states (degraded 
and nominal) within the same node must be equal to 1.0. This implies that: 
 
12.4 Methodology Steps for the BBN Model Quantification 
After defining the variables to be included as nodes and the relationship between 
the nodes in terms of arcs, the BBN structure is considered complete.  The next step is 
to quantify the model in order to estimate the HEP i.e., P(CFM ∩ PIF1, PIF2, …, 
PIF9) for each of the relevant CFMs in the model. Note that the CPTs for each of the 
CFMs are already populated and hence, the analyst does not need to asses or estimate 
their values. Therefore, the analyst needs to take the following steps in order to 
estimate the specific HEP: 
 Step 1: Identify the CFMs in the BBN model. This step involves the 
identification of the relevant and non-relevant CFMs. 
o Identify the relevant CFMs in the BBN model. The BBN model 
contains 19 CFMs and for a particular HFE, not all of them are relevant. 




analysis process) and need to be quantified in order to obtain the HEP. 
Hence, they need to be identified in the model. The other CFMs are 
considered “non-relevant” to the HFE and this information needs to be 
incorporated into the model. 
o Identify the non-relevant CFMs in the BBN model. Non-relevant CFMs 
are those that are not part of the CFM cut-set for the specific HFE. This 
implies that those CFMs have not occurred in the specific HFE. This is 
information that needs to be incorporated into the model by the analyst. 
This is done through the following steps: 
 Open the conditional probability tables for each of the non-relevant 
CFMs.  
 Change all the conditional probabilities for the failure state of each 
CFM to 0 (zero) i.e. all the conditional probabilities on the failure 
row (the 10 conditional probabilities including the leak factor). 
 Change all the conditional probabilities for the success state of 
each CFM to 1 (one) i.e. all the conditional probabilities on the 
success row (the 10 conditional probabilities including the leak 
factor).  
 Step 2: Identify the PIFs in the BBN model. This step involves the 
identification of the relevant and non-relevant PIFs. 
o Identify the relevant PIFs in the BBN model. Just as in the case of 




on the CFMs in the specific scenario). Therefore, the “relevant PIFs” need 
to be identified in the model. 
o Identify the non-relevant PIFs in the BBN model. Non-relevant PIFs 
are those that ideally, do not have an impact on the CFMs in the specific 
scenario. This information needs to be incorporated into the model by the 
analyst. This is done through the following steps: 
 Open the marginal probability tables for each of the non-relevant 
PIFs.  
 Change all the levels for the nominal state of the PIF (marginal 
probability) to 1 (one).  
 Change all the levels for the degraded state of the PIF (marginal 
probability) to 0 (zero).  
 Step 3: Assess the PIF levels. This step involves the assessment of the relevant 
PIF levels and the incorporation of the information into the model. 
o Assess the relevant PIF levels. Using the tables provided for each PIF in 
the quantification model (Table 12-3 to Table 12-11), assess the levels of 
the relevant PIFs by following the steps for PIF level estimation (see 
section 12.3.2). Note that if the analyst is uncertain about the relevance of 
any of the PIFs, he or she may follow these steps in estimating the PIF 
levels for all the PIFs. If the PIF is non-relevant, the level of its nominal 
state will equal 1 and that of its degraded state would equal 0. If it is 




number between 0 and 1, and when the level for both states of a PIF are 
added together, it must equal 1. 
o Input the levels of the PIFs into the model. After determining the levels 
of the PIFs, these estimates need to be inputted into the model. This is 
done through the following steps: 
 Open the marginal probability tables for each of the PIFs.  
 Change all the levels for the nominal state of the PIF (marginal 
probability) to reflect the estimated probability.  
 Change all the levels for the degraded state of the PIF (marginal 
probability) to reflect the estimated probability.  
Note that the analyst may change their assessment of the PIF levels as the go 
through the scenario. This information is incorporated into the BBN model 
in the form of evidence for that particular PIF node by either changing the 
levels of its states or by instantiating the PIF node to the appropriate state. 
 Step 4: Estimate the joint conditional probability of each relevant CFM. This 
step involves determining the temporal ordering of the CFMs and following the 
proper procedure to estimate the joint conditional probability of each.  
o Determine the temporal ordering of the CFMs. The temporal ordering 
of the relevant CFMs is important in order to account for any 
dependencies between them. The analyst needs to know if the CFMs will 
be quantified with or without consideration for dependency, and the order 
in which they occur in the scenario of interest. If conditional independence 




quantification. If dependency is considered, then the procedure for 
dependency quantification needs to be followed. 
 For non-dependency quantification, the analyst needs to take the 
following steps: 
 Estimate the joint conditional probabilities of each of 
the relevant CFM using equation (12-4). This is done 
using any of the softwares like [84], [90] - [92] which is 
used in constructing and quantifying BBNs. Depending on 
the particular software being used, the analyst needs to 
follow the step for running or updating the model. This 
information is provided in the user guide for the tool and is 
usually done by selecting a few tabs or clicking a few 
buttons on the toolbar. 
 For dependency quantification, see section 13.4 (Procedures for 
Dependency Quantification).  
 Step 5: Estimate the conditional HEP for the specific HFE. This is the final 
step in the quantification process. It involves the incorporation of the joint 
conditional probability estimates of the relevant CFMs into the logic equation of 








13  HFE Dependency Modeling and Quantification 
Presently, numerous HRA methods exist and new methods are still being 
developed. However, despite these advances made so far, many issues still exist in the 
field of HRA which includes the proper treatment of dependency among human 
failure events and hence, the corresponding human error probability (HEP) in an 
accident sequence. This is an ongoing issue that has been recognized and 
acknowledged in the HRA community, but has not been fully addressed [93]. 
It is recognized that in an accident sequence, early crew successes or failures can 
influence later crew judgments and subsequent actions. If the first action is not 
performed correctly, there is a high likelihood that subsequent actions will also not be 
performed correctly and vice versa. Therefore, dependencies among HFEs and hence, 
corresponding HEPs in an accident scenario should be quantitatively accounted for in 
the PRA model. This is particularly important so that combined probabilities are not 
too optimist, which could result in inappropriate decrease in the risk-significance of 
human actions, related accident sequences or inappropriate screening out of accident 
sequences from the final risk result. 
13.1 Background 
To a certain extent, dependency among HFEs has been considered by some HRA 
methods e.g. Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [7], Human 
Cognitive Reliability Model (HCR) [94], Success Likelihood Index Methodology 
(SLIM) [63], Accident Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP) [95], Cause-Based 




[29], and Standardized Plant Analysis Risk HRA Method (SPAR-H) [19]. However, 
none of these methods have adequately addressed the issue. 
THERP provides a model to address dependencies among subtask within one HFE 
and doesn’t provide explicit guidance on dependency between two or more HFEs.  
Also, estimates of the appropriate degree of dependency are left to the judgment of 
the HRA analyst and no methodology for quantification is proposed. HCR provides a 
conceptual discussion on dependencies that need to be addressed. However, the effect 
on quantification is left to the analyst judgment and no methodology is proposed. In 
SLIM, dependencies are expected to be addressed while defining task sequences and 
performance influencing factors (PIFs). However, no model or procedure is provided. 
ASEP uses the THERP model and therefore has the same limitations. CBDT provides 
a discussion on dependency but the impact on quantification and methodology is not 
specified. ATHEANA does not explicitly address the issue of dependency. It is 
discussed but no specifics are provided in terms of the modeling and quantification 
methodology. SPAR-H uses a THERP like dependency model with additional 
attributes. However, no guidance is provided to the analyst in terms of quantification. 
Hence, no method has provided detailed guidelines and specifics on how to model 
and quantify HFEs. This has contributed to the variability in results seen in the 
application of different HRA methods and also in cases where the same method is 
applied by different HRA analyst. Therefore, it is obvious that this problem has not 





The application of Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) models has become 
increasingly popular in the field of Reliability and Risk analysis and it is gradually 
finding its way into the HRA domain due to its numerous benefits.  The use of BBN 
to model HFE dependency issue was initially proposed by [6]. As part of this research 
work, we have proposed a full methodology for the explicit treatment of 
dependencies among HFEs (modeling and quantification) using the BBN model and 
the time slice concept of Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN). The methodology 
accounts for dynamic effects like changes in PIF levels and the ordering of HFEs 
during an accident scenario. It provides reproducible quantification of levels of 
dependency i.e. given the same inputs; the HRA analyst will obtain the same results 
all the time. It also provides a formal way of incorporating new information and 
evidence into the HEP estimation process. 
The BBN model contains the specific contextual factors (PIFs) that are common 
between multiple HFEs and uses these dependencies to estimate the individual 
conditional probabilities of those HFEs and hence, the corresponding HEPs in an 
accident sequence. This concept of conditional dependence and independence 
relationships among the nodes in a BBN is being used to model dependencies 
between HFEs. Note that a single BBN model is used to incorporate all the HFEs and 
PIFs as opposed to developing an individual model for each HFE and related PIF. 
This is done in order to include the interdependency among the PIFs and HFEs when 




13.2.1 Dynamic Bayesian Network 
A BBN is useful for problem domains or systems where the things are static i.e. 
doesn’t change over time. In such a system, every variable has a single and fixed 
value. However, this static assumption is not always the case, as many systems exist 
where variables are dynamic and reasoning over time is necessary, such as dynamic 
systems.  
A Dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) is a BBN that has been extended to 
incorporate a temporal dimension to enable the modeling of dynamic systems [96]. 
The temporal extension of BBN does not mean that the network structure or 
parameters changes dynamically, but it means that a dynamic system is being 
modeled. Hence, a DBN is a directed, a-cyclic graphical model of a stochastic 
process. It consists of time-slices (or time-steps), with each time-slice containing its 
own variables. The basic idea in a DBN is to specify how variables in time t influence 
variables in time t+k and replicating the structure of a model for each time slice.  
We are incorporating the time slice concept of the DBN into the methodology for 
modeling the dependency among HFEs by replicating the model structure to represent 
the system at each time step and then estimating the conditional probability of the 
relevant HFE at that particular time step. 
13.3 HFE Dependency modeling and quantification methodology steps 
Below are the general methodology steps [93]. Note that it is assumed that the 
dependency is considered in the quantification of the HFEs. 
 Step 1: Identify the variables to be included as nodes in the model. The nodes 




 Step 2: Identify the relationships between the nodes. The relationships between 
the nodes are indicated using arcs with the arrowheads indicating the direction of 
influence. Once the HFEs, PIFs and the relationships between them are identified, 
the BBN structure is considered complete. 
 Step 3: Determine the number of states of the nodes. The number of states of 
the node, number of parents for the node, and the number of states of the parent 
nodes will determine the size of the CPT for each node. 
 Step 4: Assign conditional probability table (CPT) for the nodes. Note that 
each column in the CPT for any node must be equal to 1. 
 Step 5: Estimate the conditional probabilities of the HFE nodes. This is done 
using any of the softwares like [84], [90] - [92] which is used in constructing and 
quantifying BBNs. Depending on the particular software being used, the analyst 
needs to follow the step for running or updating the model. This information is 
provided in the user guide for the tool and is usually done by selecting a few tabs 
or clicking a few buttons on the toolbar. The BBN now becomes the prior model 
before the incorporation of any new evidence. 
 Step 6: Determine the temporal ordering of the HFE nodes. The HRA analyst 
needs to determine the order in which the HFEs occur in the scenario.  
 Step 7: Determine the number of temporal ordering (time-steps) of the HFE 
nodes. Using the time-slice aspect of dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN), make 
different copies of the BBN model as needed. The number of copies depend on 




 Step 8: Incorporate the relevant information into the model at each time-
step. This is known as Bayesian updating. It is done by incorporating the relevant 
information (evidence) into the model as it becomes available. This evidence 
could be in the form of newly collected data or observations about one or more 
HFEs or PIF levels (changes in conditional probabilities of an HFE or PIF), order 
of occurrence of one or more HFEs or a combination of both. This is done using 
any of the softwares like [84], [90] - [92] which is used in constructing and 
quantifying BBNs. Depending on the particular software being used, the analyst 
needs to follow the step for setting evidence and updating the model. This 
information is provided in the user guide for the tool.  
 Step 9: Estimate the conditional HEP for the given accident scenario. This is 
done using the estimates obtained from step 8. 
13.3.1 An Example Case 
This example is used to demonstrate the application of this methodology. Note that 
the model and data is not real and is used only for the illustration purposes.  
Consider an accident sequence which is comprised of two HFEs (HFE1 and 
HFE2) with three PIFs (resources, stress and training) influencing the HFEs. Stress 
influences both HFEs while resources and training influence HFE1 and HFE2 
respectively. Therefore, in order to estimate the conditional HEP for that accident 
scenario, we need estimate the probability of both HFEs. Note that HFE =1 means 
that the human failure event has occurred. Also, the use of two HFEs is only for 
illustration purposes as more HFEs and PIFs can be modeled and quantified using the 





Figure 13-1: Diagram representing the example case 
For the conditional independence assumption:  
                           (13-1) 
However, it is assumed that the occurrence of HFE2 is dependent on HFE1 i.e. HFE1 
occurs before HFE2 i.e. conditional dependency is incorporated. Hence, applying the 
conditional probability rule to equation (13-1) yields: 
     (13-2) 
Using the information provided in the example case, below is the application of 
the methodology steps. 
 Step 1: Variables to be included as nodes in the model are HFE1, HFE2, 
resources, stress and training. 
 Step 2: This is shown in the BBN in Figure 13-1. 
 Step 3: We assume that each node in the model has 2 states. The PIFs states are 
denoted as adequate and inadequate for resources and training while that of stress 
is denoted as high and low. The states of the HFEs are denoted as failure 
(occurred) and success (did not occur) respectively. 
1 1 2 1




 Step 4: See Table 13-1 to Table 13-3. It is important to emphasize that the 
numbers used in this example case are for illustration purposes only and are not 
necessarily a reflection of the true conditional probabilities of the nodes in this 
model. 
  
Table 13-1: Marginal probabilities for the PIFs 
resources Adequate 0.65 
Inadequate 0.35 
Stress High 0.9 
Low 0.1 
training Adequate 0.6 
Inadequate 0.4 
 
Table 13-2: CPT for HFE1 
  
PIFs 
Resources adequate inadequate 
Stress Low High High  Low 
HFE1 success 0.7 0.75 0.65 0.6 
Failure  0.3  0.25 0.35 0.4 
 
Table 13-3: CPT for HFE2 
  
 PIFs 
Stress adequate inadequate 
Training adequate inadequate adequate inadequate 
HFE1 Success 0.65 0.6 0.4 0.3 
Failure 0.35 0.4 0.6 0.7 
 
 Step 5: Using the software program Trilith [84], the joint conditional 
probabilities of the HFEs indicated in Table 13-4. 
Table 13-4: Conditional probabilities for the HFEs (results of prior model) 
HFE1 success 0.684 
failure 0.316 






If the conditional independence assumption is made, as is the case with most other 
HRA methods, the conditional HEP for the accidence scenario will be given by 
equation (13-1), and the conditional probabilities in Table 13-4. 
HEP = 0.316 * 0.397 = 0.125 
 Step 6: HFE1 occurs before HFE2 in the accident scenario. 
 Step 7: Two time-steps (time-step1 and time-step2) are needed to model this 
accident scenario. See Figure 13-2. 
 
 
Figure 13-2: Two time-slices representing the model at two different time-steps 
 
 Step 8: At time-step 1, only HFE1 has occurred in the accident scenario. 
Therefore, we are only concerned about HFE1 and the PIFs directly influencing it 
(resources and stress). We are not concerned about HFE2 (and training which 
influences it) since it occurs in the future. In order to incorporate this evidence 
into the model, all the conditional probabilities for success state of HFE2 should 
be set to 1 (one) i.e. all the conditional probabilities on the success row (the 4 




i.e. all the conditional probabilities on the failure row (the 4 conditional 
probabilities). Also, the marginal probability for adequate state of training node 
should be set to 1 while that for the inadequate state should be set to 0. Thereafter, 
the time-step 1 model will be quantified in order to obtain the conditional 
probability of HFE1 i.e. P(HFE1=1) in equation (13-2). At time-step 2, the 
evidence that HFE1 has already occurred will be incorporated by setting the 
evidence for HFE1 in the model to the failure state. Thereafter, the time-step 2 
model will be quantified to obtain the probability of HFE2 given the occurrence 
of HFE1 i.e. P(HFE2=1|HFE1=1) in equation (13-2). Refer to Table 13-5 for the 
condition-al probabilities of HFE1 and HFE2. 
 









 Step 9: In order to estimate the conditional HEP for accident scenario given the 
dependency of the HFEs, equation (13-2) is applied. 
HEP = 0.316 * 0.64 = 0.202. 
Looking at this result and comparing it with the one obtained when conditional 
independence was (0.125), the probability of HFE2 has increased from 0.397 (when 
independence between the two HFEs is assumed) to 0.64 (when dependency between 
the two HFEs is considered). This has resulted in about a 38% increase in the HEP for 




accident scenario which could have been ignored if the independence assumption was 
applied in this analysis, or may lead to inappropriate reduction in the risk-significance 
of human actions and the accident scenario. As an important component of a PRA 
whose results are frequently used to drive risk-informed decisions, HRA results need 
to be consistent and should adequately address important issues like dependencies 
among HFEs. 
13.3.2 Inclusion of additional levels of detail 
Note that this methodology for dependency modeling and quantification is 
scalable. The BBN can be expanded to include additional levels of detail, meaning 
the addition of nodes as needed. This can be accomplished by adding parents to each 
PIF node, adding another level of nodes above the HFEs with arrows pointing from 
the HFEs to the new nodes or a combination of both. The incorporation of additional 
levels of detail in the form of parents to the PIF nodes can be very useful when 
conducting evidential reasoning for determining the root cause of a particular HFE. 
The addition of nodes above the HFE can be useful when modeling dependencies 
between several tasks within one HFE like the dependency model discussed in the 
THERP [7]. In such instances, the present HFE nodes in Figure 13-1 will become task 
nodes while the additional nodes then become the HFE nodes. 
13.4 Procedures for Dependency Quantification 
In our quantitative analysis process, the HRA analyst needs to determine the 
temporal ordering of the relevant CFMs in order to account for dependencies between 




consideration for dependency, and the order in which they occur in the scenario of 
interest. If dependency is considered, then dependency quantification can be 
accomplished through the following steps:  
 Determine the number of temporal ordering (time-steps) of the relevant 
CFMs. Using the time-slice aspect of dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN), the 
analyst needs to make different copies of the BBN model as needed. The number 
of copies depend on the number of temporal ordering (time-steps) of the relevant 
CFMs. 
 Incorporate the information about the relevant CFMs and PIFs into the 
model at each time-step. This is known as Bayesian updating. It is done by 
incorporating the relevant information (evidence) into the model as it becomes 
available. This evidence could be in the form of newly collected data or 
observations about the relevant CFMs or PIF levels (changes in conditional 
probabilities of a relevant CFM or PIF), the order of occurrence of one or more or 
the relevant CFMs or a combination of both. This is done using any of the 
softwares like [84], [90] - [92] which is used in constructing and quantifying 
BBNs. Depending on the particular software being used, the analyst needs to 
follow the step for setting evidence for the respective nodes in the model. This 
information is provided in the user guide for each tool.  
 Estimate the joint conditional probabilities of each of the relevant CFM 
using equation (12-4). After incorporating evidence into the model at each time 




in the user guide for the tool and is usually done by selecting a few tabs or 
clicking a few buttons on the toolbar. 
 Estimate the conditional HEP for the specific HFE. This is the final step in the 
quantification process. It involves the incorporation of the joint conditional 
probability estimates of the relevant CFMs into the logic equation of the CFM 





















14  Data Sources and Model Parameter Estimation 
Many sources of information can be leveraged to estimate BBN model parameters 
including experimental data (e.g. simulator exercises laboratory studies), operating 
experience / field data (e.g. data logs, event statistics), expert opinion, HRA databases 
etc. Both qualitative and quantitative information can be incorporated into the model 
for parameter estimation.  
14.1 Data sources incorporated into our BBN model 
One of the major issues in the field of HRA is the availability of the required type 
of data for analysis. Therefore, to estimate our BBN model parameters, we had to use 
data from different sources since there is no single source that can provided all the 
information required in our model. The sources of data currently used in our model 
for parameter estimation include Data from other HRA methods (NARA [97] - [99], 
CREAM [12], SPAR-H [19], THERP [7]), expert estimates [100], [101], and 
operating experience [102]. We plan to incorporate data from the US NRC’s HRA 
data program (SACADA database project) [30], [31] when it becomes available.   
14.2 Model Parameters 
In the previous chapters on BBN quantification, we had established that in order to 
estimate the joint conditional probability of each of the 19 CFMs in our BBN model 
(equation 12-4), we need to estimate the following model parameters: 
 The marginal probabilities of both states of each of the 9 PIFs (P(PIF1), P(PIF2), 




 The probability of the different combinations of P(CFMi | PIF1,…,PIF9) for each 
of the 19 CFM. This is the data required for the CPTs for each CFM.  
In this chapter, we will focus on the process of estimating the data required in 
populating each of the CPTs. 
14.3 Conditional probability tables (CPTs) for each CFM 
The CPT for each child node in the BBN (in this case each CFM) is intended to 
capture the strength of the relationship between each child node (CFM) and its parent 
nodes (PIFs). This implies that the probability of the CFM given all its possible 
combinations with state of PIFs needs to be defined. This can be a daunting problem 
as the number of cells in the CPT that need to be defined drastically increases with 
the addition of a parent node, parent state or child state.  
Recall that for a binary node (child node) with n parents (each parent node is also 
binary), the number of required conditional probabilities = 2 . Hence these 
probabilities grow exponentially as the number of parents increase. Now let’s 
consider our BBN model. Each child node (CFM) has 9 parents (PIFs) and both have 
2 states respectively. Therefore, to specify the strength of these relationships i.e. 
P(CFMi | PIF1,…,PIF9) (the CPT for each CFM), we have to define 2
9+1 = 210  = 
(1024) conditional probabilities. Also, considering the fact that we have 19 CFMs, 
we’ll need to define a total of 1024 *19 = 19456 conditional probabilities for the 
CFMs in the model. This amount of data is almost impossible to manually obtain 
from the different data sources and this poses a very big problem in the adoption of 




In an attempt to address the aforementioned problem, different modeling 
techniques and methods could be used in simplifying the specification of a BBN. 
These methods which aid in reducing the number of conditional probabilities required 
in building CPTs and also in avoiding the manual definition of all cells in CPTs 
include Boolean functions (e.g. Or, And, NoisyOR etc.), and comparative expressions 
(e.g. THEN, IF, ELSE etc.). The adoption of any of these methods is dependent on 
the type of nodes defined and the situation modeled in the BBN [103].  
Our BBN model consists of discrete Boolean nodes and we are modeling the 
impact of contextual factors (PIFs) on human performance (CFMs). In order to 
estimate HEP for a specific HFE, we decided to apply the NoisyOR function to aid in 
specifying the network and building the CPTs for the CFM nodes. 
14.3.1 The NoisyOR function 
The NoisyOR is a special function that can be used to specify a BBN and aid in 
reducing the number of cells that need to be populated when defining a CPT. It often 
approximates the true distribution of the conditional probabilities while also 
significantly reducing the effort required in building the CPTs [104]. NoisyOR 
function by Pearl [87] is used to describe the interactions between causal factors 
(causes) X1, X2, …, Xn of a condition (their common cause) Yi. In order to apply this 
function, two important assumptions are being made: 
 Each Xj is sufficient to cause Yi in the absent of other causes. 
 Each Xj is independent of the other in causing Yi. 
If each of the causes Xj has a probability qij of being sufficient to cause Yi, then the 




parameters (assuming each causal factor and Yi have binary states) instead of 2
n+1 
parameters. Therefore, the number of probabilities required for completing the CPT 
grows linearly rather than exponentially as the number of parents increase. 
Formally, the NoisyOR function is defined as: 
 (14-1) 
For each ij, 
 (14-2) 
is the probability that effect Yi will be true if cause Xj is present and all other causes 
Xk, k ≠ j are absent. 
The joint conditional probability of Yi being true, given all the causes P(Yi = True | 
X1, X2, …, Xn)  is given by: 
(14-3) 
 
 Extensions to the NoisyOR function have been developed such as the Recursive 
NoisyOR function [105] where the independent assumption of causes can be relaxed 
and the Leaky NoisyOR function [106] for use in situations where the effect of Y is 
true even when all the causes X1, X2, …, Xn are absent. 
14.3.2 Leaky NoisyOR Function 
This is an extension of the NoisyOR function to incorporate a parameter li called the 
leak factor.  The leak factor is the probability that Yi will be true when all the causes 
are absent. In other words, its value represents the combined effect of all causes of Yi 
that are not explicitly indicated in the model: 
NoisyOR(X1, qi1, X2, qi2, …, Xn, qin) 








For the Leaky NoisyOR function, the joint conditional probability of Yi being true, 
given all the causes P(Yi = True | X1, X2, …, Xn)  is given by: 
(14-5) 
 
 In relation to our BBN quantification model, the Leaky NoisyOR function is more 
appealing because we can represent the residual effect of the CFM i.e. the probability 
that a crew failure has occurred even when there is no influence from any of the PIFs. 
Hence, it gives us a way to account for other influencing factors that are not explicitly 
represented in the BBN model as individual PIF nodes. 
 With the application of the Leaky NoisyOR function, the number of conditional 
probabilities required for populating the CPTs for each CFM i.e. different 
combinations of P(CFMi | PIF1,…,PIF9), which was 1024 reduces to 2(n+1) = 20. 
Specifically, the following conditional probabilities are required to populate our CPT: 
 P(CFMi = failure | PIFj = degraded, PIFk = nominal for each k ≠ j). This is the 
conditional probability that a crew failure has occurred given that a particular PIF 
is in the degraded state (i.e. the PIF has a negative influence on the CFM) and the 
other PIFs are nominal (i.e. they have no influence on the CFM). It represents the 
independent influence of a particular PIF on a CFM. This probability = qij 
(equation 14-2). 
 P(CFMi = success | PIFj = degraded, PIFk = nominal for each k ≠ j). This is the 
conditional probability that a crew failure has not occurred given that a particular 
li = P(Yi = true | X1 = absent, X2 = absent, …, Xn = absent)






PIF is in the degraded state and the other PIFs are in the nominal state. Note that 
this probability = 1 - qij. 
 P(CFMi = failure | PIF1 = nominal ,..., PIF9 = nominal). This is the conditional 
probability that a crew failure has occurred given that all the PIFs are in the 
nominal state. This probability represents the leak factor (li) i.e. other influencing 
factors that have not been explicitly represented in the model. This implies that 
leak factor is the probability that a crew failure has occurred even when there is 
no influence from any of the PIFs in the model. 
 P(CFMi = success | PIF1 = nominal ,..., PIF9 = nominal). This is the conditional 
probability that a crew failure has not occurred given that all the PIFs are in the 
nominal state. This probability = 1 – li. 
Therefore, to populate the CPT for each CFM, we need qij for each PIF in the model 
and li for each CFM. Also, li and qij are related through a multiplier (rj). Therefore, 
  (14-6) 
 
The multiplier, rj, is a number used to indicate the individual influence of a PIF on a 
CFM. The multiplier “1” implies that the PIF has no influence on the CFM i.e. it 
doesn’t change the conditional probability of the CFM. Any number greater than 1 
implies that the PIF has an influence on the CFM and the larger the number, the 
greater the influence. 
14.4 Data Gathering from the sources 
This process involved the review of each data source previously indicated in this 





three parameters (li, qij and rj) required by our model. The data sources we selected 
cover a diverse spectrum including; first and second generation HRA methods, HEP 
estimates generated by experts for task in US NPPs, data estimated from NPP 
operational records in Germany, and an HRA database (future data source) which is 
currently being developed by the US NRC. Also, each of the HRA methods generated 
their data from other HRA methods and available databases. 
14.4.1 Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment (NARA) HRA Method 
NARA [97]-[99] is one of the first generation HRA methods that were developed 
as a refinement of HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique) 
HRA method [35], [36]. NARA uses the same approach as HEART to estimate HEPs. 
However, the main differences between NARA and HEART are the grouping of the 
generic tasks, the weights of the error producing contexts (EPCs) and the use of 
CORE-DATA human error database (containing data from various industries 
including nuclear, oil & gas, manufacturing, power transmission etc.) in NARA for 
estimating the generic task types (GTTs) [107]. It was due to these reasons that we 
decided to use NARA as one of our data sources. 
We mapped NARA’s GGTs (Table C1) to our CFMs and the EPCs (Table C2) to 
our PIFs respectively (Table 14-1). This was done in order to use the estimates of 
both parameters from NARA in estimating our model parameters. Note that the HEPs 
of the GGTs are used in estimating parameter li (leak factor). This is because since 
the description of each GGT is given without any reference to possible influencing 
factor, we assumed that the estimates were done assuming that all the PIFs (which 




estimating parameter rj (multiplier) in our model. Here is a list of our Main PIFs and 
their respective ID numbers: HSI = 1, Procedures = 2, Resources = 3, Team 
Effectiveness = 4, Knowledge / Abilities = 5, Bias = 6, Stress = 7, Task load = 8, 
Time constraint = 9. For the CFMs and the respective IDs, see Table 7-1. 
 
Table 14-1: Mapping of GGTs and EPCs to CFMs and PIFs 
 
 
Though we attempted to map the GGTs to our CFMs (except A5 because we 
didn’t find a match), we were only able to include the GGTs that were mapped to a 
single CFM in our estimate of parameter li. This is because the linear equations which 
resulted from the GGTs that were mapped to more than one of our CFMs didn’t 
Our CFM ID Our Main PIF Groups
ID HEP 95% t-confidence ID ID Affect ID
A1 5.00E-03 2.0E-03 - 1.0E-02 A2 1 24 8
A2 1.00E-03 n/a (only 3 data points)
D2 or D4 or D5 or 
A2 2 20 none
A3 2.00E-03 7.0E-04 - 6.0E-03 D4 or D5 or A2 3 11 8 or 9
A4 6.00E-03 n/a (only 3 data points) D1 or D2 or D7 4 10 none
A5 1.00E-04 4.0E-06 - 2.0E-03 none 5 10 none
B1 2.00E-02 3.0E-03 - 2.0E-01 I9 6 10 4
B2 4.00E-03 8.0E-04 - 2.0E-02 D4 or D5 or A2 7 9 none
B3 7.00E-04 n/a (only 3 data points) D4 or A2 8 9 none
B4 3.00E-03 3.0E-04 - 3.0E-02 D2 or D4 or A2 9 8 5
B5 3.00E-02 n/a (only 1 data points) I5 10 6 1
C1 4.00E-04 n/a (only 1 data points) I1 11 4 1
C2 2.00E-01 15.0E-02 - 33.0E-02 D1 12 3 2











produce consistent results when solved. Also, we couldn’t obtain estimates of all the 
GGTs in the equations. Hence, we didn’t include the following GGTs in our final 
estimate of li: A2, A3, A4, B2, B3, and B4. 
For the EPCs, we only include the ones that mapped to our PIFs (except EPC- 3 
which maps to two of our PIFs) in our estimate of rj. Note that as a general rule in our 
data gathering process, we excluded any data point (from any data source) that is 
made up of more than one data point in our model e.g. NARA’s GGT (A2) which is a 
made up of CFMs D2, D4, D5 and A2 (i.e. NARA’s A2 is  ≅ D2+D4+D5+A2). This 
was done in order to avoid the resulting inconsistencies when we attempted to 
estimate each of the data points it maps to (in our model). 
14.4.2 Standardized Plant Analysis Risk HRA (SPAR-H) Method 
SPAR-H [19] is one of the second generation methods that were developed for the 
US NRC in order to estimate HEPs for use in SPAR PRA models of US nuclear 
power plants (NPPs). It is one of the most widely applied HRA methods and has been 
used as part of PRA in over 70 US NPPs. It was originally developed as a screening 
methodology, but was later extended for full HRP estimation. 
SPAR-H has 8 PIFs and multipliers for both diagnosis and action task (Table C3) 
which we have mapped to our PIFs (see Table 14-2). For simplicity, we have used the 
following identification numbers (IDs) for the SPAR-H PIFs; Available time = 1, 
Stressors = 2, Complexity = 3, Experience / Training = 4, procedures = 5, 
Ergonomics = 6, Fitness for duty = 7, and Work processes = 8. Note that we are 
interested in multipliers greater than 1 since those have a negative influence on 




estimating parameter rj (multiplier) in our model. Note that data from SPAR-H PIF 8 
was excluded from our final estimate of parameter rj. 
 
Table 14-2: Mapping of SPAR-H PIFs to our model PIFs 
 
 
14.4.3 Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) 
CREAM [12] is a second generation HRA method that was developed for general 
applications, based on the Contextual Control Model [108]. From the information 
processing perspective, CREAM has emphasized the identification and estimation of 
cognitive errors. According to [32], this method has been used in two recent NASA 
PRAs. 
CREAM has generic failure types (Table C4) which we mapped to our CFMs and 
common performance conditions (CPCs) (Table C5) which we mapped to our PIFs 
(Table 14-3). The basic values of the generic failure types are used in estimating 
parameter li (leak factor). This is because since each generic failure type is given 
without any reference to a direct possible influencing factor, we assumed that the 
estimates were done assuming that all the PIFs (which would map directly to our 
Our Main PIF Groups
ID ID
1 10 10 9
2 2 5 2 5 7
3 2 5 2 5 8
4 10 3 5
5 5 20 50 5 20 50 2
6 10 50 10 50 1
7 5 5 5
8 2 5 3 or 4 or 6





model) were nominal. Also, the weighting factors for the CPCs shown as COCOM 
function in (Table C5), are used in estimating parameter rj (multiplier) in our model.  
We have used the following identification numbers (IDs) for the CREAM CPCs; 
Adequacy of organisation = 1, Working conditions = 2, Adequacy of MMI and 
operational support = 3, Availability of procedures / plans = 4, Number of 
simultaneous goals = 5, Available time  = 6, Time of day = 7, Adequacy of training 
and preparation = 8, and crew collaboration quality = 9. We are interested in 
multipliers greater than 1 since those have a negative influence on human 
performance i.e. degrade it. 
 
Table 14-3: Mapping of generic failure types and CPCs to CFMs and PIFs 
 
 
We were able to map all the generic failure types to our CFMs and included all the 
basic values in our estimate of parameter li. Note that the mapping of a generic failure 
Our CFM ID Our Main PIF Groups
obs int plan exe
O1 1.00E-03 3.0E-04 - 3.0E-03 I6, I8 1 1 1 2 2 3 or 4 or 6
O2 7.00E-02 2.0E-02 - 17.0E-02 I5 2 2 2 1 2 3
O3 7.00E-02 2.0E-02 - 17.0E-02 I1, I2, I3, I4 3 5 1 1 5 1
I1 2.00E-01 9.0E-02 - 6.0E-01 D1 4 2 1 5 2 2
I2 1.00E-02 1.0E-03 - 1.0E-01 I4, D4, D5, D6, D7 5 2 2 5 2 6
I3 1.00E-02 1.0E-03 - 1.0E-01 I5, D6 6 5 5 5 5 9
P1 1.00E-02 1.0E-03 - 1.0E-01 D3, D7 7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 5
P2 1.00E-02 1.0E-03 - 1.0E-01 D3, D7 8 2 5 5 2 5
E1 3.00E-03 1.0E-03 - 9.0E-03 A2 9 2 2 2 5 4
E2 3.00E-03 1.0E-03 - 9.0E-03 A1
E3 5.00E-04 5.0E-05 - 5.0E-03 A3
E4 3.00E-03 1.0E-03 - 9.0E-03 A2
E5 3.00E-02 25.0E-03 - 4.0E-02 A2










type to more than one CFM e.g. O1 maps to CFMs I6 and I8 implies that O1 could be 
I6 or I8 and this is very different from a situation where O1 could be made up of I6 
and I8 i.e. I6 or I8 (as in the case of some NARA GGTs and SPAR-H PIF which have 
been excluded from the estimates).   
The data from CPC 1 was excluded from our final estimate of parameter rj due to 
the aforementioned reasons. The CPC multipliers are divided into 4 groups namely 
observation (obs), interpretation (int), planning (plan), and execution (exe). These 
groups are mapped to the phases of our cognitive model as follows; obs and int = I 
(information processing) phase, int and plan = D (decision making) phase, and exe = 
A (Action) phase. These mappings are reflected in our estimate of rj. 
14.4.4 German Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operating experience data 
The first systematic attempt to generate human reliability data from German NPP 
was recently published in [102]. According to [102], the data was collected and 
analyzed in a transparent and traceable manner, and is not specific to any particular 
HRA method. The results were also compared with the data obtained in the THERP 
handbook [7]. Hence, we decided to use it as one of our data sources. 
We mapped the samples (errors) that were analyzed (Table C6) to our CFMs and 
PIFs in terms of parameters li and qij in our model (Table 14-4). Note that some error 
descriptions that were given had influencing factors that did not directly map to any 
of our PIFs and hence, we mapped those to li.  Those that had influencing factors that 
mapped directly to our PIFs were mapped qij. In instances where more than one 
influencing factor was reported as relevant to the error, we had to use our judgment in 




to. Some errors from Table C6 (ID numbers 24, 25, 26 and 36) were excluded from 
our parameter estimates because according to [102], the samples were considered too 
small to be of statistical significance.  
 







estimate CFMs PIFs Parameter
1 1.20E-03 1.80E-04 4.00E-03 0.001 A3 1 q A31
2 1.30E-03 1.90E-04 4.00E-03 none A2 8 q A28
3 3.50E-03 9.00E-04 9.00E-03 none A1 9 q A19
4 2.40E-02 3.60E-03 7.80E-02 none A3 1 q A31
5 8.90E-04 1.30E-04 2.90E-03 0.003 A3 1 q A31
6 2.90E-03 4.40E-04 9.70E-03 0.0005 A3 1 q A31
7 7.80E-04 1.20E-04 2.60E-03 none A3 6 q A36
8 2.70E-03 4.00E-04 8.80E-03 0.001 A3 1 q A31
9 1.00E-03 1.50E-04 3.40E-03 0.003 A3 1 q A31
10 1.50E-02 2.20E-03 4.70E-02 none A1 7 q A17
11 6.90E-03 1.00E-03 2.30E-02 0.0005 A3 1 q A31
12 9.80E-04 1.50E-04 3.30E-03 none A2 1 q A21
13 7.80E-03 1.20E-03 2.50E-02 0.003 A3 1 q A31
14 7.90E-04 1.20E-04 2.60E-03 0.003 A1 none l A1
15 4.20E-02 6.30E-03 1.30E-01 none A2 7 q A27
16 3.30E-02 4.90E-03 1.00E-01 none D7 5 q D75
17 3.50E-02 5.40E-03 1.10E-01 none D7 5 q D75
18 1.40E-02 2.10E-03 4.60E-02 none D7 5 q D75
19 1.30E-03 1.90E-04 4.40E-03 none D7 1 q D71
20 6.50E-02 9.90E-03 2.00E-01 none D7 5 q D75
21 6.80E-02 1.00E-02 2.10E-01 none D1 7 q D17
22 5.00E-01 1.70E-01 8.30E-01 none D7 5 q D75
23 2.10E-02 3.20E-03 6.80E-02 none A2 5 q A25
24 9.50E-01 6.40E-01 1.00E+00 none I5 1 q I51
25 9.50E-01 6.40E-01 1.00E+00 none I5 4 q I54
26 8.40E-01 2.30E-01 9.90E-01 none I6 none l I6
27 2.40E-02 3.50E-03 7.60E-02 0.01 D7 5 q D75
28 1.60E-01 2.60E-02 4.40E-02 0.1 D7 5 q D75
29 5.60E-03 8.30E-04 1.80E-02 0.003 I6 2 q I62
30 8.00E-04 1.20E-04 2.70E-03 none D7 5 q D75
31 4.20E-02 6.30E-03 1.30E-01 none D7 5 q D75
32 1.20E-02 3.20E-03 3.00E-02 0.006 I6 7 q I67
33 2.70E-03 4.00E-04 8.80E-03 0.003 I6 2 q I62
34 5.80E-02 8.90E-03 1.80E-01 none D7 5 q D75
35 2.40E-02 3.70E-03 7.90E-02 none D7 5 q D75
36 8.40E-01 2.30E-01 9.90E-01 none D7 2 q D72








14.4.5 HEP estimates generated by experts for tasks in US NPPs 
As part of a research program that was conducted by the US NRC to determine the 
practicality and usefulness of several methods for obtaining human reliability data 
and estimates for inclusion in NPP PRAs, expert judgment was used to generate HEP 
estimates and associated uncertainty bounds [100], [101]. These estimates were 
generated using paired comparisons and direct numerical estimation techniques. They 
correspond to two separate task list (level 1 tasks and levels 2 &3 tasks) tailored 
specifically for boiling water reactors. 
We mapped both level 1 and 2&3 tasks, and estimates generated using the direct 
numerical estimation technique (Table C7 & Table C8) as recommended by the 
authors to our CFMs and PIFs, in terms of parameters li and qij in our model (Table 
14-5). Note that some tasks descriptions contained information on influencing factors 
that directly map to any of our PIFs and hence, we mapped those to qij.  Those that 
did not have influencing factors that mapped directly to our PIFs were mapped li. 
Also, we included “T” as a part of the ID number for levels 2 & 3 tasks in order to 
differentiate them from level 1 tasks. Task ID “5” couldn’t be mapped to any of our 
parameters and we also excluded data from task IDs 4, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 and T15 from 








estimate CFMs PIFs Parameter
1 7.00E-04 6.00E-05 8.00E-03 A1 none l A1
2 1.00E-03 2.00E-04 6.00E-03 A2 none l A2
3 8.00E-04 7.00E-05 9.00E-03 A2 none l A2
4 2.00E-04 2.00E-05 3.00E-03 D2 or D4 or D5 none none
5 2.00E-04 3.00E-05 1.00E-03 none none none
6 7.00E-02 7.00E-03 3.10E-01 D1 5 q D15
7 6.00E-03 2.00E-04 3.00E-02 D2 none l D2
8 4.00E-02 5.00E-03 3.00E-01 D3 none l D3
9 1.00E-04 2.00E-05 2.00E-03 D5 or A1 none none
10 1.00E-02 1.00E-03 2.00E-01 D5 or A2 none none
11 3.00E-04 2.00E-05 2.00E-03 D5 or A2 none none
12 1.00E-03 9.00E-05 3.00E-02 D2 none l D2
13 2.00E-03 1.00E-04 2.00E-02 D1 none l D1
14 5.00E-04 4.00E-05 3.00E-03 D6 or A1 none none
15 3.00E-02 5.00E-03 3.90E-01 D6 or A1 none none
T1 4.00E-03 6.00E-04 3.00E-02 A3 1 q A31
T2 2.00E-03 3.00E-04 1.00E-02 A3 1 q A31
T3 5.00E-04 1.00E-04 3.00E-03 A3 1 q A31
T4 5.00E-04 8.00E-05 4.00E-03 A2 1 q A21
T5 2.00E-02 2.00E-03 2.60E-01 A3 1 q A31
T6 4.00E-04 4.00E-05 3.00E-03 A3 none l A3
T7 1.00E-03 9.00E-05 1.00E-02 I6 1 q I61
T8 6.00E-03 6.00E-04 3.00E-02 I6 1 q I61
T9 1.00E-02 1.00E-03 5.00E-02 I6 1 q I61
T10 3.00E-03 2.00E-04 2.00E-02 A3 1 q A31
T11 3.00E-03 2.00E-04 4.00E-02 I6 none l I6
T12 2.00E-02 2.00E-03 1.00E-01 I1 none l I1
T13 7.00E-03 5.00E-04 3.00E-02 I6 none l I6
T14 2.00E-06 4.00E-07 9.00E-06 I1 none l I1
T15 4.00E-02 3.00E-03 2.90E-01 I1 or I2 or I4 none none
T16 5.00E-05 9.00E-06 3.00E-04 I6 none l I6
T17 1.00E-03 1.00E-04 8.00E-03 I5 none l I5
T18 1.00E-02 1.00E-03 4.00E-02 I5 1 q I51
T19 3.00E-03 1.00E-03 8.00E-02 I5 none l I5
T20 3.00E-03 5.00E-04 2.00E-02 A2 none l A2





14.4.6 Summary of Data Gathered 
We have organized the data gathered from the different sources into tables in order 
to clearly indicate what is being used in estimating each of our model parameters li, rj 
and qij.  
14.4.6.1 Data and sources used in estimating parameter li 
As a reminder, li represents the leak factor i.e. P(CFMi = failure | PIF1 = nominal 
,..., PIF9 = nominal). This is the conditional probability that a crew failure has 
occurred even when there is no influence from any of the PIFs. Therefore, it 
represents other influencing factors that have not been explicitly represented in the 
model. The data gathered and used in estimating this parameter is indicated in Table 
14-6. 
14.4.6.2 Data and sources used in estimating parameter qij 
Note that qij represents P(CFMi = failure | PIFj = degraded, PIFk = nominal for 
each k ≠ j). This is the conditional probability that a crew failure has occurred given 
that a particular PIF is in the degraded state (i.e. the PIF has a negative influence on 
the CFM) and the other PIFs are nominal (i.e. they have no influence on the CFM). 






















C1 4.00E‐04 N/A ‐ only 1 data  point O3 7.00E‐02 2.0E‐02 ‐ 17.0E‐02 T12 2.00E‐02 2.00E‐03 1.00E‐01
T14 0.000002 0.0000004 9.00E‐06
I2 Data Not Obtained (Intentional) O3 7.00E‐02 2.0E‐02 ‐ 17.0E‐02
I3 Data Discounted O3 7.00E‐02 2.0E‐02 ‐ 17.0E‐02
O3 7.00E‐02 2.0E‐02 ‐ 17.0E‐02
I2 1.00E‐02 1.0E‐03 ‐1.0E‐01
B5 3.00E‐02 N/A ‐ only 1 data  point O2 7.00E‐02 2.0E‐02 ‐ 17.0E‐02 T17 1.00E‐03 1.00E‐04 8.00E‐03
I3 1.00E‐02 1.0E‐03 ‐1.0E‐01 T19 3.00E‐03 1.00E‐03 8.00E‐02
O1 1.00E‐03 3.0E‐04 ‐ 3.0E‐03 T11 3.00E‐03 2.00E‐04 4.00E‐02
T13 7.00E‐03 5.00E‐04 3.00E‐02
T16 5.00E‐05 9.00E‐06 3.00E‐04
I7 Information Miscommunicated D1 6.00E‐03 2.00E‐03 ‐ 9.00E‐03




D1 Plant/System State Misdiagnosed C2 2.00E‐01 15.0E‐02 ‐ 33.0E‐02 I1 2.00E‐01 9.0E‐02 ‐ 6.0E‐01 13 2.00E‐03 1.00E‐04 2.00E‐02
7 6.00E‐03 2.00E‐04 3.00E‐02
12 1.00E‐03 9.00E‐05 3.00E‐02
P1 1.00E‐02 1.0E‐03 ‐1.0E‐01 8 4.00E‐02 5.00E‐03 3.00E‐01
P2 1.00E‐02 1.0E‐03 ‐1.0E‐01
D4 Procedure Step Omitted (Intentional) I2 1.00E‐02 1.0E‐03 ‐1.0E‐01













A1 5.00E‐03 2.0E‐03 ‐ 1.0E‐02 E1 3.00E‐03 1.0E‐03 ‐ 9.0E‐03 2 1.00E‐03 2.00E‐04 6.00E‐03
E4 3.00E‐03 1.0E‐03 ‐ 9.0E‐03 3 8.00E‐04 7.00E‐05 9.00E‐03
E5 3.00E‐02 25.0E‐03 ‐ 4.0E‐02 T20 3.00E‐03 5.00E‐04 2.00E‐02


















Table 14-7: Summary of data gathered for estimating parameter qij 
 
THERP THERP THERP THERP
ID CFMs ID HEP HEP ID HEP ID HEP HEP ID HEP HEP ID HEP ID HEP ID HEP HEP ID HEP ID HEP
I5 Data Incorrectly Processed T18 1.00E‐02
T7 1.00E‐03 29 5.60E‐03 3.00E‐03 32 1.20E‐02 6.00E‐03




Misdiagnosed 6 7.00E‐02 21 6.80E‐02
D2 Procedure Misinterpreted 37 2.90E‐02











A1 Incorrect Timing 10 1.50E‐02 3 3.50E‐03
A2
Incorrect Operation of 
Component/Object 12 9.80E‐04 T4 5.00E‐04 23 2.10E‐02 15 4.20E‐02 2 1.30E‐03
1 1.20E‐03 1.00E‐03 T1 4.00E‐03 7 7.80E‐04
4 2.40E‐02 T2 2.00E‐03
5 8.90E‐04 3.00E‐03 T3 5.00E‐04
6 2.90E‐03 5.00E‐04 T5 2.00E‐02






































Table 14-8: Summary of data gathered for estimating parameter rj (PIFs 1-3) 
 
 
ID CFMs ID Xplier ID Xplier ID ID ID Xplier ID Xplier ID ID ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier Xplier
I1
Key Alarm not Responded to (intentional & 
unintentional) 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 1 16 8 2 2 2
I2 Data Not Obtained (Intentional) 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 1 16 8 2 2 2
I3 Data Discounted 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 1 16 8 2 2 2
I4 Decision to Stop Gathering Data 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 1 16 8 2 2 2
I5 Data Incorrectly Processed 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 1 16 8 2 2 2
I6 Reading Error 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 1 16 8 2 2 2
I7 Information Miscommunicated 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 1 16 8 2 2 2
I8 Wrong Data Source Attended to 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 1 16 8 2 2 2
I9
Data Not Checked with Appropriate 
Frequency 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 1 16 8 2 2 2
D1 Plant/System State Misdiagnosed 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 1 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 1 5 16 8 2 2 1
D2 Procedure Misinterpreted 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 1 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 1 5 16 8 2 2 1
D3 Failure to adapt procedures to the  10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 1 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 1 5 16 8 2 2 1
D4 Procedure Step Omitted (Intentional) 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 1 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 1 5 16 8 2 2 1
D5
Inappropriate Transfer to a Different 
Procedure 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 1 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 1 5 16 8 2 2 1
D6 Decision to Delay Action 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 1 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 1 5 16 8 2 2 1
D7 Inappropriate Strategy Chosen 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 1 1 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 1 5 16 8 2 2 1
A1 Incorrect Timing 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 16 8 2 2
A2 Incorrect Operation of Component/Object 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 16 8 2 2
A3 Action on Wrong Component / object 10 6 11 4 6 10 50 3 5 12 3 15 2 5 5 20 50 4 2 16 8 2 2
CFMs and ID
Xplier Xplier Xplier Xplier









ID CFMs ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier Xplier ID Xplier Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier Xplier
I1
Key Alarm not Responded to (intentional & 
unintentional) 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 2 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 2
I2 Data Not Obtained (Intentional) 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 2 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 2
I3 Data Discounted 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 2 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 2
I4 Decision to Stop Gathering Data 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 2 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 2
I5 Data Incorrectly Processed 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 2 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 2
I6 Reading Error 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 2 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 2
I7 Information Miscommunicated 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 2 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 2
I8 Wrong Data Source Attended to 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 2 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 2
I9
Data Not Checked with Appropriate 
Frequency 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 2 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 2
D1 Plant/System State Misdiagnosed 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 10 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 5 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 5
D2 Procedure Misinterpreted 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 10 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 5 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 5
D3
Failure to adapt procedures to the 
situation 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 10 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 5 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 5
D4 Procedure Step Omitted (Intentional) 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 10 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 5 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 5
D5
Inappropriate Transfer to a Different 
Procedure 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 10 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 5 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 5
D6 Decision to Delay Action 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 10 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 5 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 5
D7 Inappropriate Strategy Chosen 6 10 9 2 2 9 8 4 10 7 5 7 1.2 1.2 8 5 5 14 2.5 19 2 5 2 5
A1 Incorrect Timing 6 10 9 5 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 8 2 14 2.5 19 2 5 5
A2 Incorrect Operation of Component/Object 6 10 9 5 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 8 2 14 2.5 19 2 5 5
A3 Action on Wrong Component / object 6 10 9 5 9 8 4 3 7 5 7 1.2 8 2 14 2.5 19 2 5 5
SPAR-H CREAMCFMs and ID
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Table 14-10: Summary of data gathered for estimating parameter rj (PIFs 7-9) 
 
 
ID CFMs ID Xplier ID Xplier Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier ID Xplier Xplier
I1
Key Alarm not Responded to (intentional & 
unintentional) 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
I2 Data Not Obtained (Intentional) 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
I3 Data Discounted 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
I4 Decision to Stop Gathering Data 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
I5 Data Incorrectly Processed 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
I6 Reading Error 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
I7 Information Miscommunicated 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
I8 Wrong Data Source Attended to 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
I9
Data Not Checked with Appropriate 
Frequency 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
D1 Plant/System State Misdiagnosed 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
D2 Procedure Misinterpreted 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
D3
Failure to adapt procedures to the 
situation 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
D4 Procedure Step Omitted (Intentional) 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
D5
Inappropriate Transfer to a Different 
Procedure 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
D6 Decision to Delay Action 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
D7 Inappropriate Strategy Chosen 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5 5
A1 Incorrect Timing 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5
A2 Incorrect Operation of Component/Object 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 3 2 3 5 1 10 6 5
A3 Action on Wrong Component / object 18 2 2 2 5 1 24 2 3 5 1 10 6 5
SPAR-H CREAMCFMs and ID
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14.4.6.3 Data and sources used in estimating parameter rj 
Parameter rj, the multiplier is a number used to indicate the individual influence of 
a PIF on a CFM. The multiplier “1” implies that the PIF has no influence on the CFM 
i.e. it doesn’t change the conditional probability of the CFM. Any number greater 
than 1 implies that the PIF has an influence on the CFM and the larger the number, 
the greater the influence. Note that rj is used to relate li to qij i.e. qij = rj * li.  The data 
gathered and used in estimating rj is indicated in Table 14-8 to Table 14-10. 
14.5 General Method for Aggregation of Estimates from Various Sources 
After gathering the data from the aforementioned sources, we obtained a variety of 
estimates for each data point in our model as shown in the previous sections. The next 
step was to aggregate these estimates into a single representative estimate for each of 
these data points. Hence the focus on this section is to discuss a formal and structured 
aggregation method.  
Bayesian methods seem to be favored by many researchers in the field. Among the 
Bayesian methods proposed are those by [109] and [110]. Even though the underlying 
philosophy of these methods is the same, the specific structures are highly dependent 
on the assumptions regarding handling such issues as dependence and calibration. 
These methods also vary depending on the type of data to which they apply. The 
quantity of interest may be a fixed unknown value (such as the length of a table) or an 
inherently variable quantity (such as the age of children in a certain school). The data 
obtained may come in many ways, including: a point estimate, parameters of a 
distribution and upper/lower bounds. The challenge for the decision maker is to figure 




Bayesian methods for aggregation data from different sources assuming that the users 
of their estimates know the nature of the unknown quantity (i.e. if it is a single-value 
or distributed). 
The Bayesian formulation is simple conceptually. Each data source is simply 
treated as a piece of evidence on the unknown of interest (UOI). The estimate is then 
used to update the analyst’s own (prior) estimate through Bayes’ theorem. We will 
discuss the basic techniques for a number of important classes of problems. 
14.5.1 Single Data Source Methods 
This covers cases where a single data source provides an estimate x* for an unknown 
quantity x. The estimate is the evidence that can be used by the analyst to update 
his/or her state of knowledge about x, through Bayes theorem: 
    (14-7) 
where π0(x) is the prior distribution representing the state of knowledge about the 
unknown quantity x, x* is the data source’s estimate of the value of x, L(x* | x) is the 
likelihood of the evidence given that the true value of the unknown quantity is x, and 
p1(x | x*) is the posterior distribution representing the updated state of knowledge 
about the unknown quantity.  
The problem is thus reduced to the assessment of π0 and L by the analysts. The key 
element in this approach is the likelihood. The data source estimates that the true 
value of x is between x* and x* + dx* is L(x* | x)dx*. In fact, the likelihood function 
is a measure of the accuracy of the data source’s estimate in the analyst’s eye. The 
shape and functional form of the likelihood may differ from one data source to 
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another for the same unknown quantity. We also note that the form of the likelihood 
function, in general, is different for the assessments of different quantities obtained 
from the same data source. Further, the analysts can either weaken or strengthen the 
weight of the each data source’s estimate through specification of L. 
14.5.1.1 Additive Error Method 
In this method, the analyst treats the data source’s estimate (variable X*) as the 
sum of two terms: 
  (14-8) 
where x is the true value and ε an error term (itself a random variable). 
The mean of the estimate obtained from the data source in this case is  xX * . 
This means that the analyst expects the estimate to be biased by an amount . Under 
the further assumption that the error is symmetrically distributed about its mean , a 
reasonable parametric distribution of ε is the normal distribution. The normal error 
model emerges if one assumes that many factors with uncertain magnitudes 
contribute to the data sources’ error, and that the error is the sum of the effects of 
such factors. 
With the assumption of normality for ε, the distribution of X* given x is also 
normal. Therefore, the likelihood function of the additive error model is given by: 
    (14-9) 






















14.5.1.2 Multiplicative Error Method 
This covers the case where the data source’s estimate is viewed as the product of 
the true value and a random error ε: 
  (14-10) 
Taking logarithm of this relation gives: 
 (14-11) 
 
If we further assume that ln(ε) is normally distributed, the likelihood function of X* 
given x is a lognormal distribution: 
  (14-12) 
 
where b (a multiplicative bias term) is the median of ε (ε50). 
If we now choose a lognormal prior distribution based on some experimental 
evidence by [111], [112] that suggest that lognormal assumption is realistic: 
     (14-13) 
 
Since the lognormal prior and lognormal likelihood are conjugate pairs, the posterior 
distribution will also be lognormal: 
    (14-14) 
 
where μ = ω0ln(x0) + ω[ln(x*)-ln(b)], and σp, ω0, and ω are defined as in the additive 
error case. 
X* = xε







































































The median of the posterior distribution is: 
    (14-15) 
 
The posterior median is the weighted geometric mean of the analyst’s prior median 
estimate (x0), and the estimate obtained from the data source, is adjusted by dividing 
it by the bias factor. 
14.5.2 Distributed Quantities 
This section covers the case where the quantity of interest has an underlying 
variability, and the estimates from different data sources come in the form of 
estimates of possible values of that quantity [113]. This situation arises when the 
provided estimates are based on sub-populations of a non-homogeneous population. 
The variability in the numerical estimates reflects not only the uncertainty in each 
data source’s way of obtaining the individual estimates, but also the inherent 
difference between the sub-populations being considered by the data sources. It is 
assumed that estimates from the data sources is a set of values given by: 
   (14-16) 
where x*i is the estimate from the i
th data source for an unknown quantity x, with the 
recognition that the particular value being estimated by that data source may be 
different from that being estimated by another. 
The objective is to develop an estimate of the distribution representing the 
variability of x given the evidence presented by E = {x*1, x*2, …, x*N}. As before, 


















involves updating belief concerning an unknown, u, in light of the set of estimates 
from different sources: 
     (14-17) 
where u is the unknown of interest (UOI), E is the set of estimates about the value of 
u (the analyst treats this set of estimates as evidence/data), π0(u) is the analyst’s prior 
state-of-knowledge on u, π1(u | E) is the analyst’s posterior state-of-knowledge on u 
after receiving the evidence, and L(E | u) is the likelihood of observing the evidence E 
given that the true value of the unknown quantity is u. 
In the case of interest the unknown is indeed a probability distribution denoted f(x) 
representing the range of values of x that were the subject of estimation by the 
different sources. In this sense, f(x) can be called ‘source-to-source variability’ 
distribution of x. To proceed, we simplify the problem by postulating that the 
unknown distribution is a member of a parametric family of distributions, and write it 
as f(x | θ). We then need to estimate the set of parameters θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θm} using 
Bayes theorem: 
   (14-18) 
The likelihood function, L(E | θ), is the probability density that the set of estimates is 
E = {x*1, x*2, …, x*N} given that the actual distribution of the quantity of interest (x) 
is a parametric distribution f(x | θ) with parameters θ1 through to θm. Furthermore, we 
assume that the estimates are independent. Under the present set of conditions, we 
have: 
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   (14-19) 
where Li(x*i | θ) is the probability density that the i
th source estimate is x*i when the 
set of parameters of the unknown distribution is θ. Note that the ith source estimate is 
a piece of information about the random variable x. More specifically, we are 
considering the case where x*i is an estimate of xi which is one of the possible values 
of x. That is, each source is concerned with estimating xi rather than the entire 
distribution of all xi's. 
Suppose that the decision maker knows the value of xi. Then the accuracy of the 
each source’s estimate as viewed by the analyst can be represented by a probability 
distribution gi. 
   (14-20) 
The distribution gi is the analyst’s probability density that the source’s estimate is x*i 
when the source is attempting to estimate xi. The fact is that the analyst does not 
know the value of xi. What is known is that xi is one of the possible value of x, and x 
is distributed according to f(x | θ). All possible values of x can be covered by 
integrating gi over x: 
   (14-21) 
The result is the likelihood that the ith source’s estimate is x*i when the set of the 
parameters of source-to-source variability distribution is θ.  
For N independent sources we have: 

















    (14-22) 
This is the result of using Equations (14-21) in (14-19) to obtain the likelihood for all 
N sources which is then used in Bayes theorem in Equation (14-18). 
The posterior distribution, π1(θ | x*1, x*2, ..., x*N), is a probability distribution over 
a family of distributions. It is a measure of the analyst’s uncertainty about which 
member of the assumed family f(x | θ) is in fact the true distribution of x. Each value 
of the set θ, represents as a candidate with probability π1(θ | x*1, x*2, ..., x*N)dθ. The 
most probable distribution is the one whose set of parameters, ̂ , maximizes π1. Such 
a set is the solution of the following system of simultaneous equations: 
      (14-23) 
 
The method presented in this section has been used extensively, particularly in 
nuclear power risk studies for the development of component failure rate estimates 
from various sources including experts and generic data compilation. In all such 
applications, the data sources are assumed to be independent since the computational 
demands for handling dependence were considered excessive. 
We will be applying the method of distributed quantities to show how to obtain a 
representative estimate for each parameter in our model. This method is chosen in 
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As an example, we used the Bayesian method of distributed quantities to 
demonstrate the estimation of parameter qI61 i.e. CFM I6 given PIF 1, using data 
mapped directly from the data sources (3 data points: 1.00E-03, 6.00E-03, 1.00E-02) 
as evidence. For this, we used R-DAT software [114] to perform the calculation 
leading to development of the “expected distribution” based on equation 14-22. We 
used the lognormal distribution to specify the source to source variability of qI61  
estimates since it can be generally used to express orders of magnitude variations in 
the estimates of the quantity of interest. Figure 14-1 shows the cumulative 
distribution of qI61 and the uncertainty bounds. Figure 14-2 shows the expected 
variability distribution of qI61 with median of 5.11E-03 and 90% bounds of 1.03E-03 
and 1.01E-02.  
 






Figure 14-2: Expected Variability Distribution of qI61 and Uncertainty Bounds 
 
Using this method, the median value obtained for each model parameter can be 
reasonably approximated using the geometric mean [115]. For the same parameter, 
we obtained an estimate of 4.00E-03 using the geometric mean. Hence, we used the 
geometric mean to estimate the approximate median values of the other model 
parameters. 
The geometric mean is a type of average which is used to estimate the typical 
value of a set of numbers by using the product of their values. It is generally defined 
as the nth root of the product of a set of numbers where n is the count of the numbers 




                 (14-24) 
Applying Equation (14-24), we were able to provide a single representative 
estimate for the respective model parameters. Table 14-11 shows each CFM and the 
estimated leak factor li. Table 14-12 shows the multiplier rj relating each CFMi and 
PIFj while  
Table 14-13 shows parameter qij, the conditional probability that a crew failure has 
occurred (CFMi) given that a particular PIFj is in the degraded state. 
 






1 2, … ,





























Note that in order to populate the CPT for each CFMi, we need parameters qij and li.  
Also, since rj * li = qij, we used this to estimate qij. Thereafter, we combined the 
results with those mapped directly from the data sources (Table 14-13) to produce the 
final qij (Table 14-14), used to directly populate the CPT for each CFMi in our BBN 
model. 
Table 14-12: CFMs and corresponding PIF multipliers rj 
 
ID CFMs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I1
Key Alarm not Responded to (intentional  & 
unintentional) 6.3 4.8 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.1 2.7 6.2 6.3
I2 Data Not Obtained (Intentional) 6.3 4.8 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.1 2.7 6.2 6.3
I3 Data Discounted 6.3 4.8 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.1 2.7 6.2 6.3
I4 Decision to Stop Gathering Data 6.3 4.8 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.1 2.7 6.2 6.3
I5 Data Incorrectly Processed 6.3 4.8 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.1 2.7 6.2 6.3
I6 Reading Error 6.3 4.8 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.1 2.7 6.2 6.3
I7 Information Miscommunicated 6.3 4.8 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.1 2.7 6.2 6.3
I8 Wrong Data Source Attended to 6.3 4.8 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.1 2.7 6.2 6.3
I9 Data Not Checked with Appropriate Frequency 6.3 4.8 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.1 2.7 6.2 6.3
D1 Plant/System State Misdiagnosed 4.8 5.5 2.5 3.4 3.9 2.7 2.7 6.2 6.3
D2 Procedure Misinterpreted 4.8 5.5 2.5 3.4 3.9 2.7 2.7 6.2 6.3
D3 Failure to adapt procedures  to the situation 4.8 5.5 2.5 3.4 3.9 2.7 2.7 6.2 6.3
D4 Procedure Step Omitted (Intentional) 4.8 5.5 2.5 3.4 3.9 2.7 2.7 6.2 6.3
D5 Deviation from Procedure 4.8 5.5 2.5 3.4 3.9 2.7 2.7 6.2 6.3
D6 Decision to Delay Action 4.8 5.5 2.5 3.4 3.9 2.7 2.7 6.2 6.3
D7 Inappropriate Strategy Chosen 4.8 5.5 2.5 3.4 3.9 2.7 2.7 6.2 6.3
A1 Incorrect Timing 9 6.3 4 7.1 3.1 2.9 2.7 6.2 7.07
A2 Incorrect Operation of Component/Object 9 6.3 4 7.1 3.1 2.9 2.7 6.2 7.07






Table 14-13: Conditional probability of CFM given a PIF (I - 9) in a degraded state (qij) 






















D7 Inappropriate Strategy Chosen 1.30E‐03 3.44E‐02
A1 Incorrect Timing 1.50E‐02 3.50E‐03
A2 Incorrect Operation of  7.00E‐04 2.10E‐02 4.20E‐02 1.30E‐03

















(intentional & unintentional) 8.03E‐04 6.18E‐04 4.08E‐04 4.39E‐04 3.72E‐04 2.72E‐04 3.49E‐04 7.98E‐04 8.09E‐04
I2 Data Not Obtained (Intentional) 4.38E‐01 3.37E‐01 2.22E‐01 2.39E‐01 2.03E‐01 1.48E‐01 1.90E‐01 4.35E‐01 4.41E‐01
I3 Data Discounted 4.38E‐01 3.37E‐01 2.22E‐01 2.39E‐01 2.03E‐01 1.48E‐01 1.90E‐01 4.35E‐01 4.41E‐01
I4 Decision to Stop Gathering Data 1.66E‐01 1.27E‐01 8.40E‐02 9.05E‐02 7.67E‐02 5.60E‐02 7.18E‐02 1.64E‐01 1.67E‐01
I5 Data Incorrectly Processed 2.29E‐02 4.03E‐02 2.66E‐02 2.86E‐02 2.43E‐02 1.77E‐02 2.27E‐02 5.20E‐02 5.28E‐02
I6 Reading Error 4.60E‐03 3.50E‐03 2.69E‐03 2.89E‐03 2.45E‐03 1.79E‐03 4.29E‐03 5.26E‐03 5.33E‐03
I7 Information Miscommunicated 3.75E‐02 2.89E‐02 1.90E‐02 2.05E‐02 1.74E‐02 1.27E‐02 1.63E‐02 3.73E‐02 3.78E‐02
I8 Wrong Data Source Attended to 6.26E‐03 4.81E‐03 3.17E‐03 3.42E‐03 2.90E‐03 2.11E‐03 2.71E‐03 6.21E‐03 6.30E‐03
I9
Data Not Checked with Appropriate 
Frequency 1.25E‐01 9.63E‐02 6.35E‐02 6.84E‐02 5.80E‐02 4.23E‐02 5.43E‐02 1.24E‐01 1.26E‐01
D1 Plant/System State Misdiagnosed 2.06E‐01 2.36E‐01 1.09E‐01 1.47E‐01 1.09E‐01 1.15E‐01 8.92E‐02 2.68E‐01 2.71E‐01
D2 Procedure Misinterpreted 1.17E‐02 1.97E‐02 6.17E‐03 8.38E‐03 9.62E‐03 6.51E‐03 6.65E‐03 1.52E‐02 1.54E‐02
D3
Failure to adapt procedures to the 
situation 6.77E‐02 7.76E‐02 3.56E‐02 4.84E‐02 5.55E‐02 3.76E‐02 3.84E‐02 8.79E‐02 8.91E‐02
D4 Procedure Step Omitted (Intentional) 4.78E‐02 5.49E‐02 2.52E‐02 3.42E‐02 3.93E‐02 2.66E‐02 2.71E‐02 6.21E‐02 6.30E‐02
D5
Inappropriate Transfer to a Different 
procedure 4.78E‐02 5.49E‐02 2.52E‐02 3.42E‐02 3.93E‐02 2.66E‐02 2.71E‐02 6.21E‐02 6.30E‐02
D6 Decision to Delay Action 4.78E‐02 5.49E‐02 2.52E‐02 3.42E‐02 3.93E‐02 2.66E‐02 2.71E‐02 6.21E‐02 6.30E‐02
D7 Inappropriate Strategy Chosen 7.89E‐03 5.49E‐02 2.52E‐02 3.42E‐02 3.68E‐02 2.66E‐02 2.71E‐02 6.21E‐02 6.30E‐02
A1 Incorrect Timing 1.35E‐02 9.35E‐03 5.97E‐03 1.06E‐02 4.64E‐03 4.37E‐03 7.80E‐03 9.28E‐03 1.06E‐02
A2
Incorrect Operation of 
Component/Object 4.57E‐03 2.07E‐02 1.32E‐02 2.34E‐02 1.47E‐02 9.68E‐03 1.94E‐02 5.17E‐03 2.34E‐02






14.6 SACADA Database as a future data source 
The lack of sufficient and appropriate human performance data is one of the key 
factors affecting HEP estimation in particular, and the quality of HRA in general. In 
an attempt to address this issue, the US NRC is sponsoring the Scenario Authoring, 
Characterization, and Debriefing Application (SACADA) database project [30], [31]. 
This project which is a part of the US NRC’s HRA data program [31], is an on-going 
data collection effort aimed at collecting human performance data / information for 
use in human reliability applications. The SACADA tool was developed so that it 
could be suitable for implementation in the operator training program of NPPs for 
collection of operator training / simulator exercise information.  It is aimed at being a 
long term date collection program which identifies a set of anchor HEPs with 
sufficient contextual information for use as reference points in HEP estimation. It 
utilizes the macrocognitive functions of detecting / noticing, sense-making / 
understanding / diagnosis, deciding/response planning, executing actions, 
communicating / coordinating (team functions), and supervising /directing personnel 
[30]. These are the same functions on which our CFM-PIF framework is built. 
Each training scenario starts with a plant initial condition which is followed by a 
set of plant malfunctions. For each malfunction, a set of important operator task are 
pre-identified. Each task is represented by a training objective element (TOE), which 
is the basic data unit (data point). Each TOE consists of context (in terms of 
situational factors that affect success in a TOE) and performance results (in terms of 




According to [30], it is estimated that about 2800 TOEs will be produced per 
reactor per year. Therefore, when collected from a number of reactor units, the data 
produced should be sufficient to support HRA.  
Relating the SACADA database to our HRA methodology, the human 
performance results consist of error modes which map to our CFMs, Table 7-3, and 
error causes which map to our PIFs, Table A3. When obtained, this information 
would be incorporated into our model parameter estimation process (as another data 
source) using the Bayesian model uncertainty treatment method (method of 
distributed quantities) discussed earlier in this chapter. The context results will aid in 
enriching the narratives for each scenario of the particular HFE in our qualitative 
analysis. Hence, our interest in using the SACADA database to provide the needed 
statistical basis to support our methodology.  
The results from the database can be recorded in tabular form as shown in Table 
14-15. For each TOE, the CFMs that occur and the relevant PIFs can be recorded. 
Note that the PIFs are set at the beginning of the scenario by the trainer. These results 
can also be represented in form of a BBN as shown in Figure 14-3. From this, we 
would learn the structure and obtain relevant information required to quantify our 








Figure 14-3: A Sample BBN representation of the future SACADA database output 
 
14.7 Quantitative Results for Model Parameters 
Due to the application of the Leaky NoisyOR function, the CPT for each CFM in 
our BBN model has two rows and ten columns. The first row contains the 9 qijs i.e. 
P(CFMi = failure | PIFj = degraded, PIFk = nominal for each k ≠ j) and a  leak factor li 
associated with each CFMi. The second row is the complement of each data point in 
the column above it i.e. 1 – qij and 1- li. Therefore, each CFM row in Table 14-14 
I1 I2 ... D7 A1 A2 A3 1 2 3 .... 9
1 x x x x x x
2 x x x x x x
3 x x x x x x
4 x x x x x x
5 x x x x x x
6 x x x x x x
: x x x x x
: x x x x x









contains the data points for the first row of its CPT and the complement of each of 
these data points provides the data points for the second row. 
Using these data points, we developed the CPTs required for all the CFMs in our 
Model. Thereafter, we created our BBN model using GeNie BBN software [90] with 
the CFM nodes being noisy-max nodes and populated the CPTs with the respective 
data points. For the PIF nodes, we inputted different combinations of marginal 
probabilities and ran the model to obtain the joint conditional probability of each 
CFMi given the PIFs i.e. P(CFMi ∩ PIF1, PIF2, …, PIF9). See Table 14-16.  
 










unintentional) 4.00E‐02 2.10E‐02 1.00E‐04
I2 Data Not Obtained (Intentional) 9.69E‐01 7.92E‐01 7.00E‐02
I3 Data Discounted 9.69E‐01 7.92E‐01 7.00E‐02
I4 Decision to Stop Gathering Data 6.77E‐01 4.28E‐01 2.60E‐02
I5 Data Incorrectly Processed 3.11E‐01 1.72E‐01 9.00E‐03
I6 Reading Error 4.20E‐02 2.20E‐02 1.00E‐03
I7 Information Miscommunicated 2.16E‐01 1.16E‐01 6.00E‐03
I8 Wrong Data Source Attended to 3.90E‐02 2.00E‐02 1.00E‐03
I9
Data Not Checked with Appropriate 
Frequency 5.68E‐01 3.42E‐01 2.00E‐02
D1 Plant/System State Misdiagnosed 8.51E‐01 6.00E‐01 4.30E‐02
D2 Procedure Misinterpreted 1.00E‐01 5.20E‐02 2.00E‐03
D3
Failure to adapt procedures  to the 
situation 4.83E‐01 2.82E‐01 1.60E‐02
D4 Procedure Step Omitted (Intentional) 3.36E‐01 1.87E‐01 1.00E‐02
D5
Inappropriate Transfer to a Different 
procedure 3.36E‐01 1.87E‐01 1.00E‐02
D6 Decision to Delay Action 3.36E‐01 1.87E‐01 1.00E‐02
D7 Inappropriate Strategy Chosen 3.07E‐01 1.70E‐01 1.00E‐02
A1 Incorrect Timing 6.90E‐02 3.60E‐02 1.00E‐03
A2 Incorrect Operation of Component/Object 1.24E‐01 6.50E‐02 3.00E‐03







 Note that each PIF has two states which equate to either the degraded state (D) or 
the nominal state (N). From Table 14-16, we observe that: 
 The estimates obtained are consistent with the expected trend i.e. when all the 
PIFs are set to the degraded state (marginal probability of the degraded state = 1, 
marginal probability of the nominal state = 0), each PIF has the most negative 
influence on crew performance by degrading it. The joint conditional probability 
of each CFMi is at its highest. 
  When all the PIFs are set to the nominal state (marginal probability of the 
degraded state = 0, marginal probability of the nominal state = 1), the joint 
conditional probability of each CFMi is at its lowest. 
 When all the PIFs are set to the nominal state, the joint conditional probability of 
each CFM is approximately equal to the leak factor, li P(CFMi = failure | PIF1 = 
nominal ,..., PIF9 = nominal). This verifies the claim that li is the probability that a 
crew failure has occurred even when there is no influence from any of the PIFs. 
Using the above estimates (Table 14-16) which serve as inputs to our human 
response model (IDA), we obtained estimates of the conditional probabilities of each 






Table 14-17: HEP Estimates for each phase of our IDA model and overall HFE 
 
 
The conditional HEP estimates from Table 14-17 are consistent with the expected 
trend. The conditional probability of each IDA phase and HFE is highest when all the 
PIFs are set to the degraded state and lowest when they are all set to the nominal 
state. Also, the conditional probabilities of the action errors in all levels of the PIFs 
are consistently lower than those of the decision making errors.  
However, these estimates are generally higher than expected when all PIFs are in 
the nominal state and midway PIF levels i.e. when the HRA analyst is not sure if the 
PIFs are all in the nominal or degraded state respectively. Hence, there is a need to 
calibrate the data input to the model.  
14.8 Data Calibration 
The ideal situation would be to have a source that can provide the needed data 
input required to estimate our model parameters. Since that was not possible, we had 
to obtain data from different sources. Each source makes some assumptions (which 
may be different from ours) when using their data in estimating HEPs.   Also, some of 
the sources (NARA, SPAR-H) have some form of normalization factor incorporated 
into the formulation used in their HEP estimation process. Therefore, we decided to 







HFE 1.00E+00 9.99E‐01 2.71E‐01
Information processing phase (I) 1.00E+00 9.89E‐01 1.88E‐01
Decision making phase (D) 9.86E‐01 8.79E‐01 9.72E‐02






We chose to use SPAR-H nominal HEP values to aid in our data calibration 
process. This is because SPAR-H is one of the most widely used methods in NPP 
HRA. Also, it has nominal HEP values associated with diagnosis tasks (1.00E-02) 
and action tasks (1.00E-03) in general. The nominal HEP for diagnosis tasks could be 
interpreted as the resulting HEP obtained from all the CFMs in both the I and D 
phases of our model. Also, the nominal HEP for action tasks could be interpreted as 
the resulting HEP obtained from all the CFMs in the A phase. Since the leak factor li 
represents the conditional probability that a crew failure has occurred even when 
there is no influence from any of the PIFs i.e. P(CFMi = failure | PIF1 = nominal ,..., 
PIF9 = nominal), we decided to use the nominal HEPs from SPAR-H to calibrate this 
parameter in our model. 
14.8.1 Calibration of lI1 to lD7 
To calibrate the leak factor li for all the 16 CFMs in both the I and D phase (lI1 to lD7), 
we normalized the estimated nominal HEP (for both the I and D phase) to that of 
SPAR-H (1.00E-02). This was done using the following formulation: 
    (14-25) 
Where li represents the leak factor for each CFMi in I and D phase ( Table 14-11),  li* 
represents the calibrated leak factors. Note that: 











   (14-27) 
 
14.8.2 Calibration of lA1 to lA3 
The calibration of the leak factor li for the 3 CFMs in both the A phase (lA1 to lA3) 
was done by normalizing the estimated nominal HEP (for the A phase) to that of 
SPAR-H (1.00E-03), using the following formulation: 
   (14-28) 
Where li represents the leak factor for each CFMi in A phase ( Table 14-11),  li* 
represents the calibrated leak factors. Also,  
   (14-29) 
And 
   (14-30) 
 
14.8.3 BBN Model Output with Calibrated Inputs 
Using the results obtained from the above calibration, we developed the updated 
CPTs for the CFMs. We inputted it into the BBN model with different combinations 
of marginal probabilities of PIFs and ran the model to obtain the joint conditional 
probability of each CFMi given the PIFs i.e. P(CFMi ∩ PIF1, PIF2, …, PIF9). Also 


















From Table 14-18, we observe that the estimates compare favorably to the GGTs 
in NARA and generic failure types in CREAM. They are consistent with the expected 
trends. The joint conditional probability of each CFMi is at its highest when all the 
PIFs are set to the degraded state and lowest when all the PIFs are set to the nominal 
state. Also, the joint conditional probability of each CFMi is approximately equal to 
the leak factor, li when all the PIFs are set to the nominal state.  
 
Table 14-18: Joint Conditional Probabilities of CFMs given PIFs (calibrated) 
 
 
Using these estimates as inputs to our human response model (IDA), we obtained 
estimates of the conditional probabilities of each phase of the IDA model and the 









unintentional) 1.65E‐04 8.47E‐05 4.24E‐06 4.24E‐06
I2 Data Not Obtained (Intentional) 8.66E‐02 4.52E‐02 2.31E‐03 2.31E‐03
I3 Data Discounted 8.66E‐02 4.52E‐02 2.31E‐03 2.31E‐03
I4 Decision to Stop Gathering Data 3.35E‐02 1.73E‐02 8.75E‐04 8.75E‐04
I5 Data Incorrectly Processed 1.31E‐02 6.72E‐03 2.77E‐04 2.77E‐04
I6 Reading Error 2.95E‐03 1.49E‐03 2.80E‐05 2.80E‐05
I7 Information Miscommunicated 7.69E‐03 3.95E‐03 1.98E‐04 1.98E‐04
I8 Wrong Data Source Attended to 1.29E‐03 6.60E‐04 3.31E‐05 3.31E‐05
I9 Data Not Checked with Appropriate Frequency 2.54E‐02 1.31E‐02 6.61E‐04 6.61E‐04
D1 Plant/System State Misdiagnosed 7.93E‐02 4.10E‐02 1.42E‐03 1.42E‐03
D2 Procedure Misinterpreted 6.29E‐03 3.19E‐03 8.10E‐05 8.10E‐05
D3 Failure to adapt procedures  to the situation 1.81E‐02 9.32E‐03 4.68E‐04 4.68E‐04
D4 Procedure Step Omitted (Intentional) 1.28E‐02 6.60E‐03 3.31E‐04 3.31E‐04
D5 Inappropriate Transfer to a Different Procedure 1.28E‐02 6.60E‐03 3.31E‐04 3.31E‐04
D6 Decision to Delay Action 1.28E‐02 6.60E‐03 3.31E‐04 3.31E‐04
D7 Inappropriate Strategy Chosen 1.80E‐02 9.20E‐03 3.31E‐04 3.31E‐04
A1 Incorrect Timing 1.72E‐02 8.77E‐03 2.85E‐04 2.85E‐04
A2 Incorrect Operation of Component/Object 3.64E‐02 1.87E‐02 6.30E‐04 6.30E‐04








Table 14-19: HEP Estimates with Calibrated Inputs 
 
 
The estimates from Table 14-19 are still consistent with the expected trend. The 
conditional probability of each IDA phase and HFE is highest when all the PIFs are 
set to the degraded state and lowest when they are all set to the nominal state. As 
expected, the nominal HEP for the A phase errors is equal to 1.00E-3 and the sum of 
the nominal HEP for the I and D phase errors is equal to 1.00E-02. Also, the HEPs of 
the action errors in all levels of the PIFs are consistently lower than those of the 
decision making errors. 
However, the conditional HEP estimates are generally lower than expected when 
all PIFs are set to the degraded state. In particular, we would expect the conditional 
HEP estimate for the HFE to be closer to 1. This would be the subject for future 
research after expert opinion and the data from SACDA database are incorporated 











HFE 3.87E‐01 2.21E‐01 1.09E‐02
Information processing phase (I) 2.34E‐01 1.27E‐01 6.69E‐03
Decision making phase (D) 1.51E‐01 8.02E‐02 3.29E‐03






15  Examples on Various Application of Methodology 
In this chapter, we will be providing examples to demonstrate possible 
applications of our HRA methodology, including various important concepts 
developed as part of this research work. Since the specific instance of this 
methodology is applicable to NPPs, the examples presented are tailored towards 
applications like that of accident sequence precursor (ASP) analysis (portraying an 
event that actually happened and taking it hypothetically to the what-if scenarios), 
significant determination process (SDP) (events that involve performance 
deficiencies), event assessment (looking at an event and trying to understand its 
significance in terms of its causes and whether to take actions to prevent future 
occurrences e.g. changing regulations), power operations (when the reactor is 
operating normally and something goes wrong, requiring crew response), and shut 
down operations (when the reactor is transitioning to shut down or start-up and 
something goes wrong, requiring crew response).  
We will be using an ASP analysis example to demonstrate our entire methodology 
i.e. both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Thereafter, other examples will focus 
on specific aspects of our qualitative analysis methodology like building CRTs, 
developing fault trees to link the CFMs to the respective branch points in the CRT, 
merging CRTs to form larger ones etc. 
15.1 Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Analysis Example Application 
We will be using the H. B. Robinson event “Electrical Fault Causes Fire and 




Cooling” [116] as an example to demonstrate our entire methodology. Below is a 
brief description of the event and some key details according to the final precursor 
analysis report [116]:  
 “At 18:52 on March 28, 2010, with the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 
No. 2, operating in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power, an electrical feeder 
cable failure to 4kV non-vital Bus 5 caused an arc flash and fire. Bus 5 failed to 
isolate from non-vital 4kV Bus 4 due to a failure of Breaker 52/24 to open, which 
resulted in reduced voltage to Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) B and a subsequent 
reactor trip on Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loop low flow. Subsequent to the 
reactor trip, an automatic safety injection (SI) occurred due to RCS cool down. 
Plant response was complicated by equipment malfunctions and failure of the 
operating crew to understand plant symptoms and properly control the plant. 
During plant restoration the operating crew attempted to reset an electrical 
distribution system control relay prior to isolating the fault, which re-initiated the 
electrical fault and caused a second fire.”  
 “The Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) failed due to an overload condition 
caused by the ground fault on Bus 5. This caused a fast transfer of 4kV Buses 1, 
4, and 5 to the Startup Transformer (SUT).” 
 “The reactor automatically tripped as designed due to low reactor coolant flow 
caused by an under-voltage condition on Bus 4, which led to a decrease in RCP B 
speed. Main feedwater (MFW) was isolated when the SI signal occurred, as 
designed. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) initiated as designed and provided makeup 




 RCP seal injection to the RCPs was lost initially due to both running charging 
pumps being de-energized when the transient occurred. Operators restored seal 
injection by restarting two charging pumps (only one is required to adequately 
cool the seals) within one minute. 
 RCP seal cooling [via Component Cooling Water (CCW)] was unavailable due to 
the closing of Flow Control Valve (FCV) 626 (thermal barrier outlet isolation 
flow control valve) which stopped flow from the thermal barrier heat exchangers. 
FCV-626 closed due to momentary loss of power to vital Bus E2 and flow control 
circuit being de-energized (via Instrument Bus 4) causing the closure of FCV-626 
due to an inaccurate high-flow signal when the flow sensor lost power. Operators 
restored seal cooling in 39 minutes by re-opening FCV-626 (approximately 12 
minutes after RCP seal injection became inadequate). This recovery was delayed 
because operators initially failed to use annunciator procedures that directed the 
opening of FCV-626. 
 RCP seal injection was determined to be inadequate to fulfill its safety function 
from 19:19 until approximately 19:58 (~39 minutes).This was due to the opening 
of Chemical and Volume Control (CVC) Valve 310A (charging flow valve to 
Loop 1) because of a loss of instrument air; thus, diverting charging flow from the 
RCP seals to the RCS. The loss of instrument air occurred due to a Phase-A 
Containment Isolation (normal) function of SI actuation signal). The valve failed 
fully open 19 minutes after the SI signal. Operators were unaware that the 
opening of CVC-310A caused the diversion of RCP seal injection away from the 




room and an inadequate emergency operating procedure (EOP) step for 
determining seal injection flow contributed to operators failing to determine that 
seal injection was inadequate. 
In summary, the success criterion for this event (loss of reactor coolant pump 
(RCP) seal injection and cooling) is to restore RCP seal cooling or seal injection 
within 13 minutes ( after the loss of both cooling and injection) from the control 
room to avoid the occurrence of voiding within the RCPs. After 13 minutes, the 
temperature will be very high which could cause thermal shock and the entire seal 
could be lost based on studies performed by Westinghouse. In order to restore seal 
injection and cooling, the crew needs to either open FCV-626 to restore CCW to 
the RCP seals or close CVC valve 310A to restore charging flow to the RCP 
seals. According to the report, the crew re-opened FCV-626 exactly 12 minutes 
after RCP seal injection became inadequate.  
15.1.1 Qualitative Analysis  
We will conduct the qualitative analysis by applying the methodology steps. 
 
15.1.1.1 Step 1: Develop/Identify PRA scenarios for analysis 
This involves the building of the event tree (ET) or event sequence diagram (ESD) 
for the initiating event (IE), selection of the PRA scenario and gathering of the 
required context information. 
The ET was built for a loss of MFW transient initiating event with complications. 
The PRA scenario selected is that of a loss of seal cooling (LOSC), Figure 15-1. 
Relevant context information for the scenario include: operating instructions for the 




plant layout, operating experience, design specifications for the system, system-fault 
information, information about the associated  equipment and system functions, etc. 
 
 
Figure 15-1: Robinson modified LOSC event tree [116] 
 
15.1.1.2 Step 2: Develop the Crew Response Tree (CRT) 
This step involves analyzing the crew’s task, constructing the CRT, pruning or 
simplifying it, and inserting any additional HFEs that are identified in process.  
Task Analysis 
In the precursor analysis [116], the HFEs have already been defined. In our Task 
analysis, the HFE of interest is the failure of the crew to restore seal injection and 
cooling to the RCPs. Our task analysis flow is provided by the level of detail in PRA 




model (IDA). We have also defined types of crew activities which guide the entire 
task analysis process. 
According to the PRA model and details of the event given, the reactor has tripped 
and the crew responded by entering EOP Path-1, step 4. The overall task was to 
restore seal injection and cooling to the RCPs. This task can be decomposed into two 
sub-tasks of restoring seal cooling and restoring seal injection. The sub-task of 
restoring seal cooling in turn involves the following sub-tasks: 
 Transfer from EOP Path-1, step 4 to End Path Procedure (EPP 4) to open CCW 
flow for reactor trip response. 
 Use other cues (the RCP thermal barrier cooling water low flow annunciator and 
bearing high temperature alarms) to open CCW flow. 
 Open FCV-626 
The sub-task of restoring seal injection in turn involves the following sub-tasks: 
 Move from EOP Path-1, step 4 to step for checking charging pump status. 
 Close CVC 310A. 
This task decomposition can be pictorially represented using a hierarchical 
structure (Figure 15-2). We have used the types of crew activities defined in our 
methodology to characterize each sub-task in the lowest level of our task 
decomposition (Table 15-1 and Table 15-2). Each crew activity can be further 
described as corresponding to the four main functions of Noticing/ detecting / 
understanding, Situation assessment / Diagnosis, Decision-making / Response 
planning, and Action taking. These functions in turn correspond to different IDA 




corresponding phase (s) of our human response model (IDA). As an example, the 
sub-task “open FCV-626” (Table 15-1) is characterized by the crew activity of 
decision and execution can be described as corresponding to the Decision-making / 
Response planning and Action-taking functions respectively, which fall under the 
Decision making (D) and Action Taking (A) phases of the human response model. 
 
 







Table 15-1: Restore seal cooling sub-tasks and corresponding crew activities 
 



































































Table 15-2: Restore seal injection sub-tasks and corresponding crew activities 


















































This event can be modeled as having one HFE (failure of the crew to restore seal 
injection by closing CVC-310A and seal cooling by re-opening FCV-626 to the 
RCPs) or broken down into different combinations of HFEs. For the purpose of our 
analysis and in order to be consistent with the actual analysis report [116], we have 
broken down it down into two HFEs namely: 
 Failure of crew to restore CCW to the RCPs by reopening FCV-626, and  
 Failure of crew to restore seal injection to the RCPs by closing CVC-310A   
Our CRT flow chart methodology covers a case where the HFE is associated with 
a specific safety function in the context of a defined PRA scenario. Therefore, the 
event can be associated with two safety functions namely: 
 Keep the CCW flow to cool down the thermal barrier of the RCP 
 Keep seal injection to the RCP seal 
Using the CRT construction flow chart (Figure 5-1) provided, the flow chart 
questions (Table 5-1) and the description of the Success and Failure Paths for each 
BP (Table 5-2), we have constructed two CRTs, each representing a safety function 
and provided corresponding tables to indicate the flowchart questions and branch 
point descriptions. In addition, we have also demonstrated the concept of the modular 
construction of CRT where the two different function-level CRTs actually form a 
larger and more comprehensive CRT. 
Safety function 1: Keep CCW flow to cool down thermal barrier of RCP 
The preconditions are as follows: 




 CVC-310A failed open 
 Reactor trip, operating crew in EOP Path-1, step 4 
 
Figure 15-3: CRT 1 for the safety function “keep CCW flow to cool down thermal barrier of RCP” 
 
Note that the sequence from branch point (BP) D through BP E (highlighted in 
red), BP H2 and ends with the success end state “S02” (highlighted in green) was the 
actual path taken by the crew during this event.  The other paths are all hypothetical. 
Also, even though all three failure paths BP D to end state F1-CRT2, BP D to end 
state F2-CRT2, and BP D to end state F3-CRT2 all add up to the HFE (failure of crew 
to restore CCW to the RCPs by reopening FCV-626), we will be using only the path 
from BP D to end state F3-CRT2 (highlighted in red) to estimate the HEP for the 
HFE. This is because the other paths are those of execution error and have a lower 














Is the specific function designed to be initiated 
automatically?
No, go to question 3.
2 Is the scenario a fast transient? NA
3.a
Is there a procedure that includes monitoring and 
operation of the specific safety function?  
3.b
Is there a specific entry point in the current procedure 
to a step to manually initiate the safety function?
4
Are there other procedural entry points that lead to a 
step to manually initiate the safety function? This 
could include other cues like alarms, annunciators, 
shift technical advisor (STA who is always 
monitoring the control panel)
Yes, using other cues (alarms and annunciator) to 
open CCW flow). Go to Branch Point E.
5.1
Are there any unexplored options under 3.b and 4? No, there are no other options in the particular 
procedure. Go directly to Branch Point H1 because 
Branch point G is ignored due to the low 
probability of its occurrence and hence, it is not 
created in the CRT.
5.2
Are there any unexplored options under 3.b and 4? No, there are no other options in the particular 
procedure. Go directly to Branch Point H2 because 
Branch point G is ignored due to the low 
probability of its occurrence and hence, it is not 
created in the CRT.
6.1
Are there additional equipment and manual actions 
that could be used to provide the specific safety 
function? This question refers to recovery actions 
that the crew could potentially take when everything 
else fails.
No, there are no other ways to achieve the safety 
function (failed path, go to F1-CRT 2).  
6.2
Same as 6. 1 No, there are no other ways to achieve the safety 
function (failed path, go to F2-CRT 2).  









BP Description Application in CRT
A




The safety function is automatically initiated. NA
C




This branch point considers whether the crew is in 
the correct procedure, various options provided by 
the procedure for success (i.e., multiple choices, 
each providing a successful path to the critical step 
to manually initiate the safety function, given the 
condition) So this branch point may produce 
multiple branches, each of which need to be 
pursued separately in the CRT. The Success Path 
corresponds to operator choosing a correct option 
for the condition and manually initiating the safety 
function.
Branch Point: Transfer from EOP step 4 to EPP 4 
(procedure to open CCW flow).
•    Success Path – Yes, crew transfer to EPP 4 
(Go to Question 5).
•   Failure Path – No, crew doesn’t transfer to EPP 
4 (Go to Question 4).
E
Similar to Branch Point D. Branch Point: Use other cues (RCP thermal 
barrier cooling water low flow annunciator and 
bearing high temperature alarms) to open CCW 
flow.
•   Success Path – Yes, crew uses other cues to 
open CCW flow (Go to Question 5).
•   Failure Path – No, crew doesn’t use other cues 
to open CCW flow (Failed path, go to F3-CRT 2). 
F




Safety function is not impaired by equipment 
(hardware / system) failure.
This BP is ignored because of the low probability 
of this event. Therefore this BP is not created (go 
directly from Question 5 to Branch point H).
H1
Crew successfully initiates the safety function 
manually.
Branch Point: Open FCV -626.
•   Success Path – Yes, crew opens FCV-626 
(success path SO1).
•   Failure Path – No, crew doesn’t open FCV-626 
(go to Question 6).
H2
Crews successfully initiate the safety function 
manually.
Branch Point: Open FCV -626.
•   Success Path – Yes, crew opens FCV-626 
(success path SO2).
•   Failure Path – No, crew doesn’t open FCV-626 




Safety function 2: Keep seal injection to RCP seal 
The preconditions are as follows: 
 FCV-626 failed close 
 CVC-310A failed open 
 Failed CRT 1 sequences i.e. F1-CRT2, F2-CRT2, and F3-CRT2 
 
 




























No. Question Description and Example
1 Is the specific function designed to be 
initiated automatically?
No, go to question 3.
2 Is the scenario a fast transient? NA
3.a Is there a procedure that includes 
monitoring and operation of the specific 
safety function?  
3.b Is there a specific entry point in the 
current procedure to a step to manually 
initiate the safety function?
4 Are there other procedural entry points 
that lead to a step to manually initiate the 
safety function?
No, there is no extra entry point in the 
procedure to check charging pump status. 
Failed path F02.
5 Are there any unexplored options under 
3.b and 4?
No, there are no other options in the 
particular procedure. Go directly to Branch 
Point H because Branch point G is ignored 
due to the low probability of its occurrence 
and hence, it is not created in the CRT.
6 Are there additional equipment and 
manual actions that could be used to 
provide the specific safety function? This 
question refers to recovery actions that 
the crew could potentially take when 
everything else fails.
No, there are no other ways to achieve the 
safety function (Failed path F01).  




Table 15-6: Description of success and failure paths for each BP in CRT 2 
 
 
Note that the CRT doesn’t need to be pruned and for the purpose of this example, 
there are no HFEs to add to the PRA model. 
BP Description Application in CRT
A Crew manually initiates the safety function before it 
is automatically initiated.
NA
B The safety function is automatically initiated. NA
C Crew does not manually turn off the automatically 
initiated safety function.
NA
D This branch point considers 
whether the crew is in the correct procedure,
various options provided by the procedure for 
success (i.e., multiple choices, each providing a 
successful path to the critical step to manually 
initiate the safety function, given the condition)
So this branch point may produce multiple 
branches, each of which need to be pursued 
separately in the CRT. The Success Path 
corresponds to operator choosing a correct option 
for the condition and manually initiating the safety 
function.
Branch Point: Go to EOP path 1 to check 
charging pump status. 
•   Success Path – Yes, crew goes to EOP 
path 1 to check charging pump status 
(Go to Question 5).
•   Failure Path – No, crew doesn’t go to 
EOP path 1 to check charging pump 
status (Go to Question 4).
E Similar to Branch Point D. NA 
F
Crew doesn’t transfer to the wrong direction from 
the exit point.
NA
G Safety function is not impaired by equipment 
(hardware / system) failure.
This BP is ignored because of the low 
probability of this event. Therefore this 
BP is not created (go directly from 
Question 5 to Branch point H).
H Crew successfully initiates the safety function 
manually.
Branch Point: Close CVC -310A.
• Success Path – Yes, crew closes CVC – 
310A (success path SO1).
• Failure Path – No, crew doesn’t close 




15.1.1.3 Step 3: Identify CFMs for CRT branches 
The scenario leading to the HFE of interest (failure of crew to restore CCW to the 
RCPs by reopening FCV-626) has end state F3-CRT2 in CRT1. It has two branch 
points BP D (transfer from EOP Path 1, step 4 to EPP 4) and BP E (use other cues to 
open CCW flow). 
BP D - Transfer from EOP Path 1, step 4 to EPP 4 
According to the precursor report [116], when the crew got to EOP Path 1, step 4, 
they were unsure of what had happened and they didn’t do anything. They basically 
waited at that point for more information and delayed transferring to EPP 4. They 
finally didn’t transfer to EPP 4. That means that the conditional failure probability for 
BP D is 1. 
However, let’s assume a hypothetical case where we are not sure if they 
transferred to EPP 4. We will be relating it to the (D) phase of our fault tree model 
which represents our human response (IDA) model. This means that the crew failed 
in making the decision to transfer to EPP 4 even when the procedure told them to do 
so. Tracing through the D part of the fault tree model while following procedure as 
the strategy, the predominant CFMs are Decision to delay action (D6) because they 
were waiting for more information, Inappropriate strategy chosen (D7) because they 
decided to wait for more information, and Plant /system state misdiagnosed (D1) 
because they were unsure of what had happened (state of the plant). Note that the 
relevant parts of the fault trees are indicated using red lines and the CFMs have red 
circles underneath them. Also the predominant CFMs are a subset of those identified 















BP E - Use other cues (alarms & annunciator) to open CCW flow 
For this precursor analysis, we are assuming that the crew did not follow the cues 
to check the annunciator or the alarms (even though they did in reality). In relation to 
the human response fault tree model, there was a failure in collecting necessary 
information (I). Tracing through the I phase of the fault tree model, the crew failed in 
decision to collect necessary information. While following procedure as the strategy, 
the predominant CFMs are Data not obtained (I2) because they were focused on 
procedure and had no experienced crew member available in the control room at the 
time, and Data not checked with appropriate frequency (I9) because they didn’t 
check the annunciator or alarms as required. Note that the relevant parts of the fault 
tree are also indicated using red lines. Also the predominant CFMs are a subset of 
those identified as possible CFMs for this task using our task analysis process. 
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Figure 15-9: Decision in I phase part of the FT showing the relevant sections and CFMs for BP E in CRT1 
 
15.1.1.4 Step 4: Develop CRT scenarios for HFE (s)  
This step involves the development of the CRT scenarios for HFE in terms of 
CFMs cut-sets and also the identification of the PIFs relevant to the CRT scenario.  
CRT scenario CFM minimal cut-sets 
In order to obtain the CFM Cut-sets for the HFE scenario of interest, the FTs 
(Figure 15-5 to Figure 15-9) have to be linked to the respective BPs and each BP is 
expressed in terms of its CFM logic. Then using the ET logic, they can be combined 
to produce the cut-sets for the scenario. 
For the hypothetical case which assumes that we are not sure if the crew 
transferred to EPP 4, then for BP D, the minimal CFM cut-sets are D1, D6, D7, and 




as I2+I9. Hence, for the entire scenario, the CFM minimal cut-set expression (CFM 
min cuthypo) is given as follows: 
CFM min cuthypo = (D1+D6+D7)*(I2+I9) = I2D1+I2D6+I2D7+I9D1+I9D6+I9D7 
For the real case (which the crew did not actually transfer to EPP 4), the 
probability of failure given BP D is 1. In this case, the CFM min cutreal for the entire 
scenario is given by: 
CFM min cutreal = I2 + I9 
Identification of relevant PIFs 
Given the event, the following PIFs have been identified as relevant, i.e. PIFs that 
influenced the crew performance by degrading it. We have identified these PIFs as 
the dominant ones, even though it may be argued that there are other PIFs relevant to 
the scenario. 
 Procedure Quality: The EOP which the crew was using didn’t contain 
instructions that directed them to check CCW status. It was only the alarm 
response procedure (ARP) that addressed it. As a side note (since this is not 
directly related to this HFE but to the failure to restore seal injection to RCP by 
closing CVC-310A), the EOP directed the crew to check the status of the charging 
pump and not the status of the flow rate of the pump (which should be what the 
crew needed to check). Therefore, the crew checked the pump status and it was 
running. However, there was no flow because the pressure release valve (CVC 
310A) had opened and the crew was unaware of it. 
 Leadership: According to [116], “the crew supervisors were distracted from 




failed to properly manage the frequency and duration of crew updates/briefs 
during the early portion of the event leading to interruption in the implementation 
of emergency procedures and distraction of the crew.” Therefore the crew didn’t 
have adequate leadership and wasn’t properly supervised during the event because 
their supervisors were attending to other issues that had occurred earlier in the 
plant.  
 Team Composition: According to the report, the team composition was 
determined to be less than optimal because several crew members were newly 
qualified or were standing unfamiliar or new positions. Also, the most 
experienced reactor operator was stationed as the balance-of-plant operator and 
was busy with fire-related activities that had occurred earlier in the plant and was 
not actively supporting the initial reactor plant response. 
 Extra Work Load: Due to the fire event that occurred earlier in the plant, the crew 
had other tasks to perform in addition to responding to this event. 
 Knowledge/Experience/Skill (content): The simulator training which the crew 
underwent was not a true representation of the actual control room which they 
work in. According to [116], “the plant’s training simulator did not demonstrate 
the correct expected plant response for a loss of Instrument Bus 4. Specifically, 
the operating crews experience in simulator training was for FCV-626 to stay 
open during a loss of Instrument Bus 4.” Hence, they did not have the adequate 
knowledge/experience/skill level required for this event.  
 Cognitive Complexity: There was a fire in the plant and it rendered several electric 




opened, causing diverse flow which in turn caused inadequate seal cooling. The 
occurrence of these multiple failures in the plant induced high cognitive demands 
on the crew. 
 Time Constraint: According to [116], “the crew would need minimal time (< 1 
minute) to re-open FCV-626 from the control room. Based on the RCP purge 
volumes (48 gallons) and the seal leak-off rates and temperatures of RCP B, they 
would only have approximately 19 minutes to determine the need to restore RCP 
seal cooling. The crew was unaware that CCW to the RCPs was isolated via FCV-
626 until the second RCP bearing high temperature alarm was received 
(approximately 13 minutes after seal injection had become inadequate). 
Therefore, only 6 minutes was available for operators to diagnose the need to 
reopen FCV-626 prior to voiding conditions within RCP B.” Hence, the amount 
of time they had available was also a factor. 
15.1.1.5 Step 5: Analyze Scenarios, Write Narrative, Trace Dependencies   
The path through the integrated model (PRA, CRT, FTs and BBN) gives the 
details of how the entire story needs to be narrated and read.  For the real case (which 
the crew did not actually transfer to EPP 4), the scenario of interest (F3-CRT1), in 
made up of 2 sub-scenarios (I2 and I9).  
For the hypothetical case (which assumes that we are not sure if the crew 
transferred to EPP 4), the scenario of interest (F3-CRT1) is made up of 6 sub-
scenarios namely: I2D1, I2D6, I2D7, I9D1, I9D6, and I9D7. In either the real or 
hypothetical case, these sub-scenarios are strings and when combined together, 




Beginning with the event, loss of reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection and 
cooling, the crew needed to either open FCV-626 to restore CCW to the RCP seals or 
close CVC-310A to restore charging flow to the RCP seals. Either of these actions 
needed to be carried out within 13 minutes of the loss of seal cooling and seal 
injection. Therefore the crew had the task of restoring seal cooling and injection to 
the RCP seals. This task could be decomposed into two main sub task of restoring 
seal cooling and restoring seal injection. Each of this sub tasks has been further 
decomposed into more sub tasks, corresponding crew activities and functions (Table 
15-1 and Table 15-2).  
Therefore, for the HFE scenario (failure of crew to restore seal cooling to the 
RCPs), the crew could fail due to any of the following reasons:  
Real case: 
 They did not obtain the information from the annunciator /alarms 
 They did not check the annunciator / alarms at the appropriate time 
Hypothetical case: 
 They did not obtain the information from the annunciator /alarms and hence, 
misdiagnosed the state of the system (corresponds to I2D1 CFM combination). 
 They did not obtain the information from the annunciator /alarms and hence, 
decided to delay and wait for more information (corresponds to I2D6 CFM 
combination). 
 They did not obtain the information from the annunciator /alarms and hence, 
decided to choose a strategy that was inappropriate i.e. they did not follow the 




 They did not check the annunciator / alarms at the appropriate time and hence, 
misdiagnosed the state of the system (corresponds to I9D1 CFM combination). 
  They did not check the annunciator / alarms at the appropriate time and hence, 
decided to delay and wait for more information (corresponds to I9D6 CFM 
combination). 
 They did not check the annunciator / alarms at the appropriate time and hence, 
decided to choose a strategy that was inappropriate i.e. they did not follow the 
procedure instructions (corresponds to I9D7 CFM combination). 
Also, these crew failures were enhanced by the inadequate quality of the procedure, 
extra work load imposed on them by other plant events, inadequate leadership during 
the event, less than optimal team make up, inadequate knowledge/experience/skill 
level of the crew, cognitive demands induced on them by the occurrence of multiple 
failures within a short span of time, and the limited amount of available time which 
was barely enough for the tasks. 
Inputs to quantification  
The inputs to the quantitative analysis are as CFM minimal cut-set logic 
expression (I2 + I9) for the real case, or (I2D1+I2D6+I2D7+I9D1+I9D6+I9D7) for 
the hypothetical case. The inputs also include the list of relevant PIFs mapped to the 
main PIF groups (Procedures, Team effectiveness, Task load, Knowledge/abilities, 




15.1.2 Quantitative Analysis – Phoenix HRA 
The quantitative analysis will be carried out by applying the methodology steps. Note 
that the BBN model for this example is built and run using IRIS [84] and GeNie [90]  
softwares. 
15.1.2.1 Step 1: Identify the CFMs in the BBN model 
This step involves the identification of the relevant and non-relevant CFMs in the 
model. They are I2, I9 for the real case, and I2, I9, D1, D6, D7 for the hypothetical 
case. All the other CFMs are considered non-relevant and we have incorporated this 
information into the model. This is done by changing all the conditional probabilities 
for the failure state of each CFM to 0 (zero) i.e. all the conditional probabilities on the 
failure row (the 10 conditional probabilities including the leak factor) in the BBN 
model, and all the conditional probabilities for the success state of each CFM to 1 
(one) i.e. all the conditional probabilities on the success row (the 10 conditional 
probabilities including the leak factor) in the BBN model as well. 
15.1.2.2 Step 2: Identify PIFs in the BBN model 
This step involves the identification of the relevant and non-relevant PIFs in the 
model. The relevant PIFs are Procedures, Team effectiveness, Knowledge/Abilities, 
Task load and Time Constraint. All the other PIFs are considered non-relevant and we 
have incorporated this information into the model. This is done by changing all the 
levels for the nominal state of the PIF (marginal probability) to 1 (one), and all the 




15.1.2.3 Step 3: Assess the Relevant PIF levels 
This step involves the assessment of the relevant PIF levels and the incorporation 
of the information into the model.  
PIF level assessment 
This is done using the tables provided for each of these PIFs in section 12.3.1. 
Procedures 
Using the PIF assessment questionnaire for Procedures (Table 15-7), the PIF 
level for the degraded state (inadequate procedures) is estimated to be 0.7. 













































































Using the PIF assessment questionnaire for Team Effectiveness (Table 15-8), the 
PIF level for the degraded state (ineffective team) is estimated to be 0.6.  
 
Table 15-8: PIF assessment – Team Effectiveness 
 
 





















5 Is the crew lead too involved in individual tasks (over focused)? Leadership X










10 Is there a shortage of personnel required to make up the crew? Team composition X
11 Is there a challenging mix of experience within the crew? Team composition X









































Using the PIF assessment questionnaire for Knowledge / Abilities (Table 15-9), 
the PIF level for the degraded state (inadequate knowledge / abilities) is estimated 
to be 0.88.  
 




Using the PIF assessment questionnaire for Task Load (Table 15-10), the PIF 
level for the degraded state (inadequate task load) is estimated to be 0.75.  
ID Questions Lower level PIF Yes No N/A
1



















































Using the PIF assessment questionnaire for Time Constraint (Table 15-11), the 



































































Table 15-11: PIF assessment – Time Constraint 
 
 
Note that the analyst may change their assessment of the PIF levels as they go 
through the scenario, especially in instances where a CFM occurs at multiple BPs. 
This information is incorporated into the BBN model in the form of evidence for that 
particular PIF node, by either changing the levels of its states or by instantiating the 
PIF node to the appropriate state. 
Incorporating the estimated PIF levels into the model 
After assessment of the PIF levels, the estimates obtained need to be incorporated 
into the model. This information is incorporated into the model by changing all the 
levels for both the nominal and degraded states of each PIF (marginal probability) to 




















































levels of each PIF state will be a number between 0 and 1, and when the level for 
both states of a PIF are added together, it must equal 1. 
15.1.2.4 Step 4: Estimate the joint conditional probability of each relevant CFM 
This step involves determining the temporal ordering of the CFMs and following 
the proper procedure to estimate the joint conditional probability of each. For this 
analysis, we will demonstrate both the non-dependency and dependency 
quantification.  
Non-dependency quantification 
In this case, the assumption is that the CFMs are quantified without considering 
dependency. Therefore, conditional independence is assumed. Using IRIS [84] and 
GeNie [90] software, we ran the model and obtained the following estimates for the 
joint conditional probability of each of the relevant CFMs (Table 15-12). 
 





We will be using the hypothetical case, which assumes we are not sure of the 
crew’s transfer to EPP 4, to demonstrate our dependency modeling and quantification 












on the IDA model and the CFM cut-set combination, we are assuming that the CFMs 
I2 and I9 occur before CFMs D1, D6, and D7. 
Number of temporal order (time steps) 
Each CFM cut-set (note that there are 6 cut-sets) requires two time steps. 
However, we need a total of 8 time steps (I2, D1|I2, D6|I2, D7|I2, I3, D1|I3, D6|I3, 
and D7|I3) instead of 12. This is because I2 and I9 each account for 3 time steps 
respectively. 
Incorporate evidence into the model at the respective time steps 
This is known at Bayesian updating. It is done before running the model at each 
time step to obtain the joint conditional probability of each relevant CFM in the 
model. 
I2 time step 
At this time step, the conditional probability of failure of each of the other relevant 
CFMs is assumed to be 0 (i.e. they haven’t occurred and the conditional probability of 
success is assumed to be 1). To incorporate this information into the model at this 
time step, all the conditional probabilities for the failure state of each of these other 
relevant CFMs are changed to 0 (all the conditional probabilities on the failure row 
i.e. the 10 conditional probabilities), and all the conditional probabilities for the 
success state changed to 1 (all the conditional probabilities on the success row i.e. the 
10 conditional probabilities). Note that the conditional probabilities of the other 
relevant CFMs are now the same as those of the non-relevant CFMs that were already 





D1|I2 time step 
At this time step, it is assumed that I2 has occurred i.e. its conditional probability 
of failure is 1. This information is incorporated into the model by setting evidence of 
I2 at this time step to failure. In GeNie [90] or IRIS [84] software, this is done by 
right clicking node I2, then selecting “evidence”, then “failure”. Also, the conditional 
probability of failure of each of the other relevant CFMs is assumed to be 0 and 
incorporated into the model. 
D6|I2 time step 
At this time step, it is assumed that I2 has occurred i.e. its conditional probability 
of failure is 1. Also, the conditional probability of failure of each of the other relevant 
CFMs is assumed to be 0. All these information are then incorporated into the model. 
D7|I2 time step 
At this time step, it is assumed that I2 has occurred i.e. its conditional probability 
of failure is 1. Also, the conditional probability of failure of each of the other relevant 
CFMs is assumed to be 0. All these information are then incorporated into the model. 
I9 time step 
At this time step, the conditional probability of failure of each of the other relevant 
CFMs is assumed to be 0 and the information is incorporated into the model. 
D1|I9 time step 
At this time step, it is assumed that I9 has occurred i.e. its conditional probability 
of failure is 1. Also, the conditional probability of failure of each of the other relevant 
CFMs is assumed to be 0. All these information are then incorporated into the model. 




At this time step, it is assumed that I9 has occurred i.e. its conditional probability 
of failure is 1. Also, the conditional probability of failure of each of the other relevant 
CFMs is assumed to be 0. All these information are then incorporated into the model. 
D7|I9 time step 
At this time step, it is assumed that I9 has occurred i.e. its conditional probability 
of failure is 1. Also, the conditional probability of failure of each of the other relevant 
CFMs is assumed to be 0. All these information are then incorporated into the model. 
Joint conditional probabilities of the relevant CFMs 
We ran the model at each of the time steps and obtained the following estimates 
for the joint conditional probability at each of the respective time steps (Table 15-13). 
 
Table 15-13: Joint conditional probabilities obtained at the each time step 
 
 
15.1.2.5 Step 5: Estimate the conditional HEP for the HFE 
This is the final step in the quantification process which involves the incorporation 
of the joint conditional probability estimates of the relevant CFMs into the logic 
















HEP estimate using the non-dependency quantification procedure 
This is used when conditional independence is assumed. For the real case which 
the crew did not transfer to EPP 4, the conditional HEP estimate is given by (HEPreal): 
P(I2) + P(I9) = 5.20E-02 
For the hypothetical case which assumes that we are not sure of the crew’s transfer 
to EPP 4, the conditional HEP estimate will be given by (HEPhypo): 
 
= 2.96E-03 
HEP estimate using the dependency quantification procedure 
As indicated earlier, we are using the hypothetical case, which assumes we are not 
sure of the crew’s transfer to EPP 4, to demonstrate our dependency modeling and 
quantification methodology. When conditional dependence between the CFMs is 
assumed, the estimated HEP is given by (HEPhypodep); 
  
= 3.17E-03               
When compared with HEP1 (2.96E-03), there is about a 5% increase. Though this 
increase in HEP is not significantly large (partly due to the nature of model parameter 
estimates), it still indicates the need to consider dependency between HFE. 
Irrespective of the numerical values, this demonstrates our dependency modeling and 
quantification methodology. 
P(I2)*P(D1)+ P(I2)*P(D6)+ P(I2)*P(D7)+ P(I9)*P(D1)+ P(I9)*P(D6)+ P(I9)*P(D7) 




15.1.3 Quantitative Analysis using SPAR-H  
SPAR-H broadly categories crew failure as either diagnosis failure or action 
failure and dependency was not accounted for in this analysis. Therefore applying our 
methodology but using the same assumption like SPAR-H, the relevant CFMs for this 
HFE will include all the 9 CFMs in I phase (I1 –I9) and the 7 CFMs in the D phase 
(D1-D7). Since non-dependency quantification is assumed, the estimates of the joint 
conditional probabilities of these CFMs are given in Table 15-14. 
 
Table 15-14: Joint conditional probability estimates for CFMs in I & D phases 
 
 
The conditional HEP estimate is given by (HEP4): 



























Therefore HEPsparH = 2.00E-01.  
In summary, we have used this ASP example to demonstrate the capabilities of our 
methodology (both qualitatively and quantitatively). 
15.2 CRT Application in Event Assessment 
In this example, we will be using the Loss of Inventory Event at Oconee [117] to 
demonstrate the application of CRT in event assessment during shut down operations. 
This analysis is considered part of a significant determination process (SDP) because 
it was done to see the impact of performance deficiency. We have also developed 
fault trees to link the relevant CFMs to the respective branch points. 
Event Summary   
“On April 12th, 2008 Oconee Unit 1 shut down for refueling. On April 15th Unit 1 
had restored level, from a midloop operation to install cold leg nozzle dams, to below 
the reactor vessel flange. The head was detensioned in preparation for removal. As 
part of main generator voltage regulator modification testing, a main generator 
lockout signal was generated while the switchyard was back-feeding all Unit 1 
electrical loads through the main transformer and the associated auxiliary 
transformer. This caused a slow transfer from the aux transformer to backup 
transformer (CT1) from the switchyard. The resulting electrical transient caused a 
momentary loss of power to the running pumps performing shutdown cooling (SDC) 
and due to one complication, a relief valve in the letdown purification system opened 
and remained open as designed. This transient caused a loss of inventory (LOI) from 





The status of major plant equipment prior to the even was as follows: 
 “Reactor in cold shutdown (mode 6) with the reactor head detensioned, but still in 
place 
 RCS level 70 inches above the midloop and approximately 110 inches above top 
of active fuel (TAF) 
 RCS temperature 96 F 
 Estimate of time to boil (TTB) of 20 minutes supplied to shift, however, this TTB 
was calculated for midloop and shift had raised level 70 inches above midloop so 
TTB would be greater. 
 Low pressure injection (LPI) pumps A and B in service supplying decay heat 
removal and reactor temperature indication 
 Low pressure service water (LPSW) loops A and B in service, supporting shut 
down cooling (SDC) 
 All reactor coolant pumps secured 
 Low pressure injection (LPI) was cross connected to the high pressure injection 
(HPI) system for letdown purification 
 Steam generator upper primary hand holes removed supplying a large vent for the 
RCS, cold leg nozzle dams installed” [117] 
Crew Action Success Criteria 
The crew must recognize the occurrence of an abnormal event and begin the 
implementation of procedure AP-26 “Loss of Decay Heat Removal”. The specific 
section that they must start is Section 4C: “RCS Vented and FTC Not Flooded (both 




level drops to the middle of the hot leg at which time the low pressure injection (LPI) 
/ shut down cooling (SDC) pumps will begin to cavitate or they need to make up RCS 
to prevent core damage.  
The safety function is to keep RCS’s completeness in terms of stopping the leakage or 
making up RCS. The HFE could be defined in terms of each expected crew action in 
the process of accomplishing the safety function or a combination of all the crew 
actions. In terms of a combination of actions, the HFE could be defined as failure of 
the crew to keep RCS complete. We have constructed a CRT for it, provided the CRT 
construction questions and answers (Table 15-15), branch point descriptions and 
applications in the CRT (Table 15-16), and fault trees which link the CFMs (we 
consider relevant) to some of the branch points in the CRT (Figure 15-11 to Figure 
15-22). Note that CFMs have red circles underneath them in the fault trees and the 
relevant parts of the fault trees are indicated using red lines. 
Some key notes about this example 
1. In conventional HFE modeling, this event may include four HFEs: 
 The crew isolates the leakage early. 
 The crew makes up RCS early. 
 The crew isolates the leakage late. 
 The crew makes up RCS late. 
These four HFEs may have complicate dependency relations. CRT approach 
provides more detailed inside knowledge to help address the complicated 
dependency problem. For example, success sequences S01 & S02 represent the 




up RCS early. Two human failure actions in failure sequence F01 (branch points 
H11 & H12) can be seen as two dependent actions. 
2. Note that each branch point is conditional to its preconditions. For example, 
branch point H11 is conditional to the success paths of branch points D1, F1, and 
F2. Therefore, the CFMs applied for the failure paths of branch points D1, F1, and 
F2 should not be applied to the failure path of branch point H11. 
3. For branch point D1, the only symptom is the RCS level decreasing and there 
isn’t any passive information (alarm).  
 
 












1 Is the specific function designed to be 
initiated automatically?
No, go to Question 3.
2 Is the scenario a fast transient? NA
3.a Is there a procedure that includes monitoring 
and operation of the the specific safety 
function?  
3.b Is there a specific entry point in the current 
procedure to a step to manually initiate the 
safety function?
4 Are there other procedural entry points that 
lead to a step to manually initiate the safety 
function?
Yes, once the RCS level drops to the middle of 
the hot leg, the LPI/SDC pumps will begin to 
cavitate and more alarms are shown. Go to 
Branch Point E.
5.1 Are there any unexplored options under 3.b 
and 4?
Yes, step 4.12 may lead operators jump to 4.18 
and exit this procedure. Go to Branch Point F1.
5.2 Are there any unexplored options under 3.b 
and 4?
Yes, step 4.17 leads operators transfer to 4C. Go 
to Branch Point F2.
5.3 Are there any unexplored options under 3.b 
and 4?
No unexplored points. Go to Branch Point H21. 
6.1 Are there additional equipment and manual 
actions that could be used to provide the 
specific safety function?
This question refers to recovery actions that 
the crew could potentially take when 
everything else fails.
Yes, crew may make up the RCS to prevent core 
damage. Go to BP H12. (Note that to simplify the 
CRT, Questions 3 & 5, and BPs D & G are all set 
to yes and they are bypassed).
6.2 Same as 6.1 No. Failure sequence F05
6.3 Same as 6.1 No. Failure sequence F01
6.4 Same as 6.1 No. Failure sequence F04




Table 15-16: Description of success and failure paths for each BP in the CRT 
 
[1] Because crew enter AP-26 late with extra alarms, assume that crew will not jump out the AP-26 from step 4.12 & 4.17. 
  
[2] BP G is ignored per the condition that the component was available in this actual event.   
BP Description Application in CRT
A Crew manually initiates the safety function 
before it is automatically initiated
NA
B
The safety function is automatically initiated NA
C Crew does not manually turn off the 
automatically initiated safety function
NA
D1 This branch point considers 
(a) whether the crew is in the correct procedure,
(b) various options provided  by the procedure 
for success (i.e., multiple choices, each 
providing a successful path to the critical step 
to manually initiate the safety function, given 
the condition)
Branch Point: Crew enters AP-26
•   Success Path – Yes, operators enter AP-26 (Go to 
Question 5.1)
•   Failure Path – No, operators do not enter AP-26 (Go to 
Question 4) 
E This branch point considers 
(c) whether the crew is in the correct procedure,
(d) various options provided  by the procedure 
for success (i.e., multiple choices, each 
providing a successful path to the critical step 
to manually initiate the safety function, given 
the condition)
Branch Point: Crew enters AP-26
•   Success Path – Yes, crew enters AP-26 (Go to Question 
5.3 ) checked
•   Failure Path – No, crew does not enter AP-26 (Failed 
Path F06)
F1 Crew does not transfer to wrong direction from 
the exit point
Branch Point: Crew does not jump to step 4.18 from step 
4.12
• Success Path – Yes, crew does not jump to step 4.12 (Go 
to Question 5.2)
• Failure Path – No, crew jumps to step 4.121. Failure 
Sequence F03
F2 Crew does not transfer to wrong direction from 
the exit point
Branch Point: Crew transfers to 4C from step 4.17.
•   Success Path – Yes, crew transfers to 4C from step 4.17. 
(Go to BPD11)
•   Failure Path – No, crew does not transfer to 4C from step 
4.171. Failure Sequence F02
H11
2 Crew successfully initiates the safety function 
manually
Branch Point: Crew isolates the leakage before loss of 
shutdown cooling.
• Success Path – Yes, crew isolates the leakage before loss 
of shutdown cooling. Success Sequence S01.
• Failure Path – No, crew does not isolate the leakage 
before loss of shutdown cooling. Go to Question 6.1
H12
2 Crew successfully initiate the safety function 
manually
Branch Point: Crew makes up RCS to prevent core damage
• Success Path – Yes, crew makes up RCS successfully. 
Success Sequence S02.
• Failure Path – No, crew failed to make up RCS. Go to 
Question 6.3.
H2 Crew successfully initiates the safety function 
manually
Because the success criteria here are to isolate the leakage 
and to make up the RCS, the branch point here is 
presented as two branch points D21 & D22 in series to 
represent these two actions.
H21 Crew successfully initiates the safety function 
manually
Branch Point: Crew isolates the leakage before loss of 
shutdown cooling.
•   Success Path – Yes, crew isolates the leakage 
successfully.  Go to BP D22.
•   Failure Path – No, crew failed to isolate the leakage 
before loss of shutdown cooling. Go to Question 6.2. 
H22 Crew successfully initiates the safety function 
manually
Branch Point: Crew makes up RCS to prevent core damage.
•   Success Path – Yes, crew makes up RCS successfully.  
Success Sequence S03






Branch point H11 
 




Figure 15-12: A phase part of the fault tree showing the relevant CFMs for BP H11 
 
 
Branch point H12 
 






Figure 15-14: A phase part of the fault tree showing the relevant CFMs for BP H12 
 
 
Branch point D1 
 




























Branch point E 
 























15.3 CRT Application in Heat Sink Control during Loss of Main Feed 
Initiating Event Example 
In this example, we are demonstrating the application of CRT in Heat Sink Control 
during Loss of main feed initiating event. This is considered at power operations.  
Once the main feed is lost, the crew needs to initiate the AFW or perform feed & 
bleed to prevent core damage. In a Westinghouse style EOP, these actions are 
addressed in EOP FR-H.1. The crew may enter FR-H.1 either from step 14 of EOP 
E.1 or from the critical safety function tree.  
The safety function modeled is to restore heat sink while the HFE could be any of 
the different combinations of crew failure while carrying out the safety function. We 
have developed the CRT for this safety function (Figure 15-23) and have used it to 
demonstrate the modeling of the commission error “the crew turns off the 
automatically started auxiliary feed water (AFW) when they should not have turned it 
off” in branch point C. We have provided the CRT construction questions and 
answers (Table 15-17) and branch point descriptions and applications in the CRT 
(Table 15-18). Also, we have developed the fault trees (Figure 15-24 and Figure 
15-25) linking the relevant CFMs to this branch point as indicated by the red 
highlighted lines. Note that the fault tree (Figure 15-25) indicates that the crew can 
jump from following the procedure to relying on their knowledge. The crew started 
out by following the procedure, but they deviated from it and relied on their 






















Is the specific function designed to be initiated 
automatically?
Yes, AFW is designed to be automatically initiated. Go to 
Question 2.
2 Is the scenario a fast transient?
Yes, It is a fast transient. Usually, the reactor will be 
tripped immediately when the main Feed lost. Go to branch 
point B.
3.a
Is there a procedure that includes monitoring and
operation of the the specific safety function?  
3.b
Is there a specific entry point in the current procedure 
to a step to manually initiate the safety function?
4
Are there other procedural entry points that lead to a 
step to manually initiate the safety function?
Yes, crew may enter FR-H.1 from red path of critical safety 
function tree. Go to branch point E1.
5.1 Are there any unexplored options under 3.b and 4?
Yes, crew may exit FR-H.1 when they are performing step 1 
of FR-H.1. Go to branch point F1.
5.2 Are there any unexplored options under 3.b and 4?
Yes, crew may exit FR-H.1 when they are performing step 1 
of FR-H.1. Go to branch point F2.
6.1 Are there additional equipment and manual actions 
that could be used to provide the specific safety 
function?
This question refers to recovery actions that the crew 
could potentially take when everything else fails.
Yes, crew may control the heat sink via Feed and Bleed. Go 
to branch point H2. (Note that to simplify the CRT, 
question 3 &5 and BP G in the flow chart guidance are set 
to be 
6.2 Same as 6.1 Yes, crew may control the heat sink via Feed and Bleed. Go 
to branch point H6. (Note that to simplify the CRT, 
questions 3 & 5 and BPs D & G in the flow chart guidance 
are set to be successful, and directly go to BPH)
6.3
Same as 6.1 Yes, crew may control the heat sink via Feed and Bleed. Go 
to branch point H4. (Note that to simplify the CRT, 
questions 3 & 5 and BPs D & G in the flow chart guidance 
are set to be successful, and directly go to BP H)
6.4 Same as 6.1
Yes, crew may control the heat sink via Feed and Bleed. Go 
to branch point H5. (Note that to simplify the CRT, 
questions 3 & 5 and BPs D & G in the flow chart guidance 
are set to be successful, and directly go to BP H)
6.5 Same as 6.1 No. Failure Sequence F06.
6.6 Same as 6.1 No. Failure Sequence F05.
6.7 Same as 6.1 No. Failure Sequence F02.
6.8 Same as 6.1 No. Failure Sequence F03.
Yes, procedure FR-H.1 is for this safety function. Crew may 




Table 15-18: Description of success and failure paths for each BP in the CRT 
 
BP Description Application in CRT
A Crew manually initiates the safety function before it is 
automatically initiated
NA
B The safety function is automatically initiated AFW automatically initiated.
Success Path: Yes, AFW automatically initiated. Go to 
Branch C.
Failure Path: No, AFW is not automatically initiated. Go 
to Question 3.
B The safety function is automatically initiated
AFW automatically initiated. Success Path: Yes, AFW 
automatically initiated. Go to Branch C.                                   
Failure Path: No, AFW is not automatically initiated. Go 
to Question 3.
C Crew does not manually turn off the automatically 
initiated safety function
Manually stop automatically initiated AFW.
Success Path: No, crew does not stop AFW manually – 
S01.
il h A ll 01D1 This branch point considers 
(e) whether the crew is in the correct procedure,
(f) various options provided  by the procedure for 
success (i.e., multiple choices, each providing a 
successful path to the critical step to manually initiate 
the safety function, given the condition)
So this branch point may produce multiple branches, 
each of which need to be pursued separately in the CRT. 
The Success Path corresponds to operator choosing a 
correct option for the condition and manually initiating 
the safety function.
Enter FR-H.1 from step 14 of E-0.
Success Path: Yes, crew enters FR-H.1 from step 14 of E-
0. Go to Question 5.1.
Failure Path: No, crew does not enter FR-H.1 from step 14 
of E-0. Go to Question 4.
F1 Crew exits FR-H.1 from step 1 of FR-H.1. Exit FR-H.1 from step 1 of FR-H.1.
Success Path: No, crew does not exit FR-H.1 from step 1 
of FR-H.1.                Go to BP H3. 
Failure Path: Yes, crew exits FR-H.1. Failure Sequence 
F04.
F2 Crew exits FR-H.1 from step 1 of FR-H.1. Exit FR-H.1 from step 1 of FR-H.1.
Success Path: No, crew does not exit FR-H.1 from step 1 
of FR-H.1.               Go to BP H1.
Failure Path: Yes, crew exits FR-H.1. Failure Sequence 
F07.
E1 Similar to Branch Point D, this branch point considers  
(g) whether the crew is in the correct procedure,
(h) various options provided  by the procedure for 
success (i.e., multiple choices, each providing a 
successful path to the critical step to manually initiate 
the safety function, given the condition)
Enter FR-H.1 from critical safety function tree.
Success Path: Yes, crew enters FR-H.1 from critical safety 
function tree.       Go to Question 5.2
Failure Path: No, crew does not enter FR-H.1. Failure 
Sequence F08.
G1 Safety function is not impaired by equipment failure AFW is available.
Success Path: Yes, it is available. Go to branch point D1.
Failure Path: No, it is not available. Go to Question 6.1. 













H1 Crew successfully initiates the safety function manually Crew initiates AFW.
Success Path: Yes, crew initiates AFW per step 2 of FR-
H.1 – Success sequence S05.
Failure Path: No, crew failed to initiate AFW. Go to 
Question 6.3. 
H2 Crew successfully initiates the safety function manually Crew initiates Feed and Bleed.
Success Path: Yes, crew initiates Feed and Bleed per step 
22 of FR-H.1 – Success sequence S07.
Failure Path: No, crew failed to initiate Feed and Bleed. Go 
to Question 6.5. 
G3 Safety function is not impaired by equipment failure AFW is available.
Success Path: Yes, it is available. Go to branch point D3.
Failure Path: No, it is not available. Go to Question 6.2. 
H3 Crew successfully initiates the safety function manually Crew initiates AFW.
Success Path: Yes, crew initiates AFW per step 2 of FR-
H.1 – Success sequence S02.
Failure Path: No, crew failed to initiate AFW. Go to 
Question 6.4.
H4 Crew successfully initiates the safety function manually Crew initiates Feed and Bleed.
Success Path: Yes, crew initiates Feed and Bleed per step 
22 of FR-H.1 – Success sequence S06.
Failure Path: No, crew failed to initiate Feed and Bleed. Go 
to Question 6.6.
H5 Crew successfully initiates the safety function manually Crew initiates Feed and Bleed.
Success Path: Yes, crew initiates Feed and Bleed per step 
22 of FR-H.1 – Success sequence S03.
Failure Path: No, crew failed to initiate Feed and Bleed. Go 
to Question 6.7.
H6 Crew successfully initiates the safety function manually Crew initiates Feed and Bleed.
Success Path: Yes, crew initiates Feed and Bleed per step 
22 of FR-H.1 – Success sequence S04.






The fault trees shown here are used to represent the error of commission, “the crew 
turns off the automatically started auxiliary feed water (AFW) when they should not 
have turned it off” (branch point C).  
 
 









15.4 Example showing the Connection of two CRT Modules 
The focus of this example is to demonstrate the connection of two function–level 
CRTs to form a larger and more comprehensive one. A simplified event tree for the 
non-recoverable loss of main feed initiating event is provided in Figure 15-26. A CRT 
(Figure 15-27) is developed for the first top event (RPS) in Figure 15-26.  Another 
one is developed (Figure 15-28) for the second top event (SHSC) in Figure 15-26 as 
well. The CRT for SHSC is also a continuation of the SHSC end states in the CRT for 
rector trip (Figure 15-27). Therefore, these two CRTs (RPS and SHSC) are combined 
together to form a more comprehensive CRT for modeling the first two top events of 



























16  Summary and Conclusion 
This dissertation introduces Phoenix HRA, a model-based methodology (both 
qualitative and quantitative) for conducting HRA. Based on a framework for a 
model-based HRA that was proposed by Mosleh et al. in [6], [23], this research 
has developed and enhanced the building blocks, complete methodology and 
procedure for its implementation. Example applications have been provided to 
demonstrate the implementation of the entire methodology and some important 
concepts.  
16.1 Foundation of Phoenix HRA 
This research is built based on available theories (including cognitive sciences and 
psychology), experimental results, operating experience (including those of US and 
German NPPs), and expert opinions (from PRA, & HRA analysts, plant operators, 
cognitive scientists, psychologists). We have provided two tables, Table 16-1 and 
Table 16-2, to show the key elements of both the qualitative and quantitative phases 






Table 16-1: Foundation of the Qualitative Analysis Key Elements 
 
 


































































16.2 Research Contributions 
 For the qualitative analysis framework (Figure 16-1) which has three layers (CRT, 
human response model - IDA, PIFs), this research has made the following 
contributions: 
 Proposed guidelines for conducting task analysis in the context of the PRA model, 
CRT, IDA task decomposition, and crew activities. 
 Enhanced the CRT construction process for consistency and completeness by 
improving the overall structure of the flowchart used for CRT construction and 
also incorporated timing of crew responses into the CRT. 
 Provided a catalog of information required by analyst for conducting HRA. 
 Expanded the set of CFMs to capture the various modes in which NPP operating 
crews fail while conducting their day-to-day activities. The CFMs are used to 
represent crew failures in terms of the phases of our human response model 
(IDA). 
 Enhanced the human response model (IDA) which is represented using fault trees, 
for more accurate identification of human failure events (HFEs) and scenarios 
leading up to the HFEs. This was done by improving its overall structure and 
expanding it to include all the CFMs proposed for use in this methodology. 
 Proposed a set of PIF groups and hierarchy which enables information to be 
captured at different levels of detail. The PIFs are classified into levels within the 
groups. Therefore, they form a hierarchical structure which can be fully expanded 




main PIF of each group serves as a frontline factor that affects human 
performance from a causal perspective.   
 Proposed a framework for relating CFMs to PIFs based on possible causes of 
failure and mechanisms for human error. It has been developed based on 
extensive literature review of psychology, cognitive sciences, operating 
experience and expert inputs sponsored by the US NRC. This framework provides 
a means for developing a structured, causal model.  
 Developed a BBN causal model based on the CFM-PIF framework to model the 
effects of the influence of PIFs on crew performance. The BBN model nodes are 
made up of CFMs and PIFs, and the relationships between the nodes are based on 
the links in the CFM-PIF framework. This model has the flexibility to be 
modified for interfacing with existing HRA methods like SPAR-H. Note that this 
is of particular interest to HRA practitioners since SPAR-H is widely used in US 






Figure 16-1: Qualitative framework showing the contributions of this research 
 
 
As part of this research the overall quantification framework (Figure 16-2) and 
methodology for estimating the HEP has been developed, based on the BBN model. 
The quantification methodology provides a way to; explicitly treat dependencies 
between HFEs, account for dynamic effects in terms of changes in the PIF levels 
during the sequence and ordering of HFEs, incorporate new information and evidence 
into the HEP estimation process upon availability. Specifically, we have: 
 Proposed a methodology for HFE dependency modeling and quantification by 
incorporating the time slice concept of Dynamic Bayesian Networks (BBN) into 
BBN modeling and quantification. This is aimed at providing a methodology that 




 Proposed a methodology for the BBN model quantification. The use of the BBN 
model amongst others provides a means to obtain consistent and reproducible 
HEP estimates. 
 Proposed a methodology for assessing the levels of the different PIF states for 
input into the BBN model. This assessment is done using questionnaires that we 
have developed. The methodology provides a means of obtaining consistent and 
reproducible estimates based on the questionnaire. These PIF levels are a part of 
the model parameters required for HEP estimation. 
 Provided estimates of the BBN model parameters by the use of Bayesian methods 
to incorporate data from sources which included other HRA methods, NPP 
operating experience, and expert estimates, through a detailed data gathering and 
analysis process. 
 
Figure 16-2: Quantification framework showing research contribution 
 
This research is an attempt to develop a comprehensive HRA methodology that 
encompasses the desirable attributes of a robust HRA method, identified by the team 
of experts in HRA and related domains [23]. Using these attributes as a set of criteria 
to evaluate other HRA methods, Table 16-3 gives a summary of how Phoenix HRA 



























































































Aside from the usual challenges one expects to face when working on a research 
project like this, perhaps the most important challenge was obtaining reliable and 
relevant information for estimating the BBN model parameters. The BBN model 
required over 19,000 data points and we had no way of obtaining this information. 
The data collection problem is a predominant one in HRA and it clearly limits 
advances in this field. 
Hence, we had to apply a modeling technique (Leaky NoisyOR) in order to reduce 
the required data points to a more reasonable number. We understand that the 
application of this modeling technique may reduce the types of effects that could be 
observed from our model. However, we are dealing with a trade-off between 
producing a very sophisticated model and one that is feasible to quantify.  
Even though the Leaky NoisyOR technique drastically reduced the number of data 
points to about 190, there was still no single data source that could be used to produce 
these 190 data points. Therefore, we had to map data from different sources, analyze, 
aggregate, and calibrate based on what is available to us in order to produce estimates 
for these model parameters. 
16.4 Suggestions for Future Work 
Even though Phoenix HRA provides an end-to-end methodology for conducting 
both qualitative and quantitative HRA, there are still some areas that could be further 
improved.   
 Incorporation of data based on operating experience or simulators (e.g., SACADA 




is building a data base (SACADA) to support HRA. As part of this research work, 
we have mapped and established the links of the main elements of the data base to 
our methodology. We have also provided a means of incorporating it as a data 
source into our model parameter estimation process, using Bayesian methods. 
Therefore, when this data base is ready (currently estimated to be available 3 
years from now), its output should be used to support both our qualitative and 
quantitative analysis process.  
 More work needed on calibration of model parameter estimates. As part of the 
process of calibrating these estimates, a formal expert elicitation process should 
be conducted so that the experts can review and provide their inputs. 
 PIF assessment questions. These questions should be reviewed by domain experts 
and extended if necessary. 
 Development of a software tool. For practical considerations, automation can hide 
all the computational and analytical complexity of Phoenix HRA. The analyst 
view of the software aid can be summarized using a three step process: 
o Analyst answers a series of questions via software user-interface. These 
questions aim to determine the credible set of specific context factors for 
the HFE, assess the values of the relevant PIFs that characterize the 
context, and identify the relevant CFMs. Note that the specific sub-set of 
questions that an analyst would see in analyzing a particular HFE is 
determined dynamically depending on the answers to earlier questions, 
thus reducing the analysis workload. This reflects the fact that situational 




o  Software then generates HEPs and uncertainty distributions based on the 
analyst’s response to questions.  
o For multiple HFEs in the same PRA scenario, the analyst answers   
questions for each HFE in the sequence they appear in the PRA model, 
and the software will then calculate the corresponding conditional 
probabilities.  
In these steps the  analysts only answers questions and is not required to see or 










Appendix A – PIF Sources 























OUR PIFs Groth's PIF IDAC PIFs HRA Good Practice SPAR-H

























































































































□       Label/Mimic/Display Issues
□     Slight changes: Slight change is difficult to detect.
□     Unspecific Alarms: Individual alarms are not specific enough 
pointing to the system problem.
□     Spurious: For example, sensor failure triggered the alarm.
□     Failed: Key alarm failed dark.
□     Misleading Indications: Subset of indicators gave misleading or 
conflicting information.
□     Missing Indications: The primary cue was missing.
□     Distributed: Relevant information distributed over time/space.
□   Feedback: Inadequate system feedback, e.g., long system
response time 
□    Similar Controls
□   Nonstandard Controls: Operates differently from standard
controls or normal conventions. 
Procedures Group
□    Procedure-Scenario Mismatch: Plant conditions do not match 
procedure assumptions.
□    Conflicting Guidance : Conflicting guidance in procedures, 
policies, or practices.
□    Procedure Inadequacy: Confusable words included in the 
















□    Too Formal: Overly formal communication substantially 
delayed/distracted the crew
□    Unclear: Similar sounding words, e.g., increase and decrease.
□    Noise : Noise makes communication difficult.
Communication Availability
□    High Demand: Tight communication/coordination demands within 
MCR.
Team Coordination   Lack of Familiarity: Limited experience in working together
◊        Misplaced Trust: Halo effect (inappropriate assuming that 
unsupervised work is sufficient).
◊        Over Focused: Too involved in individual tasks
◊      Overconfidence
◊        Non-confrontational: Disinclined to confront nonconformance.
  Cohesion Problem: Baggage or historical issues.
Role Awareness
  Personnel Shortage : Shortage of personnel.
  Experience Mix: Challenging mix of experience.
  Personality Mix: Challenging mix of personality types.
Team Training
Knowledge / Abilities Group
  Knowledge Gap: Lack of knowledge or wrong mental model.
◊      Knowledge Gap: Lack of knowledge or experience/skill
  Knowledge Gap: The whole team collectively lacks the required 
knowledge
□       Alarm Unexpected: Alarms are triggered by more than one 
plant malfunctions.  The alarms triggered by one of the malfunctions 
were either not detected or omitted.    
□     Unfamiliar/Unrecognizable Alarm Pattern: Alarm did not 
show recognizable pattern in pointing to the system problem.
□    Unfamiliar: unfamiliar scenario.
  STAR: Fail to stop, think, act, and review.
  No Obvious Causes: e.g., mental lapse and loss of focus.
  Multiple Demands: Multiple competing demands on attention.
  Attention Distracted.
Physical Abilities and Readiness   Slow: slow in thinking, moving, monitoring, and communication.
Bias Group
  Lack of Questioning Attitude : Lack of discussion of concern.
◊      Disrespect: Disrespect of others
Safety Culture
□     Motivation: No reason to check.
□     Ambiguous/Unreliable : Ambiguous/subtle cues.
 Habit Intrusion: Highly practiced response interfered with
desired response.
□     Pre-disposed (Fake-out): Initial symptoms capture thinking 
leading to misdiagnosis.
□     Mismatch: Plant response mismatch prior training/experience.
□    Prior Experience : Plant responses mismatched with prior 
training or experience.






























Task Load Group □    Complex: Complex system dynamics.
Cognitive Complexity   Memory: Demand on memory.
Inherent Cognitive Complexity
Cognitive Complexity External to the Mind □     Masked: Masked cue.





o   Multiple Alarms: Multiple simultaneous alarms causing 
distraction on individual alarm detection or pattern recognition






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix C –Data Sources 
Table C1: NARA GTTs [98] 
ID 
 
GTT Description HEP 95% t-
confidence 
Task Execution 
A1  Carry out a simple single manual action with feedback. 
Skill-based and therefore not necessarily with 
procedures. 
0.005 0.002 – 
0.01 
A2 Start or reconfigure a system from the Main Control 
Room following procedures, with feedback. The 
procedures may require some diagnosis of 
alarms/indications before the need for the action is 
recognised. 
0.001 N/A(only 3 
data points) 
A3 Start or reconfigure a system from a local control panel 
following procedures, with feedback. 
0.002 0.0007 – 
0.006 
A4 Judgement needed for appropriate procedure to be 
followed, based on interpretation of a situation which is 
covered by training at appropriate intervals. 
0.006 N/A 
(only 3 data 
points) 
A5 Completely familiar, well designed highly practised, 
routine task performed to highest possible standards by 
highly motivated, highly trained and experienced person, 
totally aware of implications of failure, with time to 
correct potential errors. 
0.0001 0.000004 – 
0.002 
Ensuring correct plant status and availability of plant resources 
B1  Routine check of plant status. 0.02 0.003 – 0.2 
B2 Restore a single train of a system to correct operational 
status after a test, following procedures. 
0.004 0.0008 – 
0.02 
B3  Set system status as part of routine operations using strict 
administratively controlled procedures, e.g. top up tank 
to correct level. 
0.0007 N/A (only 
3 data 
points) 
B4 Calibrate plant equipment using procedures, e.g. adjust 
set-point. 
0.003 0.0003 – 
0.03 




C1  Simple response to a range of alarms/indications 
providing clear indication of situation (simple diagnosis 
required). Response might be direct execution of simple 
actions or initiating other actions separately assessed. 
0.0004 N/A (only 
1 data 
point) 
C2 Identification of situation requiring interpretation of 
complex pattern of alarms/indications. 
0.2 0.15 – 0.33 
Communication











NARA EPC DESCRIPTION NARA EPC 
Affect 
1 A need to unlearn a technique and apply one 
which requires the application of an opposing 
philosophy. 
24 
2 Unfamiliarity, i.e. a potentially important 
situation which only occurs infrequently or is 
novel. 
20 
3 Time pressure. 11 
4 Low signal to noise ratio. 10 
5 Little or no independent checking or testing of 
output (when normally present) 
10 
6 Difficulties caused by poor shift hand-over 
practices and/or team co-ordination problems 
or friction between team members. 
10 
7 A means of suppressing or over-riding 
information or features which is too easily 
accessible. 
9 
8 No obvious means of reversing an unintended 
action. 
9 
9 Operator inexperience. 8 
10 Information overload, particularly one caused 
by simultaneous presentation of non-
redundant information. 
6 
11 Poor, ambiguous or ill-matched system 
feedback. 
4 
12 Shortfalls in the quality of information 
conveyed by procedures. 
3 
13 Operator under-load/boredom. 3 
14 A conflict between immediate and long-term 
objectives. 
2.5 
15 An incentive to use other more dangerous 
procedures. 
2 
16 Poor environment. 8 
17 No obvious way of keeping track of progress 
during an activity. 
2 
18 High emotional stress and effects of ill health. 2 














Table C3: SPAR-H PIFs and multipliers for both Diagnosis and Action [19] 
 
 





























Table C6: HEP estimates from German NPP operating experience (1/4) [102] 
 
 






Table C6: Continued (3/4) [102] 
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